

**LEARNING TO COOPERATE
NOT TO COOPERATE:
BARGAINING FOR THE 1965
KOREA-JAPAN NORMALIZATION***

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With the conceptual tool of "Pareto optimum" (or "Pareto frontier"), this article offers an explanation as to why the 1965 Korea-Japan normalization was achieved at that particular time. No existing single factor can sufficiently explain the outcome. The exclusive focus of the existing literature on favorable domestic and international conditions only after General Park Chung-hee's military coup in 1961 blinds us to the long-term learning process of the two states. We also need to ask a non-question: Why was normalization so delayed even under favorable conditions at the time? Based on counterfactual analysis, this article argues that without the coup, normalization would have been achieved much faster and in a way more conducive to the genuine Korea-Japan reconciliation. The complicated political situation caused by Park's military coup delayed rather than accelerated the normalization. Refocused analysis suggests that an America-centric approach turns our attention away from the simple but crucial fact that Korea and Japan themselves were most responsible for determining their

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own bilateral relations, and that the U.S. role in Korea-Japan relations was significant but not determining.

Key words: Korea-Japan relations, East Asian politics, Parento frontier

Introduction: Necessity for Refocusing

When we read about the successful conclusion of the 1965 South Korea-Japan (hereafter, Korea-Japan) normalization of relations, we see that most experts focus on the facilitating factors, such as President Park Chung-hee's pragmatic leadership,¹ U.S. pressure,² backdoor networks,³ domestic politics, and the international situation. For instance, criticizing the leadership-focused analysis, Victor Cha argues that⁴

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1. Chong-Sik Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1985); Charles J. Fucello, "South Korean-Japanese Relations in the Cold War: A Journey to Normalization," Ph.D. diss., Department of Political and Social Sciences, New School for Social Research, New York, 1977.
 2. Most studies point to U.S. pressure as an important factor. See Victor D. Cha, "Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty," *Korean Studies*, vol. 20 (University of Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 123-60; Young Gil Chang, "The Normalization of Relations Between Japan and Korea and the Role of the United States East Asian Policy," Ph.D. diss., School of International Service, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1975; Kwan Bong Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971); Ok Yul Kim, "The American Role in Korean-Japanese Relations," Ph.D. diss., Bryn Mawr College, 1967; Soon-Won Lee, "Korean-Japanese Discord, 1945-1965: A Case Study of International Conflict," Ph.D. diss., Rutgers (The State University), New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1967.
 3. Journalistic analyses tend to emphasize this aspect.
 4. Cha's "quasi-alliance model," by employing Glenn H. Snyder's theory of alliance politics and the concept of "alliance security dilemma"—that is, the inverse structure of abandonment/entrapment fears—explains Korea-Japan cooperation and frictions as a function of the U.S. engagement in or disengagement from the Northeast Asian region: When the U.S. disengages from Northeast Asia, there is Korea-Japan cooperation

Another factor critical to the materialization of a treaty in 1965 was the *subtle but significant* efforts of the United States to consolidate the Japan-Korea axis in response to heightened cold-war tensions in the region. . . . By 1964 . . . increasingly tense cold-war circumstances in Asia prompted a *marked change* in U.S. attitudes. . . . The normalization treaty sheds light on the difficulties of using *historical-animosity and leadership variables*. . . . [I]n fact, acute historical animosities and anti-treaty sentiments were present on both sides. . . . Instead, confluence of U.S. cold war security imperatives and domestic realpolitik in Tokyo and Seoul produced the settlement.⁵

Contrary to Cha's emphasis, the U.S. pressure on Korea and Japan to normalize relations had been fundamentally a *constant* factor despite some "subtle" differences in its intensity.⁶ Mean-

because of their *multilateral* symmetric abandonment fears regarding the United States; when the United States engages in the region, there is Korea-Japan friction because of their *bilateral* asymmetric abandonment/entrapment fears. See Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999); Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," *International Organization*, vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter, 1991), pp. 121-42; Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring, 1990), pp. 103-23; and Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, vol. 36, No. 4 (July, 1984), pp. 461-95.

5. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, pp. 28, 34. Emphasis added.

6. This point is against conventional wisdom and can be controversial. However, I do not intend to imply that U.S. policy was constant over time. Rather, I argue, U.S. pressure on Korea and Japan to strengthen the weakest leg of the triangular alignment had been constantly exerted. U.S. disengagement from the region can also be understood as a method of indirect U.S. pressure. Even if we admit that the U.S. pressure (or "marked change in U.S. attitudes") was the decisive factor for the final achievement of normalization, Cha's separate analysis of the normalization process is not based on his own theoretical framework's main causal variable—that is, the structure of abandonment/entrapment fears affected by the U.S. engagement or disengagement. U.S. pressure is positively correlated with the U.S. engagement policy. According to the quasi-alliance model, the strong U.S. engagement in this period should have generated Korea-Japan *frictions*. Therefore, the achievement of normalization in the period of U.S. engagement must be a *deviant* case for the quasi-alliance model. By emphasizing U.S. pressure to explain the success of normalization, Cha is undermining his own model's validity.

while, Cha downplays the significance of the normalization as he argues that the signing of a basic relations treaty hardly represented the start of a new era of amiable relations, pointing out mass demonstrations against the settlement and residual animosity in the years immediately following the signing of the treaty.⁷ However, as I will substantiate, his argument is founded on selective evidence.⁸ After the normalization treaty was signed, Korea-Japan cooperation actually accelerated, even before the Nixon Doctrine in 1969.⁹

This article seeks to explain why normalization of relations was achieved in 1965. No single cause sufficiently explains the particular outcome. All the factors mentioned above played some positive roles in the normalization process. However, this article introduces a different perspective.

First, because the Korea-Japan normalization treaty was achieved by President Park's administration, the existing literature tends to emphasize various facilitating factors that were present during the period of 1961-1965. Scholars naturally have paid attention to the negotiations that took place between 1961 and

For an analysis of disengagement hypothesis and the U.S. pressure hypothesis, see Seongji Woo, "Naengjŏn sigi han'guk-ilbon hyŏpnyŏk ūi pŏjŭl: pulgaeip gasŏl tae gaeip-yŏnhap chŏngch'i gasŏl" (Explaining South Korea-Japanese Cooperation during the Cold War Era: Disengagement Hypothesis vs. Engagement-Coalition Politics Hypothesis), *Han'guk chŏngch'i hakhoebo* (Korean Political Science Review), vol. 37, No. 3 (September, 2003).

7. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, p. 59.

8. For instance, the U.S. policies have multiple and contradictory effects on Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, focusing on only one causal chain can lead to the analyst's selective bias. For elaboration, see Tae-Ryong Yoon, "Searching for a New Paradigm for Korea-Japan Relations," *Kukje kwan'gye yŏn'gu* (IRI Review), vol. 12, No. 2 (Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University, Fall 2007), pp. 189-94, available at http://ilminkor.org/board/bbs/board.php?bo_table=intRel&wr_id=129.

9. 1969 is the starting point for Cha's main analysis, when the Nixon Doctrine intensified Korea-Japan abandonment fears regarding the United States and thus stimulated Korea-Japan cooperation. Cha tends to ignore variations in Korea-Japan relations over the long period of 1945-1969, and emphasizes the conflictive aspects shown in the pre-Nixon Doctrine period. It is Cha's quasi-alliance model itself that forces the analyst to see only the "dark side" of the Korea-Japan relationship in the era of U.S. engagement.

1965. However, this exclusive attention to the 1961-1965 period blinds us to the long-term *learning process* of the two states since their first conference in 1951. Therefore, what is needed is a long-term focused analysis of the process.

Second, after the coup on May 16, 1961, Korea and Japan agreed to resume the sixth round of normalization talks on October 20, 1961 and the seventh round on December 3, 1964. After four more years of tough bargaining, normalization of relations was finally achieved on June 22, 1965. Given the favorable situation, such as strong U.S. pressure, economic needs, and the political leaders' strong incentives and determination, a question not yet raised begs the asking: Why was the normalization of relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in this period accomplished in only four years?

Employing the concept of "Pareto frontier," the following section provides an analysis of the ways that Korea and Japan learned to "solve the unsolvable issues" related to their incompatible "conflict of interests." The reason for delayed settlement is then analyzed by examining the nationwide anti-normalization movements in both states. I argue that normalization of relations would have been achieved much faster and in a way more conducive to the genuine Korea-Japan reconciliation but for the 1961 military coup in Seoul. The complexity of dissidents' democratic movement against Park's dictatorship delayed rather than accelerated the normalization process.

Learning by Failures, and Cooperation by Avoidance

In the wake of the Korean War, throughout the 1950s and in the first half of the 1960s, there was a certain level of common threat perceived by the United States, Japan, and the ROK. This kept the United States engaged in the Korean peninsula, and kept its troops stationed there as a "tripwire." In this cold-war context, the U.S. pressure—one aspect of the U.S. engagement policy—for Japan and the ROK to strengthen their relations was a constant factor, by virtue of which it cannot explain the variations in Korea-Japan relations.

Different Identities and Grand Strategies, and Japan's Entrapment Fears

The most fundamental reason for the discordant Korea-Japan relations is that the two states had severe political disputes caused by conflicts of interest. Though the cold-war structure was firmly set, Japan did not fully commit itself to the defense of South Korea because of Japanese fears of entrapment in the cold-war politics. The Yoshida Doctrine was the result of compromise between these entrapment fears and Japan's abandonment fears regarding the United States.¹⁰ It was difficult for Japan to conduct staunch anti-communist policies toward the Korean peninsula because of its post-World War II pacifism¹¹ and because Japan's conservative leadership could not ignore the socialist and communist political forces within Japan.¹²

Japan's self-identity—whether to identify itself as a friend, enemy, or neutral state regarding Korea—was formed under international and domestic influence. Internationally, the United States and ROK exerted pressure on Japan to be an “enemy” of

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10. For a discussion of institutionalization of the Yoshida doctrine in Japan's defense policy, see Sun-Ki Chai, “Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization,” *International Organization*, vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), pp. 389-412.
 11. For discussions of the effects of the post-war pacifism on Japan's foreign policy, see Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” *International Security*, vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter, 2001/02), pp. 153-85; idem, “Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” *International Security*, vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 84-118; idem, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, East Asian Program, 1993); Thomas Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism,” *International Security*, vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 119-50.
 12. For a discussion of the long-term LDP rule in Japan where LDP was flexible enough to incorporate socialist agendas into its policy platform despite veto power of JSP (Japan Socialist Party), see Gerald L. Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
 13. For discussions of the effects of the post-war pacifism on Japan's foreign policy, see Katzenstein and Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security”; idem, “Japan's National Security”; and idem, *Japan's National Security*; also see Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum.”

communism. Domestically, the Japanese government was under pressure not to establish any military alliances. However, Japan concluded a security pact with the United States for its own interest: The Japanese conservatives needed U.S. support for their political survival. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru took advantage of the U.S. protection while pouring national energy into economic development. However, alliance with the United States was an exceptional decision. The Japanese leaders judged that benefits from the alliance relationship with the most powerful state in the world outweighed its side effects. They did not want a military alliance with the ROK, however, as they had to consider their relations with China and the Soviet Union, which were “clear friends” of North Korea. Therefore, having an intentionally “ambiguous identity” regarding neighboring states was the choice of Japanese leaders in the early 1950s.

Meanwhile, the ROK conservative leaders judged that their national interest would be best served by clearly allying with the United States. In terms of ROK self-identity, it could not but be a “clear enemy” of North Korea. Korea and Japan conducted normalization talks, yet were pursuing different grand strategies due to incompatible self-identities. Historical animosity was all the more exacerbated by this conflicting interest regarding the two states’ policies toward North Korea. Therefore, judging by realist logic alone and without employing the historical-animosity variable, it is natural that the two states hit bumpy roads on the path toward normalization. Both needed time to adjust the conflicting interests, or time to solve the unsolvable—that is, to learn to shelve their fundamental political disputes so as to meet more immediate needs. In this sense, the previous “failures” brought about the “success” of normalization in 1965. Through those repeated failures, they gradually *learned how not to fail*.

Long-term Learning through Short-term Failures

Table 1 briefly summarizes the negotiation process of the normalization talks.

As seen in *Table 1*, Korea and Japan held seven rounds of talks to discuss normalization, excluding numerous preliminary meetings. Even during the First Republic led by President Rhee Syngman—notorious for his anti-Japanism—there were four

Table 1. Outline of the Korea-Japan Normalization Talks, 1951-1965¹⁴

Dates	Regimes	Chief Delegates	Characteristics
First Conference: October 20, 1951 - April 21, 1952	Rhee	Yang Yu-Ch'an	Agreed on agenda and established committees. Adjourned because of conflict over Japanese property claims in Korea. (Started through good offices offered by SCAP in Japan.)
	Yoshida	Matsumoto Shinichi	
Second Conference: April 15, 1953 - July 23, 1953	Rhee	Kim Yun-Sik	Nothing accomplished. Conflicts over "Rhee Line" and property claims predominated. (Adjourned by the request of Japan after the Armistice of the Korean War was concluded and Geneva Political Conference was agreed to be held.)
	Yoshida	Okura Katzuo	
Third Conference: October 6, 1953 - October 26, 1953	Rhee	Yang Yu-Ch'an	Ruptured because of controversial remarks made by Kubota Kanichiro. (Controversy on "Rhee Line" continued; Japan insisted on Japanese property claims in Korea.)
	Yoshida	Kubota Kanichiro	
Fourth Conference: April 15, 1958 - April 19, 1960	Rhee	Yim Byöng-Jik	Reopened through Kim-Fujiyama accord of December 31, 1957. Preoccupied with the new issue: Japanese repatriation of Koreans to North Korea. Adjourned three times. (Japan withdrew the property claims in Korean and retracted Kubota's statement; Agreed on a mutual release of detained Japanese fishermen and detained illegal Korean residents in Japan; Controversy on "Rhee Line" continued; Adjourned by April 19 Student Uprising in Korea.)
	Kishi	Sawada Renzo	

14. Compiled from Soon-Won Lee, "Korean-Japanese Discord, 1945-1965: A Case Study of International Conflict," Ph.D. diss., Graduate, Rutgers (The State University), New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1967; Wön Yong-Sök, *Han-Il hoedam sipsanyöñ* (Fourteen Years of Korea-Japan Normalization Talks) (Seoul, Korea: Samhwa Ch'ulp'ansa: Ch'ongp'an Üryu Munhwasa, 1965).

Fifth Conference: January 25, 1961 - May 16, 1961	Chang	Yu Chin-O	Considerable improvements in relations; Chang government was overturned by the coup before concrete results were achieved. (Started to discuss the Korean property claims on the basis of 8 items proposed by the ROK side; Adjourned by the military coup on May 16, 1961.)
	Ikeda	Sawada Renzo	
Sixth Conference: October 20, 1961 - March 24, 1964	Park	Pae Ŭi-Hwan	Dragged on intermittently after failure to reach a settlement at the end of 1962. Marked by several summit meetings (Park-Ikeda in November 1961, and Kim Jong Pil-Ikeda in March and October 1962) and a ministerial meeting in March 1962, which helped to narrow differences. (Agreed on the Korean property claims by Kim Jong Pil-Ohira Memorandum in October 1962; Discussed fishery problems; Held talks between two agricultural ministers on March 1963; Adjourned by March 24 demonstration.)
	Ikeda	Sugi Michisuke	
Seventh Conference: December 3, 1964 - April 3, 1965	Park	Kim Tong-Jo	Was able to draft a basic treaty on February 20, 1965; further agreements before April 3; normalization treaty signed on June 22, 1965. (Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo visited Seoul on February 17, 1965.)
	Sato	Ushiba Nobuhiko	

rounds of talks. Despite the repeated failures, the significance of the very fact that a series of negotiations did continue at all cannot be underestimated. Moreover, regardless of the failures, Korea-Japan relations were *always* better than Japan-North Korea relations: Throughout the cold-war period, Japan never tried to hold official government-to-government negotiations to discuss normalization of relations with North Korea. Japan's trade relations with North Korea were extremely limited because Japan was fearful of irritating South Korea.

The continuation of normalization talks suggests that com-

mon threats led the two governments to make efforts to improve their relations. The repeated resumption of talks was not largely because the two states had to “pretend” to want to cooperate due to the U.S. pressure to do so, but mainly because both states saw this as being in their own best interest. States want to maintain good relations with neighboring states—which is itself in their common interest—if it is possible.¹⁵ Of course, this is neither to suggest that a state’s wish for a good relationship is always or even easily translated into reality, nor to imply that all states are peace-oriented.

However, the reason that neighboring states often have political disputes is not that they do not have incentives to cooperate, but that a good relationship is not easy to achieve due to conflicting interests or inevitable security dilemma between two distrusting states. In the case of ROK-Japan-DPRK relations, Japan wanted to maintain good relations with both Koreas. However, it was impossible for Japan to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea first under the cold-war situation in which the United States, Japan’s most important ally, was the enemy of North Korea. Thus, a certain type of Korea-Japan normalization (which did not foreclose the possibility of normalization with North Korea) was the second-best option for Japan. Therefore, fundamentally, Korea-Japan relations continued to evolve not merely because of external factors alone, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because of their own consideration of national interests—possible absolute gains obtainable from the normalization of relations.

In particular, Japan did not pursue normalization of relations in order to gain short-term economic or military support from South Korea against the North Korean threat; instead, Japan sought normalization largely to benefit its long-term economic development. Japan’s main concern was expanding its export and investment markets to South Korea. Even for South Korea, the goal was not to obtain direct military support from Japan, but mainly to gain economic and political support. Never-

15. A state’s *Realpolitik* calculation doesn’t necessarily lead to frictions with the neighbors. See Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” *International Security*, vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994/95), pp. 50-90.

theless, the Korea-Japan normalization of relations itself was not the first priority in each government's directory of national interests. Their self-identities and core interests, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, could not be compromised for the sake of normalization. Thus, only after the two figured out a *modus vivendi*—a method of allowing the existence of “intended ambiguity” in their relations and a method of putting the uncompromisable issues on the back burner—in the process of repeated failures and resumptions that they came to succeed.

In this process of “learning by failure,” the failures of the negotiations were not solely the result of useless and emotional demands stemming from historical animosity. Rather, they were the result of each state's *realpolitik* desire to satisfy its own interest at the expense of the other's interest. Nevertheless, failures themselves helped provide the basis for future cooperation between the two states. As Robert Jervis once put it,

How we judge a policy may also depend on the *time span* we examine. *Defection in one instance can produce mutual cooperation over the long run.* Indeed, one implication of the theorizing about anarchy is that cooperation is enforced by the possibility of defection. . . . [I]n the situations we are trying to analyze, *these distinctions [of cooperation and defection], and the answers to the questions whether the behavior is seen as cooperative or not, are subjective if not artificial.*¹⁶

In light of the time span, the previous failures in the process of the Korea-Japan normalization talks should not necessarily be considered failures because they may have helped one side to learn to refrain from irritating the other side by demanding the unacceptable in a following round. This is confirmed by the fact that the two governments gradually narrowed down the gaps between their positions.

For instance, the first conference was held through the good offices of the Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP) under the condition that, at Japan's request, the talks focus solely on the legal status of Korean residents in Japan. However, once the talks started, the two sides agreed to extend the agenda at

16. Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” *World Politics*, vol. 40 (April, 1988), p. 330; emphasis added.

Korea's request. After the third round broke off due to the statements by Kubota Kanichiro, to reopen the talks the Japanese government withdrew its property claims in Korea and officially retracted Kubota's statement. After that, at the official negotiation table, the Japanese side did not repeat Kubota's position justifying Japan's colonial rule.

Moreover, at the time of the seventh conference, Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina visited Seoul on February 17, 1965 and announced: "The two states had an unfortunate time in a part of the long diplomatic history of the two states. It is very regretful, and [I am (or we are)] deeply reflecting (*hansei*) it."¹⁷ This was the first public statement from a high official of the Japanese government in which the words "regret" or "reflection" (*hansei*) were used in regard to Japan's past.¹⁸ Clearly, the Japanese side decided to refrain from provoking the ROK on the matter of interpretation of history. Although the Japanese government did not officially apologize for Japan's colonial rule over Korea, it learned to refrain, at least during the negotiation period, from instigating anti-Japanese feelings among the Koreans by making provocative remarks.

The ROK government also learned to make compromises. It not only gave up the controversial "Rhee Line," but also cut down the number of Korean property claims. At Japan's request it also tacitly agreed not to use the terms "deportation" or "forced repatriation" regarding the issue of repatriation of Koreans (living in Japan) to North Korea. The ROK government did not go as far as to ask Japan to give up claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima (hereafter, Dokdo) islets officially and publicly through a treaty provision.

It is safe to say that at least both sides "learned by their failures" to differentiate where compromise could be made and where it could not. Although neither side was satisfied with the final results, the two agreed on the normalization pact. However, insofar as their perceptions of core self-interests did not change, what was deemed uncompromisable would remain the source of

17. *Who* is reflecting was not clear in his statement. The Japanese word *hansei* could mean either self-examination or apology. But he did not use the word "apology."


18. Yi Tong-Wŏn, *Taet'ongryŏng ūl kŭrimyŏ* (I Miss President Park) (Seoul, Korea: Koryŏwŏn, 1992), p. 207.

friction between Korea and Japan in the future—the Dokdo issue being one example.

Cooperating Not to Cooperate and Allowing the Other to Save Face

In this context, it is important to examine the way in which the two states avoided conflict by purposely making sensitive issues not so salient. In this examination, the following model may prove useful as an analytical tool.

Figure 1. Model of Bargaining for the Korea-Japan Normalization



*Q is a status quo.
 * U_N = State N's utility function

In Figure 1, Pareto frontier (AA') is a sort of threshold that is very difficult to reach from the status quo (Q). In terms of absolute gains in state utilities, it *should* be easy to do so. However, in the case of the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan,

reaching agreements required a series of endless negotiations in which *relative gains* problems occurred.¹⁹ An overall bilateral relationship is also constituted by a series of agreements through the bargaining process. In this bargaining process, the overall atmosphere of negotiation and political skills as well as calculation of self-interests were important. However, "self-interest" is formed and perceived by each "self." Therefore, subjective utilities could be different from the real or objective ones. In light of this model, I examine the two states' political bargaining (or political decision making) for the Korea-Japan normalization.

To move from Q (status quo) to A3 or A4 (the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan) was clearly beneficial to both Japan and South Korea. However, even though the two states preferred to go to these points, they may have disagreed about whether to choose A3 or A4 because at either point relative gains concerns could become a problem. Moreover, because of historical animosity the objective agreement point A3 or A4 might be misperceived as if it were A1. Or, the two states' different perceptions on a certain value, especially a value perceived by both as being related to national prestige, could create a deadlock situation. This kind of deadlock situation would have been highly likely to lead to a breakdown of the bargaining

19. For Grieco's early view on a state's *relative/absolute gains concern*, see Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 485-507; idem, *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). For his changed view, idem, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: the Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Joseph M. Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal, "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 87, No. 3 (September, 1993), pp. 729-35. Also see Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," *International Organization*, vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 313-44; Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics*, vol. 43 (April, 1991), pp. 336-66.

process. All this means that perception, subjective utilities, as well as objective self-interests, if they exist at all,²⁰ will each play a role in a specific bargaining situation (as well as in a general state relationship).

In a strict sense, normalization of relations was achieved neither because the two states succeeded in narrowing the perceptual gaps on issues pertaining to history or self-interests, nor because they agreed to move to a satisfactory consensual optimal point on the Pareto frontier. Rather, they succeeded in avoiding or delaying the solution of sensitive issues, such as the territorial dispute concerning Dokdo or the problem of recognition of the ROK as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula (which was related to Japan's North Korea policy). In other words, they did not agree on exactly where they were on the Pareto frontier, but each side argued to its domestic audiences as if the two sides were at an agreed certain point on the Pareto frontier, although each one's interpretation was different.

As it was, the Japanese government argued that the two states agreed to go to point A₃, while the ROK government argued that they agreed to go to point A₄. However, these different interpretations about what was agreed upon were not the result of the negotiators' follies or carelessness, but their *deliberate choice* for achieving normalization of relations at that moment. Therefore, they agreed to solve the problem of normalization not by agreeing to solve all of the related issues, but by agreeing to delay the solution of some of the most fundamental and controversial issues. In a word, they *agreed not to cooperate too much*. Therefore, even after the normalization treaty was signed, the seeds of friction remained.

For instance, in Article 3 of the "Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan" signed by South Korean Foreign Minister Yi Tong-Wŏn (Tong Won Lee) and Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo, the two states agreed on the following: "It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea *as specified* in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly" (emphasis mine).²¹ This was to be the most controversial part of

20. Objective self-interest may not exist at all because political "values" are always "political," therefore subjective.

21. "Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan,"

their agreement.

The ROK government held the view that Japan, by concluding the treaty, recognized the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea over the whole Korean peninsula as provided for in the constitution of the ROK. Public statements and testimony of Korean leaders made it clear that the government only envisaged Japan's recognition of the ROK and Japan's refraining from maintaining any relations with the DPRK (North Korea). On the other hand, the Japanese government argued that Article 3 must be interpreted in the light of General Assembly Resolution 195 (III) and must not be construed to specify the jurisdiction of the treaty application area. After the normalization treaty was signed, in the Japanese Diet Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo stated without reservation that "the area of the treaty application is limited only to the area where the present jurisdiction of South Korea extends." Prime Minister Sato Eisaku indicated that although Japan could not maintain diplomatic relations with North Korea because of this treaty, his government could take the same attitude or posture toward North Korea "as before because he could not ignore the existence of the North Korean regime." He declared that Japan could not negate "the fact that another authority is actually controlling North Korea." He promised that he would deal with North Korea "on a case by case basis." Thus, the Japanese government refused to accept the South Korean government's interpretation and made it clear that Japan would maintain informal relations with North Korea even though Japan could not officially recognize the DPRK.²²

Previously, Resolution 195 (III) passed at the UN General Assembly on December 12, 1948 specified that:

There has been established a lawful government (the Government of Republic of Korea), having effective control and *jurisdiction over that part of Korea* where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid express of the free will of electorate of that part of Korea and

Wŏn Yong-Sŏk, *Han-Il hoedam sipsanyŏn* (Fourteen Years of Korea-Japan Normalization Talks), pp. 295-96.

22. Chang, "The Normalization of Relations Between Japan and Korea," pp. 236-38.

which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is *the only such government* in Korea.²³

It is clear from this phrase, and considering the entire situation, that the United Nations recognized the ROK as the only legitimate government with jurisdiction over the southern part of the Korean peninsula. The UN did not approve the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. Superficially, it appears that Japan and the ROK were at odds over Article 3 of the treaty because they mistakenly used a semantically ambiguous sentence. However, it was a controversy of the two governments' own deliberate making. Such controversy after the successful conclusion of the normalization treaty was not unprecedented, however.

Before the military coup, as the prospects of a real settlement drew nearer under the Chang Myŏn government,²⁴ the issue of legal implications came to the fore. This was a difficult problem for Japan, where the socialist opposition tended to support North Korea. The Japanese confidentially raised this subject with the United States, which maintained that in view of UN recognition, the ROK was competent to negotiate a settlement.²⁵ This implied that the United States could approve Japan's posture if the issue

23. "Text of Joint Resolution," *Department of State Bulletin*, December 19, 1948 (No. 494), p. 728; emphasis added.

24. If the Chang Myŏn government had not been toppled down by the coup, it would have achieved normalization much faster with all the favorable conditions: economic needs and U.S. pressure. For a detailed counterfactual analysis of Korea-Japan negotiation for the normalization under the Chang Myŏn government, see Tae-Ryong Yoon, "Fragile Cooperation: Net Threat Theory and Japan-Korea-U.S. Relations," Ph.D. diss., Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, New York, 2006 (available at <http://digitalcommons.libraries.columbia.edu/dissertations/AAI3203774/>). For discussions of the necessity of counterfactual analysis in social science research, see Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, ed., *Counterfactual Thoughts Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics*, vol. 43, No. 2 (January, 1990), pp. 169-95.

25. Donald Stone Macdonald, *U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record—An Interpretative Summary of the Archives of the U.S. Department of State for the Period of 1945 to 1965* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 122.

were settled with the ROK through negotiations.

In his memoir, Yi Tong-Wŏn (Tong Won Lee), ROK foreign minister at that time, records the backdoor negotiations with Minister Shiina Etsusaburo as follows:

The *issue of jurisdiction* was a delicate one. Although Korea is divided into North and South Korea, we argued that the ROK government is the only legitimate government. Nevertheless, *understandably* Japan cannot regard the North Korean regime as a puppet regime as we do. . . . (I cannot but use *the last card* thinking that unless it works, all our efforts will turn out to be in vain.) The card I presented [to Shiina] was actually a very simple one. I asked the Japanese side *to leave room for the two parties to interpret the Article differently on each own purpose by deliberately* combining the two issues of legitimacy and jurisdiction and diluting the arguments of both sides. By not mentioning the issue of jurisdiction but just explicitly putting down “the only lawful government” of UN Resolution, we conceded one step on the issue of legitimacy while Japan conceded one step on the issue of jurisdiction.²⁶

The bargaining card presented by the ROK side was accepted by the Japanese. As it was, although the two sides could not publicly accept the other’s argument, they privately agreed to accept the reality that Japan, for its own interest and for domestic reasons, could not publicly go as far as to make North Korea one of its clear-cut enemies, as it would leave Japan no room to keep even private-level contact with North Korea.

This secret agreement on intentionally using vague wording was intended to let each side save face when confronting domestic political opposition. More importantly for Japan, “intended ambiguity” was also necessary as an expedient measure so as not to provoke China, the Soviet Union, or North Korea, which were vehemently opposed to the Korea-Japan normalization treaty as “an aggressive U.S.-Korea-Japan military alliance” aimed at socialist countries.²⁷ In short, this compromise was a desperate measure to relieve Japan’s bilateral entrapment fears by rendering open the legal possibility of its negotiation for normalization

26. Yi, *Taet’ongryŏng ŭl kŭrimyŏ*, pp. 215, 230; emphasis added.

27. Morton Abramowitz, “Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers” (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), *Adelphi Paper*, No. 80.

with North Korea in the future. It is especially interesting that South Korea's Foreign Minister Yi (Lee) expressed his understanding on the difficulties Japan faced in regard to the two Koreas, though he could not do so in public.

The Dokdo Issue as an Example

The diplomats also privately and tacitly agreed that the issue of title to Dokdo would not be mentioned in the treaty provisions, thus deliberately prolonging the territorial dispute. Once again, the two states *cooperated in deciding not to cooperate*.²⁸ The case of the territorial dispute²⁹ between Japan and ROK is often referred to as an example of historical animosity between the two states. One argument claims that the two states cannot avoid frictions on "even the smallest of issues"³⁰—like the Dokdo issue—when their relations are strained. The point of those who resort to this kind of argument is that the territorial dispute over Dokdo is basically an irrational and emotional fight over infinitesimal gains, and that such a fuss is just an expression of historical animosity; therefore, when the relations between the two were good, they don't make a fuss over such a small issue. However, simply speaking, this argument does not fit either with empirical reality or with realism's theoretical expectation.

For instance, a territorial dispute is not just a matter of the size of the disputed territory; it is a matter of national interest and sovereignty. From the standpoint of a state's *realpolitik*, nothing is more important than territorial integrity and national sovereignty. For Korea, the Dokdo issue is also related to the problem of fishing area. Whether Dokdo is included in or excluded from the ROK territory makes a significant difference in determining the scope of exclusive fishing waters. Moreover,

28. For the private conversation between Ministers Yi and Shiina at the last moment of their bargaining, see Yi, *Taet'ongryŏng ūl kŭrimyŏ*, pp. 220-21.

29. The ROK government's official posture is that there is "no territorial dispute" between the two states, rejecting an official discussion of the matter with Japan.

30. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, pp. 158, 192; idem, "Alignment Despite Antagonism: Japan and Korea as Quasi-Allies," Ph.D. diss., Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, New York, 1994, p. 396.

even though Dokdo is small in size, it is a symbol of national independence and national prestige. Therefore, it is not that irrational and emotional historical animosity brings about territorial disputes, but that political disputes on this significant matter of self-interest make the historical animosity salient when the disputes occur. Whether Korea-Japan relations are good or bad, the territorial dispute, if it erupts again, will strain their relations.

Second, both the ROK government and the Korean people perceive the issue of Dokdo as more important than anything else. Therefore, the possibility that the ROK government will concede on this matter is remote. It is probable that the Japanese government recognizes that it cannot obtain by any means what it calls Takeshima. Therefore, if some other issues are more urgent (but not necessarily more important) to be solved between the two states, Japan tends to be silent on the territorial issue. It is not that the two states are silent on the issue when their relations are good; rather, it is when they feel urgent necessity to advance political cooperation in other areas that they tend to keep silent. Therefore, we should not put the cart before the horse by arguing that "Neither the Japanese nor the South Korean government refers to Dokdo or Takeshima when their relations are cordial."³¹

The ROK government is never first to bring up the Dokdo issue. The ROK believes that time is on South Korea's side because it has occupied the islets since the end of World War II. The ROK government wants to make it a *fait accompli*. It is always the Japanese side that breaks the silence on this issue. Thus, when Japan's cooperative incentives are great, it tends to be silent. But that doesn't mean that the other issues are more important than this so-called "insignificant issue." If it had been really insignificant, the dispute would have been solved a long time ago. On the contrary, because the issue itself is such an important one, it will erupt time and again until one side gives up.³²

31. This view, which Cha wholeheartedly accepts, is originally from Chong-Sik Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension*, p. 120.

32. For detailed analyses of the Dokdo issue (written in Korean), see Han'guk Chöngsin Munje Yön'guso, *Tokto yön'gu* (Study on Tokto Island) (Seoul, Korea: Han'guk Chöngsin Munje Yön'guso, 1996); Sin Yong-Ha, "Tokto munje wa Tokto yöngyukwön kwisok" (The Issue of Tokto and Its Restoration of Dominion), *Ilbon P'yöngron* (Commentaries on Japan)

It is evident that if both sides had insisted on carrying their points to the last, normalization of relations would have been aborted once again. Therefore, they made a tacit deal that both sides would refrain from arguing this matter. At that time, the territorial dispute was avoided because the two sides needed political cooperation to achieve normalization. The territorial dispute had to be shelved not because their relations were already good, but because they wanted to improve their relations in other areas first.

In other words, Korea-Japan cooperative incentives affect the level of actual cooperation within the limit of each government's perception of its own core national interests. As long as this perception remains unchanged, volatile confrontation can be expected to erupt from time to time. Therefore, it is a great mistake to see such a matter of core national interest as "the smallest of issues."

Anti-Normalization Movements

From 1961 to 1965, anti-normalization movements in both Japan and South Korea slowed down the process of both settling outstanding issues at the initial stage of negotiations and ratifying them at the final stage. Cha sees anti-normalization movements in this period as caused by the lack of outward cooperative incentives between the two states because of the asymmetric structure of abandonment/entrapment fears in the period of U.S. engagement. He argues that "significantly different dynamics prevailed" in the pre- and post-Nixon Doctrine period of 1969-1971.³³ However, we should be cautious not to lose sight of another aspect of *realpolitik* concerns by overemphasizing the role of U.S. pressure. Both the ROK government and the Korean people commonly held *fears of losing autonomy* regarding Japan; however, the two governments' cooperative incentives were

(Spring/Summer, 1993); See also Sung-Hwa Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945-1952* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 68-69.

33. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, p. 59.

strong enough to overcome the anti-normalization movement forces.

The feeling that Japan had committed many atrocities against the Korean people and that Japan should apologize for the past before any normalization of relations took place was widely shared by most Koreans, including the leaders of the ROK government.³⁴ At this juncture, it is interesting to note that even General Park Chung-hee (who is *both* praised for his pragmatic and strong leadership in achieving the normalization of relations with Japan and criticized as a “national traitor” or “pro-Japanist” by the opponents for his pro-Japanese policy lines) expressed his concerns regarding Korea-Japan economic cooperation and the issue of Japan’s apology on the past atrocities:

[T]he Korean Hostilities made great contributions to the recovery of Japan’s economy, providing Japan with a starting point for further development. Historically, the improvement of Japan’s economy necessitated the sacrifice of Korea, either deliberately or accidentally, and it is ironical that the post-war rehabilitation of Japan also required such sacrifice. . . . We cannot overlook the possibility that so-called *economic cooperation with Japan* may bring forth *another form of Japanese aggression against Korea*.³⁵

After he was elected as civilian president in 1963, Park visited West Germany in December 1964 and talked with German Chancellor Erhard, who recommended that President Park hasten normalization of relations with Japan, following the example of German-French relations. President Park responded as follows:

Korea-Japan relations should be normalized as soon as possible. . . . But Korea-Japan relations are different from German-French relations. You fought each other fairly with might and main. Thus it is also easy to apologize and correct the past wrongdoings. However, *we were stabbed in the back* [by the Japanese] without having a chance to fight a war with Japan. . . . That’s why our people have bad feelings toward them.³⁶

34. Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System*, p. 45.

35. Chung Hee Park, *Our Nation’s Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction* (Seoul, Korea: Hollym Corporation Publishers, 1st ed., 1962; 2nd ed., 1970), pp. 154, 158-59; emphasis added.

36. Yi, *Taet’ongryöng üll kürimyö*, pp. 98-100; emphasis added.

Park's comments reveal that there was no fundamental difference between the ROK government and the opposition in their perceptions on the past history of Japanese colonialism. Park also did recognize the necessity of taking appropriate measures to prevent Korea from being dominated by foreign capital.³⁷ Both the ROK government and the opponents of the normalization negotiations commonly feared the possible re-domination of South Korea by Japanese capital. Both the previous Chang Myŏn and Park Chung-hee regimes shared fears of losing autonomy regarding Japan, and thus tried to avoid relying on Japanese capital alone by establishing an international consortium for Korea's economic development.

Although both Koreans and Japanese at various times spoke of an international consortium or consultative group to coordinate foreign assistance to Korea, the first mention of such an idea was by the ROK chargé d'affaires, Ko Kwang-rim (Koh Kwang-lim), under the Chang Myŏn government in January 1961. In a conversation with a State Department official, David Bane, Ko attributed to Professor Edwin O. Reischauer (then at Harvard University, later ambassador to Japan) the concept of an American guarantee that *economic assistance from Japan would not lead to political domination*. Reischauer had noted, also, according to Ko, that Korea would require aid from many nations, which would have to be coordinated. At that time, the State Department reaction was not enthusiastic, but the idea grew both as a way of reassuring the Koreans and as a parallel to multilateral coordinating arrangements in other countries.³⁸

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) discussed aid to Korea in December 1962. However, little interest was shown, in the absence of a settlement with Japan, and there was considerable embarrassment when failure of the discussions was reported in the press. An ROK foreign ministry official in November 1963 proposed to the Canadians that they participate with the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Australia in a \$1.9 billion consortium with World

37. Chung Hee Park, *Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 159-60.

38. Macdonald, *U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance*, p. 135.

Bank sponsorship to cover the foreign exchange requirements of the Korean five-year development plan. In 1964, both Korean and Japanese press stories referred to the idea, and the Japanese foreign ministry considered a proposal for a DAC consultative group. The United States also floated the idea of a consulting group in the DAC meeting of July 1964. In March 1965 the ROK foreign ministry formally proposed to the United States the establishment of an international group, *initially without Japan*, but in the U.S. and World Bank view, Japanese participation was essential. A consulting group that included Japan was eventually formed and held its first meeting in London in May 1968, although the World Bank was still not committed to it at that time.³⁹

Therefore, the ROK government, whether under Chang or Park, tried to diversify the sources of foreign capital to avoid overdependence on Japan and the resultant increase of Japanese political influence on Korea. But the Korean leaders were not very successful in attracting capital from other than Japan.

Given all this discussion, the real debate between the ROK government and the political opponents at that time was not *whether* to normalize relations with Japan, but how and *when* the issues between Japan and the ROK should be settled in order to bring about a just and equal settlement that would be still advantageous to the interests of the ROK. Among 103 national assemblymen who responded to a survey conducted by the *Chosun Ilbo* in January 1964, those who favored the earliest settlement and those who were in favor of postponement were almost equally divided. As well, the debates that continued created a massive and intense political crisis in the ROK, with political forces mobilized in favor of and in opposition to normalization, as the governments of Korea and Japan carried out their negotiations.⁴⁰

It is especially interesting that leaders of the opposition such as Yun Po-Sŏn (former president) and Chŏng Il-Hyŏng (former foreign minister), who were vehemently opposed to the normalization and led nationwide anti-normalization movements during Park's regime, were the very leaders who pursued normal-

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-36.

40. Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System*, p. 95.

ization of relations between Korea and Japan during the previous Chang Myŏn regime.⁴¹ Therefore, anti-normalization movements at that time should be understood not as merely an eruption of anti-Japanese sentiments, but also as anti-Park and pro-democracy movements. In other words, while the Park regime was pursuing normalization in the interest of his regime (or for the national interest in its view) despite holding similarly negative sentiments of its own toward Japan, the opponents tried to magnify and utilize anti-Japanese sentiments among the Korean people in order to further their own political interest (or for the national interest in their view).

The anti-normalization movements in the ROK should be examined in the context of internal contradictions disclosed while South Korea was undergoing the April 19 student uprising (or democratic revolution) in 1960 and May 16 military coup in 1961. Had it not been for the Korean people's discontent with the military government's suppression of the people's nationalist and democratic demands, anti-normalization movements would not have developed into persistent and nationwide movements. At the initial stage of the coup (when the military junta appealed for popular support both by criticizing the Chang Myŏn government's inability to solve Korea's economic problems and lack of governing capacity, and by proclaiming that the junta was the successor of the April 19 revolution and "nationalist democracy,") many intellectuals defined the May 16 military coup as a "nationalist military revolution."

However, this initial popular support gradually diminished as the military junta became linked to several corruption scandals, and began to oppress existing political forces in the name of political purification. In particular, suspicions deepened when the junta broke its pledge to transfer power to a civilian government and when General Park reversed his previous pledge not

41. For the opposition's arguments on normalization, see *Han-Il kwan'gye charyojip* (Materials on Korea-Japan Relations) (Seoul, Korea: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Asea Munje Yŏn'guso, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 204-421; To-Sŏng Yi, *Sillok Pak Chŏng-Hui wa Han-Il hoedam: 5.16 esŏ choin kkaji* (A True Account of Park Chung Hee and Korea-Japan Normalization Talks) (Seoul, Korea: Tosŏ ch'ulp'an Han'song, 1995), pp. 457-76; Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System*, pp. 98-102.

to run for the presidency. In this context, the antipathy of the intellectuals and people against the military government found its expression via anti-normalization movements.⁴²

Anti-Normalization Movement as a Method of Increasing Bargaining Power

Anti-normalization movements in both Japan and the ROK usually have been understood as showing contending aspects of the government-opposition relationship, as well as the negative effects of historical animosity. However, one also needs to look at the other side of the same coin. In fact, there exist two other intriguing aspects of the anti-normalization movements.

First, in order to extract a better deal from Japan, the ROK government covertly encouraged political opponents to raise their voices concerning the normalization; the government and the opposition leaders tacitly or secretly cooperated to stir up anti-normalization sentiments so that they could increase Korea's bargaining power.

In his personal letter to Ambassador Pae Ŭi-Hwan on April 27, 1962, General Park admitted that he tacitly tolerated domestic newspapers' severe critiques because they were denunciations of Japan's insincerity and trickery in the negotiation process.⁴³ Around October 20, 1964, as a negotiation tactic, Foreign Minister Yi Tong-Wŏn encouraged Yun Po-Sŏn, leader of an opposition party, to oppose the normalization talks.⁴⁴ Later, Minister Yi (Lee) discussed the matter with Pak Sun-Ch'ŏn, leader of another opposition party. Minister Yi also met President Park to get his approval to employ such a negotiating tactic.⁴⁵ Yi did not stop there. Even without Park's approval beforehand, he visited university campuses and encouraged the students to raise their voices

42. Yi Kwang-Il, "Han-il hoedam pandae undong ũi chŏn'gae wa sŏnggyŏk," in Minjok Munje Yŏn'guso, ed., *Han-Il hyŏpchŏng ũl tasi ponda: 30 chunyŏn ũl majihayŏ* (Seoul, Korea: Asea Munhwasa, 1995), pp. 92-97.

43. Yi, *Sillok Pak Chŏng-Hui wa Han-Il hoedam*, pp. 58-59.

44. Yi, *Taet'ongryŏng ũl kŭrimyŏ*, pp. 199-200.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

in opposition to normalization of relations with Japan, arguing that it was natural that Korean students come forward to fight. In this way, he stirred up domestic opposition to the normalization talks.⁴⁶

A comparable example exists of secret cooperation between the ruling party and the opposition parties in Japan, though in a different political context.⁴⁷ This suggests that Japan may have employed similar bargaining tactics in negotiating with the ROK. As it was, anti-normalization movements in both Japan and the ROK can be seen as having had the effect of strengthening each respective government's position and bargaining leverage. For instance, in talks over Japan's economic aid to the ROK between Kim Jong-pil (director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) and Masayoshi Ohira (Japanese foreign minister) on October 20, 1962, the Japanese side expressed the view that, considering public opinion and opposition from the dissident parties, economic aid was possible only when it was seen as a "complement to Korean independence" and not as a response to Korean property claims.⁴⁸

46. *Ibid.*, p. 201. Through phone conversations with this author, Won-Deog Lee, expert on Korea-Japan relations, expressed his skepticism on the authenticity of the related descriptions in Minister Yi's memoir. See also Won-Deog Lee, *Han-Il Kwagösa ch'öri üi wönjöm: Ilbon üi chönhuch' öri oegyo wa Han-Il hoedam* (Starting Point for Settlement of Korea-Japan Past History) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1996).

47. See Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute, 1992), p. 24. According to Pyle, when Dulles came to Japan in June 1950 to negotiate a peace treaty and the end of the occupation, he urged Japanese rearmament. Prime Minister Yoshida refused to accede to these demands. He established a bargaining position by making light of Japan's security problems. Yoshida skillfully argued that rearmament would impoverish Japan and create the kind of social unrest that the communists wanted. *Through backdoor channels he was even prevailing on Socialist party leaders to whip up anti-rearmament demonstrations and campaigns during Dulles' visits!*

48. From email exchanges with Dr. Doo-seung Kim, expert on the history of Korea-Japan normalization talks. Also see Doo-seung Kim, *Ikeda Hayato Seiken no Taigai Seisaku to Nikkan Kosho* (Ikeda Hayato Administration's Foreign Policy and the Japan-Korea Conference) (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2008), pp. 145, 151-54.

Admittedly, this study did not find direct evidence of government-opposition collusion in Japan's case, and it is highly likely that such evidence does not exist. As a Japanese scholar pointed out, the anti-normalization movement in Japan was much less intense than in Korea for two reasons: The movement in Japan didn't affect the progress of the normalization talks very much; and the Japanese people were not much interested in the talks, as a public opinion poll revealed that more than half of the Japanese population did not hold any view at all on them.⁴⁹ Considering the political apathy, the Japanese government probably had no intention to manipulate the anti-normalization movement. Nevertheless, I believe my basic point still stands that both the Korean and Japanese governments tried to utilize domestic situations to increase their bargaining power in the normalization talks.⁵⁰

Second, around the time of its conclusion, the normalization treaty touched off what would be the largest popular demonstrations in Japan since the 1960 security treaty crisis. However, the anti-normalization movement was not by then driven mainly by historical animosity. Rather, it was related more closely to the anti-Vietnam War atmosphere. The Japanese feared the possibility of military involvement in the wars of others. In this sense, both the 1960 security treaty crisis and the anti-normalization movement were similarly motivated by Japan's fears of being entrapped by cold-war politics. In line with these pacifist and anti-government movements in 1960, anti-normalization movements in Japan had forced the government to refrain from becoming too close to South Korea. Therefore, in no way did the normalization treaty represent Japan's unconditional acceptance of Korean demands. Japan never recognized Seoul as the only legitimate government on the peninsula.

49. Fumitoshi Yoshizawa, *Sengo Nikkan Kankei* (Japan-Korea Relations in the Postwar Era) (Tokyo: Kurein, 2005), p. 282. I thank Junya Nishino (of Keio University) for calling my attention to Yoshizawa's work by kindly sending me a copy of the related chapter of the book.

50. This process can be also understood in terms of "two-level game" where a negotiator tries to satisfy domestic audience and the foreign counterpart at the same time. See Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-60.

The multifaceted nature of the anti-normalization movements—Korean opponents' democratic movement, Japan's entrapment fears regarding cold-war politics, and the collusion between the government and opposition to increase bargaining power in both Korea and Japan—seems to be contradictory on the surface. However, this complicated reality may explain why the movements sharply dwindled soon after the ratification of the treaty in the ROK National Assembly on August 14, 1965.

Although the opposition parties and dissidents had been vehemently opposing the normalization process so as to topple the Park regime, it turned out to be coercive enough to utilize even martial law freely with the firm control of the military. Even the opposition leaders did not deny the necessity of the eventual normalization of relations, which was essential for ROK economic development—their views on when and how differed, but both saw normalization as inevitable. Therefore, once the government-to-government treaty was signed and ratified, the opponents accepted it as a *fait accompli*. Moreover, if one aspect of their movements was to help the government tacitly to get a better deal, there was no point in further opposing the treaty once it was ratified.

Conclusion

This article tried to explain why the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization of Relations Treaty was achieved at that particular time, and why the two governments spent more than four years negotiating the treaty despite all the favorable internal and external conditions that existed at that time. The intensified U.S. pressure on Japan and the ROK to accelerate the normalization process was one of the facilitating factors. However, the importance of U.S. pressure should not be exaggerated. It was basically a constant factor throughout the period of 1950-1965.

The main reason for Korea-Japan cooperation regarding the normalization of relations is that the two states had strong incentives to pursue their own interests cooperatively: In addition to market expansion and capital investment, Japan had fears of deterrence failure regarding North Korea because the ROK was undergoing political instability and economic difficulties; and

the ROK had abandonment fears regarding the United States militarily and economically. Korea also had abandonment fears regarding Japan, especially in an economic sense, though to a lesser degree.

We also need to refocus on the normalization process in two different ways. First, we need to refocus on the long-term process through which the two states learned by their failures how to “cooperate not to cooperate” or how to “solve the unsolvable.” The repeated failures in the previous period were not due to a lack of cooperative incentives between the two states, but because of various conflicting interests that kept the flame of historical animosity burning. In turn, historical animosity itself also amplified the disputes related to the conflicting interests. In particular, the territorial dispute concerning Dokdo, Japan’s North Korea policy, and history perception gaps of the two states were the major sources of friction. However, although the two states could not solve these issues, they learned that it was better to make progress in other less difficult arenas first rather than try to solve the unsolvable problems on their own terms.

Second, we need to refocus on the meaning of anti-normalization movements from a different perspective. Many experts attributed the anti-normalization movements to the deep-seated historical animosity between the two states. Although historical animosity is one aspect that intensified these movements, the more fundamental reason for the movements is that political opponents in both Japan and South Korea tried to seize the opportunity of advancing their political cause by using the anti-normalization movements as a rallying point for mobilizing domestic dissident forces. These movements did not just erupt from anti-Japanese or anti-Korean emotionalism. Rather, they were weapons wielded against the incumbent governments by opposition forces self-interestedly pursuing their political goals.

One final interesting aspect of the anti-normalization movements is that the ROK government tried to utilize them to put itself in a better bargaining position in its tough negotiations with Japan. Meanwhile, the Japanese side, knowing the ROK’s weak bargaining position, sometimes seems to have purposely delayed the normalization process to strike a better deal. Once the new ROK government seemed to grip power firmly after Park was elected as civilian president, the Japanese government

seemed to believe that time was on Japan's side.

In short, seen from the perspective of Pareto frontier, the final conclusion of the normalization talks was delayed not because the two governments had no outward and inward cooperative incentives (or no recognition of the absolute gains to be gained by the normalization), but because they tried to increase their relative gains as much as possible. However, despite the delayed settlement, the very fact that the normalization of Korea-Japan relations was finally accomplished at all is a powerful indication that Korea-Japan relations were passing the threshold toward cooperative bilateral relations. Through this accomplishment, the two states agreed to go beyond one important threshold in their relations.

This analysis also reveals that the America-centric approach, which relies overtly on the determining power of U.S. factors—whether it is U.S. pressure or U.S. (dis)engagement—in explaining Korea-Japan relations turns our attention away from one simple but crucial fact: Korea and Japan themselves are most responsible for determining their own bilateral relations. The U.S. role in Korea-Japan relations is significant but not determining.

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