

SOUTH KOREAN NATIONAL PRIDE: DETERMINANTS, CHANGES, AND SUGGESTIONS*

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This study looks at how proud South Koreans are of their nation's achievements, how strongly South Koreans feel their country is superior to other countries, what factors are important to explain differences in national pride, and how important perceptions on social trust and current political and economic situations are in determining Koreans' level of national pride. The data for this study comes from the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) of 2003. Age, education, family income, and evaluations of social trust and current political and economic situations are examined as major determinants of national pride. The study finds that South Koreans exhibit greater national pride in their achievement in sports, history, and science and technology than in politics and social welfare systems. Moreover, South Koreans who are younger, better educated, or have higher family income tend to be less proud of their country and are less likely to have strong sentiments of national superiority or allegiance to the nation.

Key words: Korea, national identity, nationalism

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Introduction: Korean Nationhood

In the era of informatization and globalization, has the significance of the nation-state, nationhood, and national identity been weakening or strengthening? This study examines the meaning of "nation-state" to South Koreans, who live in one of the most rapidly changing countries in the world.

The concepts of ethnicity, nation, and nationalism have had a very special meaning for most South Koreans since the period of Japanese colonization of the Korean peninsula.¹ During the cold-war era, the Korean peninsula stood on the edge of conflict between liberalism and communism. The authoritarian regimes of the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) fortified and exploited ethnic nationalism to increase their legitimacy and to mobilize the South Korean people against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea).² However, a strong social movement toward political democratization led to the demise of the military regime in South Korea in 1987 and the election of the country's first civilian president in 1992. South Korea exhibited further political development in the presidential election of 1997 with the horizontal transfer of political power to the opposition party. The Kim Dae Jung government introduced the so-called "sunshine policy," which attempted to maintain a cooperative relationship with North Korea and ease tensions between the two Koreas. This political orientation let the South Korean people to enjoy a little more ideological freedom than before.³ In addition to the political change, South Korea has

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1. Myeong-gyu Bak, *Geundae hanggukui taja insikui byeonhwawa minjok-jeongcheseong* (The Change of the Idea of Others and National Identity in Modern Korea) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1998); Tongseong Kim, *Hanguk minjokjuui yeongu* (A Study of Korean Nationalism) (Seoul: Oruem, 1995); Yeong-u Han, *Hanguk minjokjuui yeoksahak* (Nationalist History in Modern Korea) (Seoul: Iljogak, 1994).
 2. Hyun Choe, *National Identity and Citizenship in China and Korea* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 2003); Hyeon-gi Yi, "Hanguk jeonjaeng hu nambukhan 'minjok jeongcheseong'ui hyeongseong" (The Making of National Identity in the Two Koreas: A Sociological Essay on Otherness), *Sahoe wa yeoksa* (Society and History), vol. 65 (2004), pp. 233-59.
 3. Jonghoe Yang, "Class versus Generation: An Empirical Test of Their Relative Importance in Korea," a paper presented at the EASS confer

become ethnically far more heterogeneous over the last two decades because of the influx of foreign workers and brides. Due to these factors, the state has had more difficulty trying to impose its ethnocentric interpretation of nationhood upon its citizens.⁴

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 exposed the weakness of the South Korean economy. This had a somewhat deflating effect on South Koreans' national pride, which was based upon the nation's unprecedented economic development during the 1980s and 1990s. In trying to overcome the crisis, South Korea had to accept international "rules of the game" and has since experienced accelerated globalization and internationalization.⁵

Moreover, South Korea's hosting of international sports events such as the 1988 Olympic Games and the 2002 World Cup soccer tournament exposed more South Koreans to foreigners and foreign cultures, and influenced many to broaden their perspective of the world. The number of South Korean overseas travelers has drastically increased every year since the liberalization of overseas tours in 1989. At the same time, a great number of East Asian and Southeast Asian workers have entered South Korea since 1988—the Korean Immigration Service's current estimate is over 400,000 persons.⁶ Since the mid-1990s the number of immigrants from China and Southeast Asian countries who have married Koreans has rapidly increased. Over 100,000 foreign spouses of South Koreans reside in Korea. Consequently, this recent trend in immigration has raised concerns about Korea's future as a multiracial and multicultural society.

ence held by the Survey Research Center, Sungkyunkwan University, November 18-19, 2004.

4. Choe, *National Identity and Citizenship*; Hyun Choe, "Simingwan, minju-juui, gungmin-gukga and hanguk sahoe" (Citizenship, Democracy, the Nation-state and South Korean Society), *Simingwa segye* (Citizen and Society), vol. 4 (2003), pp. 347-67; Taehan Chang, "Hanguk daehak-saengui injong-minjok seonhodo gwanhayeo" (South Korean College Students' Ethno-Racial Preferences), *Dangdae bipyeong* (Contemporary Critics), vol. 14 (2001), pp. 99-113; Donghun Seol and Taeseok Jeong, "Saeroun sedaewi deungjanggwa minjokjeongchaeseongui byeonhwa" (The Advent of a New Generation and the Changes in National Identity), *Sasang* (Thought), vol. 54 (2002), pp. 28-52.

5. Yang, "Class versus Generation."

6. Korean Immigration Service, News Release, August 24, 2007.

Considering the social changes over the last few decades, how has South Koreans' understanding of nationhood and national identity changed? From various concepts related to national identity, this study focuses on the matter of national pride. What is the current state of South Korean national pride? More specifically, this study asks the following: First, based on an analysis of ten domains—such as the way democracy works in their country, political influence in the world, and scientific achievement—how proud are South Koreans of their nation-state's achievements, and how strongly do South Koreans feel that their country is superior to others? Second, this study identifies variations of national pride among South Koreans and determines the factors most influential in explaining the differences. Third, in determining citizens' level of national pride, the study examines the role of citizens' perception on the nation-state's social trust and its political and economic situations.

Theoretical Discussions

National Identity and National Pride: Conceptual Discussions

Although discussions of the concept of national pride are few and lack thoroughness, those on national identity can provide some ideas about how to deal conceptually with national pride. The concept of national identity has been used interchangeably with such concepts as "national consciousness," "national character," "national feeling," and "national mind." Conceptual discussions on national identity have focused mainly on four issues, the first being the nature of national identity—that is, whether it is political versus cultural or social psychological in nature. If national identity is comprised of such civic factors as "a well-defined territory, a community of laws and institutions, a single political will, equal rights for members of the nation and common values,"⁷ it would seem to be very much political. However, other

7. Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), recited from Mikael Hjerm, "National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four Western Countries," *ACTA Sociologica*, vol. 41 (1998), pp. 335-47.

scholars emphasize its cultural and social psychological nature, defining it as “the maintenance and continuous reproduction of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that particular heritage and those values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions.”⁸ When national identity takes the form of an attachment to the country, a feeling of belonging, or a feeling of closeness to the country as a nation-state or as a geographical area, it also reflects the social-psychological character of the term.

In the same context, national pride can be seen as one component of national identity. National pride has been defined by ideas such as “the positive affect that the public feels towards their country as a result of their national identity,” or “the pride or sense of esteem that a person has for one’s nation and the pride or self-esteem that a person derives from one’s national identity.”⁹ The concept of national pride also encompasses the notion of patriotism. Sometimes national pride may even cross over to the realm of nationalism, which implies a strong national devotion that places one’s own country above all others.¹⁰ However, Hopkins emphasized that it is important that national pride not be identified with nationalism, as the latter is ideological and carries a negative connotation in the sense that it implies the denegation of other nations.¹¹

Second, national identity is relational.¹² People come to have

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8. Anthony D. Smith, “Interpretations of National Identity,” in Alain Dieckhoff and Natividad Gutierrez, eds., *Modern Roots: Studies of National Identity* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2001), p. 30.
 9. Tom W. Smith and Lars Jarkko, “National Pride in Cross-national Perspective,” *GSS Cross-national Report No. 19*, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 2001, p. 1.
 10. *Ibid.*
 11. Nick Hopkins, “National Identity: Pride and Prejudice?” *British Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 40 (2001), pp. 183-86.
 12. Masamichi Sasaki, “Globalization and National Identity in Japan,” *International Journal of Japanese Sociology*, vol. 13 (2004), pp. 69-87; Anna Triandafyllidou, “National Identity and the ‘Other,’” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 21, No. 4 (1998), pp. 593-612; Nick Hopkins and Neil Murdoch, “The Role of the ‘Other’ in National Identity: Exploring the Context-dependence of the National Ingroup Stereotype,” *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, vol. 9 (1999), pp. 321-38; and R.

a sense of national identity while acknowledging the existence of other nations and differentiating their nation from others.¹³ Thus Keane defines national identity as “an awareness of affiliation with the nation that gives people a sense of who they are in relation to others.”¹⁴ Triandafyllidou insists that national identity becomes meaningful only through contrast with others, especially significant others.¹⁵ Furthermore, Robertson and Chirico argue that this “relativizing phenomenon” is facilitated due to globalization, because a given national identity must now be considered relative to all other national identities. Similarly, the level of national pride is determined in comparison with other nations.¹⁶

Third, national identity is multidimensional.¹⁷ People construct their national identity on the basis of various resources such as ethnicity, territory, political and legal systems, economy, language and culture, tradition and heritage, myths, memories, as well as values. Jones and Smith propose that national identity consists of two dimensions, one ascriptive and the other voluntaristic, that resemble the concepts of ethnic identity and civic national identity, respectively, in Smith’s terms.¹⁸ Hjerem contends that the sources of national pride are multidimensional; in

Robertson and J. Chirico, “Humanity, Globalization and Worldwide Religious Resurgence: A Theoretical Exploration,” *Sociological Analysis*, vol. 46 (1985), pp. 219-42.

13. Sasaki, “Globalization and National Identity in Japan,” p. 75. Rusciano used the concept of “fremdbild,” which means the nation’s perceived or actual international image in world opinion, to indicate the consciousness of other’s existence in a discussion of national identity. Frank Louis Rusciano, “The Construction of National Identity—A 23-nation Study,” *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 56, No. 3 (2003), pp. 361-66.
14. J. Keane, “Nations, Nationalism, and Citizens in Europe,” *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 140 (1994), pp. 169-84; also see Hjerem, “National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia,” p. 337.
15. Triandafyllidou, “National Identity and the ‘Other.’”
16. Robertson and Chirico, “Humanity, Globalization and Worldwide Religious Resurgence.”
17. F. L. Jones and Philip Smith, “Individual and Societal Bases of National Identity: A Comparative Multi-level Analysis,” *European Sociological Review*, vol. 17, No. 2 (2001), pp. 103-18; Hjerem, “National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia.”
18. Smith, “Interpretations of National Identity.”

his classification of the sources of national pride, the political dimension is similar to civic aspects of national identity, while the natio-cultural dimension is similar to ethnic aspects of national identity.

Fourth, different people regard different criteria as important in forming their national identity.¹⁹ Some people see ethnic factors, rather than civic factors, as determinative for membership in their nation-state, while others see it in precisely the opposite way. Similarly, other people may see different things as significant as sources of their national pride—such as sports or history.

Research on National Pride

Previous studies of national pride have been conducted on two levels of analysis: the national level and the individual level. From the cross-national comparative perspective, the major concern has been the relationship between globalization and national identity. Some scholars argue that the sense of national identity might be diminished by globalization,²⁰ whereas others claim that nationhood and national identity will persist even in the postmodern era.²¹ Furthermore, Edensor insisted that the globalization process might enhance national identity because people experience the influence of globalization on the basis of national character and enrich their national culture by domesticating what globalization brings.²² Therefore, even supranational institutions are developing on the basis of international cooperation, through which each nation tries to maximize its interests. Some scholars from developing countries have argued that the logic of globalization itself is faithfully working for the developed countries' national interests.²³

19. Hjerem, "National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia."

20. For a review of this perspective, see M. D. R. Evans and Jonathan Kelley, "National Pride in the Developed World: Survey Data from 24 Nations," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (2002), pp. 303-38.

21. Ibid.

22. Sasaki, "Globalization and National Identity in Japan."

23. Y. M. Kim, *Globalization and Nationalism from our Perspective* (Seoul: Ohnum, 2002); H. J. Lim, *Changes of the World and Development of Korea in*

In examining the relationship between globalization and national feelings in terms of competing assumptions such as the civilizing-process hypothesis versus the persistent-differences hypotheses, Evans and Kelly found that “neither economic nor institutional globalization seems to have melted away national feelings.”²⁴ They also found no support for the civilizing-process hypothesis, according to which the sources of people’s national pride transit from the military at the early stage of development through to the economy and to the arts and sciences. Using ISSP (International Social Survey Program) 1995 National Identity data,²⁵ Smith and Jarkko analyzed the ranking of countries in terms of general national pride and specific national pride in ten domains and found that “on average pride in specific achievements is greater for non-political domains (History, Art and Literature, and Sports) than for domains tied to the state and public policies (Global Political Influence, the Military, and Social Welfare).”²⁶ Each country’s national pride in the ten specific domains is determined by its objective accomplishments; but at the same time it seems to have an idio-national element because the relative importance of each domain is different depending on each country’s unique background and circumstances.

Efforts have been made to show the consequences of national pride. Evans and Kelley assumed that pride in a nation’s achievements may increase people’s feelings of attachment to the nation. This reveals that pride in science, arts, sports, and the economy all significantly enhance emotional attachment to the nation, regardless of the size of the country. But pride in sports is much more important to small countries in keeping their national attachment strong.²⁷

Hjerm examined the effects of national pride on xenophobia. In his study, Hjerm cautions us not to confuse national pride

the Era of Globalization (Seoul: Seoul National University Publishing, 1998).

24. Evans and Kelley, “National Pride in the Developed World,” p. 314.

25. ISSP is a program organized in 1985 to facilitate international comparative studies of social phenomena. ISSP proposed “the national identity” as the 2003 topical module of survey and required its member countries to include this module in their national survey.

26. Smith and Jarkko, “National Pride in Cross-national Perspective.”

27. Evans and Kelley, “National Pride in the Developed World,” p. 319.

with nationalism.²⁸ Unlike nationalism, national pride is not ideological and does not have negative connotations; but it is possible for national pride to have positive or negative consequences depending on the sources of national pride.²⁹ He assumes that pride in the political dimension could be seen as pride in some of the factors that make up civic national identity, whereas the natio-cultural dimension rests as part of an ethnic national identity, and therefore hypothesizes that the natio-cultural dimension should correlate better with xenophobia than the political dimension. This hypothesis seems to be supported by empirical data, since the political dimension of national pride shows negative correlation with xenophobia and the natio-cultural dimension shows positive correlation in countries like Australia, Sweden, Germany, and Britain.³⁰

Scholars who analyze national pride at the individual level have attempted to find some determinants of individual difference. Characteristics such as gender, age, and education are most frequently examined.³¹ Evans and Kelley analyzed the age, gender, and education effects on level of national pride in different achievement domains. As a result, they found small gender differences in national pride: men and women take equal pride in their nation's achievements in science and technology, sports, and economy; but men are less proud than women of their nation's arts and literature. On the other hand, older people are more proud than younger people of their nation's achievements in science and technology, its art and literature, and its economy; but the old and young are equally proud of the achievements in sports.³²

In relation to the educational effect, Evans and Kelley assumed

28. Hjerm, "National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia," p. 341.

29. National pride comes from two separate dimensions: the first is related to the political dimension of national pride where people take pride in the way democracy works, political influence, economic achievement, the social security system and equal treatment of different groups of people. The other is called the natio-cultural dimension of national pride where people take pride in sports, science, literacy achievements, and history as well as armed forces.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 344-45.

31. Evans and Kelley, "National Pride in the Developed World"; Smith and Jarkko, "National Pride in Cross-national Perspective."

32. Evans and Kelly, "National Pride in the Developed World."

that since the educated are better informed about supranational and transnational institutions, they will be more likely to adopt an international perspective. Therefore, the more highly educated tend to feel less proud than those who have limited education and hence make only local comparisons. According to their logic, education should have negative effects on pride in science and technology, the economy, and sports, but education should have no effect on pride in the arts and literature where comparisons at all levels of education will be local. However, the results did not support any of the assumptions. Rather, in the United States, education has a modestly positive effect on pride in science.

Regarding education's effect on national pride, however, a different assumption is possible. Education can help one take a more objective point of view in evaluating self-achievement and reduce the chances of one making a self-favorable evaluation. That means it is hard to make the assumption that the highly educated will take pride more (or less) in certain areas of achievement than the less educated without considering the nation's objective level of achievement. Therefore, the direction of the educational effect on national pride will vary depending on the country's level of achievement in a certain domain. If a country such as the United States has a high level of achievement in science and technology, the educated should take more pride in it than the less educated. However, in some developing countries, it is probable that the poorly educated will take more pride in their nation's achievements in science and technology than the well educated because they, the poorly educated, have limited understanding of other countries.

Smith and Jarkko also tested the individual differences of national pride by gender, ethnicity, and age/cohorts. They found that general national pride has fallen from the pre-World War II cohort to the most recent cohort in most countries and interpreted this general decline as a result of the demise of nationalism resulting from globalization and multilateralism. National minorities showed lower national pride, and this was interpreted as the result of their identification with external nations and discrimination and inequality they suffered from within their country. However, Smith and Jarkko failed to find gender difference in national pride.³³

33. Smith and Jarkko, "National Pride in Cross-national Perspective."

Studies on Japan and other countries also prove enlightening. In comparing the relative importance of the ethnic versus civic factors in being Japanese, feelings of attachment to Japan, and attitudes towards foreigners in Japan among different age groups, Sasaki found that one's generation had an important impact on national identity among the Japanese. Younger Japanese were more willing than older generations to accept globalization positively in that they showed more open-minded attitudes toward "others" than did their parents and older adult groups.³⁴ Sanchez-Ruiz also found the same kind of age effect on national identity in Canada, Mexico, and the United States—that is, the younger generations tended to have less nationalistic attitudes and weaker national pride and identity.³⁵

Building a Framework of Analysis for South Korean National Pride

This study analyzes South Korean national pride at the individual level. We deal with South Koreans' subjective evaluation of their national pride. Based on the discussion above, this study presupposes that national pride is, by definition, multifaceted, relational, and very complex in the sense that it reflects not only the nation's politics, economy, and culture but also the people's collective consciousness such as patriotism and feelings of national superiority. Among various determinants of national pride at the individual level, this study gives special attention to the effects of age (or generation) and education on determining South Korean national pride.

As already mentioned, South Korean society is one of the most rapidly changing societies in the world. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that in South Korea there must be a prominent generation gap giving rise to differences in values, attitudes, and behaviors. In fact, Yang proposed that "in a rapidly changing society like South Korea, generational differences tend to matter significantly in lifestyles, values and politics. Especial-

34. Sasaki, "Globalization and National Identity in Japan."

35. Enrique E. Sanchez-Ruiz, "Identities in Transition in North America: Paradoxes of the 'Post-national' Condition," University of Guadalajara, Mexico, 2003.

ly, generation gap in political ideology seems to have been more acute in this era of ideological freedom.”³⁶ He also showed the increasing power of “generation gap” in explaining differences in political orientation. Therefore, this study hypothesizes a “generation gap” in perceiving national pride.

In assessing national pride in South Korean society, education is assumed to be another important factor. As discussed earlier, the educated are more likely to better understand the relative status of their country in the world. Furthermore, they are more likely to have additional chances to develop cosmopolitan values and to be less nationalistic. This study also assumes that family income may have an impact on a person’s evaluation of national pride, since the more affluent have more opportunities to expose themselves to other cultures and hence tend to be objective in evaluating their country’s global standing as well as more influenced by globalization.

In addition, this study proposes that one’s recognition of how the social system works, as well as the political and economic situation, influences one’s evaluation of national pride. Thus, the more people think of their society and leaders as trustworthy and the more satisfied they are with their nation’s current political and economic situation, the more likely they are to have national pride and feelings of national superiority.

Research Methods

Data

The data for this study comes from the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) of 2003, which was conducted by the Survey Research Center of Sungkyunkwan University. The 2003 KGSS included the “National Identity” module, which as mentioned earlier was developed by the ISSP. The KGSS data was collected through face-to-face interviewing of randomly selected South Korean adults aged 18 years of age or older. A structured questionnaire was used for the interviews. The survey was conducted from July to August 2003. Of the 2,000 households target-

36. Yang, “Class versus Generation,” p. 49.

ed, a sample of 1,315 was successfully interviewed. Households were selected through a multi-stage stratified cluster probability sampling procedure. From each household, the youngest adult was selected as a survey subject.

The socio-demographic characteristics of the sample are shown in *Table 1*. Of the sample, 56 percent is female and about half of the respondents are in their twenties or thirties. People who are over 60 years of age represent about 16 percent of the respondents. As well, nearly 45 percent of the respondents have at least two years of college education, and approximately 31 percent graduated from high school. Seventy-six percent of the sample is currently married. In addition, 56 percent of the sample is working for income: 24.3 percent of the respondents are included in the category of “2 million won through 2.99 million won” monthly family income, with just under 23 percent belonging to the range of “4 million won or over.” Looking at the respondents’ occupations, 11.3 percent are professionals and managers, 13.3 percent are semi-professionals and clerical workers, 11.5 percent are service and sales workers, and 20 percent are skilled or unskilled workers. Housewives compose 18 percent of the sample and students, 9.7 percent.

Table 1. Socio-demographic Characteristics of Respondents

		N (%)			N (%)
Gender	Male	579 (44.0)	Education	middle school	319 (24.3)
	Female	736 (56.0)		high school	405 (30.8)
Age	18-29	302 (23.0)	Family Income (won)	2yrs college+	591 (44.9)
	30-39	349 (26.5)		0 - .99 million	175 (13.3)
	40-49	306 (23.3)		1 - 1.99 million	271 (20.6)
	50-59	148 (11.3)		2 - 2.99 million	319 (24.3)
	60-69	108 (8.2)		3 - 3.99 million	251 (19.1)
	70+	102 (7.8)		4 million+	299 (22.7)
	Total	1,315 (100.0)		Total	1,315 (100.0)

Note: Family income is calculated in South Korean won.

Measurement of Variables

National pride, as already discussed, is a multifaceted concept, measured by two sets of variables. In the 2003 KGSS National Identity Module, national identity is measured by two sets of questions. The first set asks people's evaluation of their national achievement in ten specific domains. In other words, the question "How proud are you of South Korea in each of the following?" is asked in regard to each of the ten items: "the way democracy works," "political influence in the world," "economic achievements," "social security system," "scientific and technological achievements," "achievement in sports," "achievement in the arts and literature," "armed forces," "history," and "fair and equal treatment of all groups in society." Each item is measured using the five-point Likert scale: 5 for "very proud," 4 for "somewhat proud," 3 for "cannot choose," 2 for "not very proud," and 1 for "not proud at all."

The second set of national pride questions is asked to measure people's feelings of national superiority and national allegiance over moral judgment. The questions are asked with reference to the following ideas: "I would rather be a citizen of South Korea than of any other country in the world"; "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like South Koreans"; "Generally speaking, South Korea is a better country than most other countries"; and "People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong." These four items are measured using the five-point Likert scale (1 = disagree strongly; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 = agree strongly). In addition to these four items, another question is asked to gauge people's esteem for their nation-state; that is, how proud the respondent is of having South Korean nationality.

In order to figure out the multidimensionality among the fifteen items, factor analysis and reliability testing are used. Table 2 shows the result of factor analysis for the fifteen national pride items. Three factors are identified. The first reflects people's feeling of national pride in how well South Korean social systems—for example, the political system, the economy, the legal and welfare systems, as well as the military system—are working in general. The first factor is called "specific national pride in social systems" (Specific NP: social systems). The second

Table 2. Factor Analysis of Specific and General National Prides

National pride items	Varimax Rotated Factor Loading		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1. Proud of the way democracy works	.60		
2. Proud of political influence in world	.75		
3. Proud of economic achievements	.49		
4. Proud of social security system	.69		
5. Proud of armed forces	.48		
6. Proud of fair treatment of groups	.69		
7. Proud of scientific achievements		.66	
8. Proud of achievement in sports		.79	
9. Proud of achievement in arts & literature		.67	
10. Proud of history		.61	
11. Rather be a citizen of South Korea			.78
12. World a better place if more like South Koreans			.67
13. South Korea better country than other countries			.75
14. South Koreans should support South Korea even in the wrong			.63
15. Proud of South Korean nationality			.68
Eigen Values	2.80	2.62	2.37
Explained % of Variance	18.66	17.47	15.77
Reliability Coefficient (α)	.77	.76	.69

factor shows people’s appreciation for their nation-state’s achievement in culture, science, and technology, and is called “specific national pride in culture and scientific achievement” (Specific NP: culture & scientific achievement). The third factor includes the items indicating national superiority and loyalty, and is aptly named “general national pride.” The three national pride scales are constructed by mean scores of relevant items that are selected on the basis of factor loading. It needs to be pointed out that “general national pride” has to be standardized first due to different scales of measurement between items³⁷ before one can

37. Items 11 through 14 are measured on the five-point scale of agree-disagree, but item 15 is measured on a four-point scale.

get the average of standardized scores of items.

The reliability tests show that three scales have Cronbach's alphas ranging from .69 to .77. The general national pride scale is significantly correlated with the specific national pride: $r=.48$ for specific national pride in social systems and $r=.33$ for specific national pride in culture and scientific achievement. This study assumes that the causal relationship goes from specific national pride to general national pride, rather than the other way around. In other words, the more pride the citizens of a nation-state feel in their nation's achievement in various areas, the more strongly they are likely to believe that their country is superior to other countries and will support their country even if their country is in the wrong.

Social trust and satisfaction of political and economic situations are predictors of national pride in that the level of social trust in public areas is conceptualized in terms of people's trust in South Korean society in general and in the leaders of political power and major social institutions. People's perception of trust in South Korean society is measured on a ten-point scale (1 = hardly trustful; 10 = very trustful—i.e., Trust 1). Another measurement of social trust is people's confidence in those who are running the sixteen major social institutions: major companies, organized religion, education, labor unions, newspapers, TV, medicine, the executive branch of the national government, local government, the legislature, the supreme court, the scientific community, the military, banks and financial institutions, the Blue House (the presidential residence), and civic organizations. Confidence in the leader of each institution is evaluated using a three-point scale (1 = hardly any confidence at all; 2 = only some confidence; 3 = a great deal of confidence).

For the sake of parsimoniousness, the sixteen items are factor analyzed. The factor analysis identified four factors. The first factor consists of the items of trust in the leaders of national and local governments, the Blue House, the legislature, and the supreme court (i.e., Trust in public institutions = Trust 2). The second factor comprises major companies, organized religion, education, medicine, the scientific community, the military, and banks and financial institutions (i.e., Trust in civic institutions = Trust 3). The third and fourth factors represent trust in leaders of mass communications and in labor union leaders, respectively.

Only the first two factors are included in accounting for variance of South Korean national pride. Their internal consistency turns out to be modest (Cronbach's alpha .78 and .71, respectively).

South Koreans' perceptions of the current state of South Korean politics is estimated in two ways: one is their level of satisfaction with the current political situation (five-point scale: 1 = very dissatisfied; 5 = very satisfied) and the other is the overall evaluation of the current government's administering of state affairs (five-point scale: 1 = very poor; 5 = very good).

South Koreans' perceptions of the current state of the South Korean economy are measured using a five-point satisfaction-dissatisfaction evaluation scale of current economic situations and prospects of the South Korean economy (five-point scale: 1 = will be much worse; 5 = will be much better).

Some *socio-demographic variables* of the respondents are considered for the analysis of national pride. These variables are measured as follows. First of all, gender is dummy-coded (0 = male; 1 = female). Age is grouped into six categories: 1 = 18-29 years old; 2 = 30-39 years old; 3 = 40-49 years old; 4 = 50-59 years old; 5 = 60-69 years old; 6 = 70 years old or over. Each respondent's level of education is grouped into one of three categories: 1 = less than junior high school (i.e., less than 11 years of schooling); 2 = high school (i.e., 13 years of schooling); 3 = college or over (i.e., more than 14 years of schooling). Monthly family income is identified and measured according to one of four groups: 1 for "less than 1 million won," 2 for "2 - 2.99 million won," 3 for "3 - 3.99 million won," and 4 for "4 million won or over." The subjective class-consciousness is measured using a ten-point scale (1 = the lowest class; 10 = the highest class).

Results

How Proud Are South Koreans of Their Nation-state's Achievement in Ten Domains?

Table 3 suggests how proud South Koreans are of their nation's achievement in the ten specific domains, how proud they are of being South Korean, and how strongly they believe their country is better than other countries. Among the ten specific areas,

Table 3. Mean and Standard Deviation of National Pride and Its Related Variables

		% of being proud/agreement	Mean	Standard Deviation
Specific National Pride	Proud of achievement in sports	87.7	4.05	.90
	Proud of history	73.1	3.70	1.19
	Proud of scientific achievements	64.2	3.38	1.14
	Proud of achievement in arts & literature	59.0	3.26	1.15
	Proud of economic achievements	44.7	2.88	1.20
	Proud of armed forces	32.6	2.58	1.20
	Proud of the way democracy works	32.1	2.61	1.12
	Proud of social security system	17.0	2.11	1.02
	Proud of political influence in world	16.4	2.15	1.00
	Proud of fair treatment of groups	16.2	2.07	1.04
General National Pride	Proud of South Korean nationality	73.8	3.74	1.12
	Rather be a citizen of South Korea	70.6	3.97	1.00
	South Koreans should support South Korea even in the wrong	56.8	3.49	1.21
	South Korea better country than other countries	44.2	3.26	1.03
	World a better place if others are like S. Koreans	24.6	2.88	.99

Note: Specific National Pride items are measured on a five-point scale (1 = not proud at all; 5 = very proud); General National Pride items are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).

“achievement in sports” and “history” showed the highest results, with 87.7 percent of the respondents signifying that they are very or somewhat proud of South Korea’s achievement in sports and 73 percent proud of South Korean history. On the other hand, South Koreans feel the least pride in their country’s social welfare system and political influence in the world. Less than 20 percent of the respondents are proud of South Korea’s social security system and fair treatment to all social groups as well as its political power in world politics. Overall, South Koreans are

more proud of their culture than their social systems, including political and economic systems.³⁸ A similar trend regarding relative importance of the ten domain achievements was found in the previous studies using the 1995 ISSP national identity.³⁹

Feelings of Superiority

About three quarters of the respondents said that they are proud of being South Korean (very proud, 26.1 percent; somewhat proud, 47.7 percent), and that they would rather be a citizen of South Korea (strongly agree, 37.2 percent; agree, 33.4 percent). On the other hand, only one quarter of the respondents agreed with the statement that the world would be a better place if others were like South Koreans, and only 44.2 percent think that South Korea is a better country than other countries. Therefore, the proportion of South Koreans having high self-esteem for being South Korean is much larger than those who think of South Korea as better than other countries. Interestingly, despite a relatively low level of national superiority, more than 50 percent of South Koreans show allegiance to their country, even when the country is in the wrong (see *Table 3*.)

Generation, Education, and Family Income Effects of National Pride

Table 4 reveals the different level of national pride depending on the respondent's age, level of education, and family income. For this analysis, the components of national pride are categorized into three dimensions: specific national pride in social systems, specific national pride in culture and scientific achievement, and general national pride.

38. Kim did a comparative analysis of South Korean national pride, using ISSP National Identity Surveys in 1995 and 2003. He found that South Koreans have a much lower level of pride in most areas, except in sports, than most other nations. See Jae-On Kim, "Korean National Identity in a Comparative Perspective: Preliminary Analysis of ISSP National Identity Surveys (1995, 2003)," a paper presented at the joint symposium of the Survey Research Center, Sungkyunkwan University and The NORC, University of Chicago, February 18, 2005.

39. Smith and Jarkko, "National Pride in Cross-national Perspective"; Evans and Kelley, "National Pride in the Developed World."

Table 4. Group Differences in Specific and General National Pride Based on Age, Education, and Family Income

		Specific NP: Social Systems	Specific NP: Culture & Scientific Achievement	General National Pride	N
Age	18-29	2.16 (.63)	3.54 (.77)	3.10 (.76)	302
	30-39	2.33 (.69)	3.65 (.76)	3.30 (.75)	349
	40-49	2.36 (.72)	3.54 (.75)	3.42 (.75)	306
	50-59	2.52 (.74)	3.56 (.80)	3.52 (.87)	148
	60-69	2.77 (.76)	3.66 (.75)	3.78 (.68)	108
	70+	2.89 (.77)	3.71 (.78)	3.93 (.68)	102
	Total	2.40 (.73)	3.59 (.77)	3.39 (.79)	1,315
	ANOVA test	F=24.71***	n.s.	F=24.66***	
Level of Education	Jr. high school	2.79 (.78)	3.72 (.76)	3.80 (.69)	319
	High school	2.43 (.71)	3.65 (.75)	3.50 (.73)	405
	College+	2.17 (.62)	3.49 (.77)	3.10 (.76)	591
	Total	2.40 (.73)	3.60 (.77)	3.39 (.79)	1,315
	ANOVA test	F=86.35***	F=11.58***	F=95.15***	
Family Income	Less than 1 million	2.74 (.81)	3.63 (.81)	3.69 (.79)	175
	1-1.99 million	2.44 (.73)	3.60 (.81)	3.47 (.74)	271
	2-2.99 million	2.40 (.76)	3.65 (.72)	3.37 (.79)	319
	3-3.99 million	2.31 (.65)	3.60 (.77)	3.40 (.77)	251
	4 million+	2.22 (.66)	3.51 (.75)	3.17 (.79)	299
	Total	2.40 (.73)	3.60 (.75)	3.39 (.79)	1,315
	ANOVA test	F=15.37***	n.s.	F=12.85***	

Note: *** $p < .001$

According to the results of the ANOVA test, the levels of specific national pride in social systems and general national pride are different depending on the respondent's age. Older people tend to have higher levels of pride in South Korea's political and economic systems and social welfare systems than younger people. At the same time, they also tend to believe that

South Korea is better than other countries. However, age difference did not show statistical significance in specific national pride in culture and scientific achievement.

The well educated tend to have a lower level of specific national pride both in the social system and in cultural achievement than the poorly educated. They are also less likely to feel that South Korea is superior to other countries. Depending on family income level, there are significant differences in specific national pride of social systems and general national pride. More specifically, those who have a higher family income tend to have less pride in South Korea's political, economic, and social welfare systems, and are less likely to think that South Korea is better than other countries or hold higher loyalty to the country.

Determinants of General National Pride

As described earlier, this study examines how South Koreans' understanding of their society has an impact on their national pride, in particular, their high self-esteem as a South Korean and the feeling of national superiority. In order to do so, this study constructs a series of multiple regression models, paying special attention to R^2 changes among different models. There are five multiple regression models, as seen in *Table 5*. Regression model I is a basic model, which consists of only the socio-demographic variables of the respondents. From the previous discussion, it is known that age has a positive effect on general national pride, but education and family income have a negative effect on it. The first regression model shows the net effect of age, education, and family income on general national pride. Other factors being equal, including gender and a subjective class-consciousness, age, and level of education have statistically significant effect on general national pride. More specifically, the younger and more educated tend to have lower levels of general national pride than their counterparts.

Regression model II shows the importance of the people's social trust in their society and their leaders to keep their national pride high. All three variables to measure social trust are statistically significant. Those who have confidence in their society and believe that their political leaders and other major social institution leaders are trustworthy are more likely to be proud

Table 5. Determinants of General National Pride
(Standardized Regression Coefficients)

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
Sex (Female=1)	-.04	-.06	-.05	-.02	-.05*
Age	.14***	.09*	.13***	.13***	.06*
Level of Education	-.28***	-.27**	-.29***	-.28***	-.19***
Family Income	-.05	-.03	-.05	-.02	-.03
Subj. Class Consciousness	.05	.04	.05	.04	.04
Trust in Society		.08**			.06*
Trust in Political Leaders		.11**			.05
Trust in Major Social Institution Leaders		.19***			.13***
Satisfaction with Current Political Situation			.09**		-.03
Satisfaction with Current Government			.05		-.04
Satisfaction with Current Economic Situation				.07**	-.01
Prospect of South Korea Economy				.17***	.12***
Specific NP on Social Systems					.29***
Specific NP on Culture & Scientific Achv.					.12***
R ² changed		.09***	.01***	.04***	.21***
R ²	.15***	.24***	.18***	.19***	.36***
N	1258	1054	1192	1189	978

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** P<.001

of having South Korean nationality, as well as more likely to believe that their country is better than any other country. By adding social trust variables to the basic regression model, the explanatory power (R²) of the model increases by 9 percentage points and the R² change is statistically significant. Among the three social trust variables, trust in leaders of major social insti-

tutions (i.e., leaders of religious, educational, medical, military, and financial institutions, as well as leaders of major companies) is the most important.

Regression models III and IV reveal the effects of South Koreans' satisfaction with domestic politics and the economic situation on their national pride. How well the government is doing does not have significant impact on general national pride, but satisfaction with the political situation is importantly related to general national pride. Moreover, South Koreans' national pride is significantly influenced by their national economy. More specifically, those who are more satisfied with the current economic situation and believe the South Korean economy will be better in the future are more likely than their counterparts to have higher general national pride. Good economic prospects ($\beta=.17$) seem more important than satisfaction with the current economic situation ($\beta=.07$) for the South Korean people to keep national pride high. Comparing R^2 changes of regression models II, III, and IV, it can be said that social trust matters more than the political and economic situations in determining South Koreans' general national pride.

Regression model V is constructed to test the net effects of specific national pride both in social systems and in culture and scientific achievements on South Koreans' general national pride. The underlying assumption for this model is that those who have a higher level of national pride in their country's achievement in various areas are more likely to believe their country is superior to other countries. This assumption turns out to be true. In other words, types of specific national pride have statistically significant positive impact on South Koreans' general national pride. The national pride in South Korea's achievement in democracy, world political influence, economic development, social welfare system, and armed forces ($\beta=.29$) has greater impact on the feeling of national superiority than the national pride in South Korean culture and scientific achievement ($\beta=.12$). About 36 percentage points of variation of South Korean general national pride can be explained by the independent variables considered in regression model V. Among those independent variables, the specific national pride in social systems is the most prominent in explaining South Korean general national pride, and the level of education and social trust in the

leaders of major social institutions are subsequently important predictors of South Korean general national pride.

Conclusion

The above analysis of South Korean national pride based on the 2003 KGSS National Identity data can be summarized as follows. First, the South Korean people's pride is higher in their country's achievements in sports, history, and science and technology than in its politics and social welfare systems. Second, over 70 percent of South Koreans feel pride in being South Korean, but the level of national superiority is not as high. Third, there are significant differences in national pride among South Koreans depending on their age and level of education. Younger Koreans, better educated Koreans, and those who have a higher family income tend to be less proud of the way democracy works, their country's world political influence, and its welfare systems. They are also less likely to have strong feelings of national superiority and show less allegiance to the nation. These results seem to have something to do with the influence of globalization. This is because the younger generation, the better educated, and Koreans with higher incomes have more opportunities to experience other cultures and to develop cosmopolitan values.⁴⁰

South Korea is a low-trust society. About 76 percent of the respondents said that they do not trust their assemblymen and slightly over 50 percent of them do not trust the people who run the executive branches of the national government and the local government (see Appendix 1). At the same time, the majority of South Koreans are not satisfied with the current political and economic situation of South Korea. Nevertheless, South Koreans' perceptions of social trust and the country's political and

40. Chang's research on South Korean college students' ethno-racial preferences reveals that the effect of globalization on young female students is stronger than on their male counterparts. That is, female students are less nationalistic. (Chang, "Hanguk daehaksaengui injong-minjok.") Similarly, we find that female respondents are more likely to have lower national pride than their male counterparts after controlling others as equal (see *Table 5*).

economic situation still make a significant difference in their feelings of national superiority and self-esteem as South Koreans. In particular, it is noteworthy that the findings of this study show how important the role of leaders in major social institutions is in making the South Korean people more patriotic. The authors of this study also draw attention to the need to more seriously contemplate the discovery that the well-educated and informed young South Koreans tend to have less pride in what their country has achieved, tend to feel less confident about being South Korean, and tend to have less of a belief that they are living in a better country compared to other countries. This could be interpreted as a sign of waning nationalism and national pride among South Koreans.

However, even in the era of informatization and globalization, national identity is still one of the most important social identities. Thus, the South Korean government and leaders need to make a greater effort to promote national pride among South Koreans. Nowadays, it is clear that they can no longer appeal to ethnocentric nationalism and the myth of Korea's racial homogeneity.⁴¹ They have no other option but to inspire civic nationalism or republican patriotism in the South Korean people. Thus, South Korea should start to discuss and reestablish South Korean nationhood.⁴²

41. Chang, "Hangguk daehaksaengui injong-minjok"; Seol and Jeong, "Saeroun sedaeui deungjanggwa minjokjeongchaeseongui byeonhwa."

42. For the implications of republicanism in South Korea, see Choe, "Simingwan, minjujuui, gungmin-gukga and hanguk sahoe"; Jun-Hyeok Kwak, "Minjokjuui eomneun aeguksim gwa bijibaepyeonghwa wonchik" (Patriotism without Nationalism and the Peace Principle of Nondomination), *Aseayeongu* (Asian Studies), vol. 114 (2003), pp. 311-40; Jun-Hyeok Kwak, "Minjokjeok jeongcheseong gwa minjujeok siminseong bijibaepyeonghwawonchik" (National Identity and Democratic Citizenship), *Sahoegwahak yeongu* (Social Science Studies), vol. 12, No. 2 (2004), pp. 34-66; and Ahn, "Taljeongchironui sidae."

Appendix

Appendix 1. Mean and Standard Deviation of Major Independent Variables

		%	Mean	Standard Deviation
Social Trust	South Korean Society (10-point scale)			
	Civic service organizations*	18.9	2.05	.66
	Scientific community*	18.9	1.93	.57
	Medicine*	24.2	1.90	.62
	Military*	27.3	1.89	.66
	The Supreme Court*	27.2	1.85	.63
	TV*	27.7	1.82	.59
	Banks and financial institutions*	29.5	1.80	.60
	Education*	30.0	1.78	.59
	Organized religion*	31.5	1.81	.65
	Newspapers*	33.2	1.74	.60
	Major companies*	38.3	1.64	.55
	Labor Unions*	38.6	1.64	.58
	The Blue House (the Presidential Residence)*	41.7	1.62	.59
	Local government*	50.9	1.51	.58
Executive branch of the national government*	53.8	1.48	.58	
Congress*	75.7	1.23	.45	
Satisfaction with political & economic situations	Political situation (% of satisfaction)**	6.7	1.80	.92
	Government's administration (% of doing good)**	14.6	2.43	.97
	Economic situation (% of satisfaction)**	6.9	1.80	.89
	Prospects for economy (% of getting better)**	40.8	3.01	1.07

Note: The items with "*" are measured by a three-point scale and the percent of each item means the proportion of the respondents who indicate "hardly any confidence at all (=1)"; items with "**" are measured by a five-point scale.

Appendix 2. Zero Order Correlations among the Variables

	Sex	Age	Education	Family Income	Class	Trust1	Trust2	Trust3	Political Satisfaction	Economic Satisfaction	Government Satisfaction	Pros K. Econ.	Npride SS	
G.N.Pride	1.00													
Sex	<u>-03</u>	1.00												
Age	.31	<u>-05</u>	1.00											
Education	<u>-.37</u>	<u>-06</u>	<u>-59</u>	1.00										
Family Income	<u>-.18</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>-.30</u>	<u>.40</u>	1.00									
Class	<u>-.09</u>	<u>.02</u>	<u>-.24</u>	<u>.30</u>	<u>.35</u>	1.00								
Trust 1	<u>.14</u>	<u>.02</u>	<u>-.03</u>	<u>.05</u>	<u>.01</u>	<u>.12</u>	1.00							
Trust 2	<u>.27</u>	<u>.03</u>	<u>.09</u>	<u>-.07</u>	<u>-.08</u>	<u>-.03</u>	<u>.26</u>	1.00						
Trust 3	<u>.34</u>	<u>.05</u>	<u>.22</u>	<u>-.18</u>	<u>-.07</u>	<u>-.04</u>	<u>.19</u>	<u>.60</u>	1.00					
Political Satisfaction	<u>.15</u>	<u>.09</u>	<u>.07</u>	<u>-.09</u>	<u>-.09</u>	<u>-.01</u>	<u>.21</u>	<u>.30</u>	<u>.21</u>	1.00				
Eco. Satisfaction	<u>.12</u>	<u>-.03</u>	<u>.04</u>	<u>-.01</u>	<u>-.03</u>	<u>.04</u>	<u>.18</u>	<u>.25</u>	<u>.16</u>	<u>.42</u>	1.00			
Gov. Satisfaction	<u>.11</u>	<u>.07</u>	<u>.05</u>	<u>-.10</u>	<u>-.09</u>	<u>-.01</u>	<u>.24</u>	<u>.26</u>	<u>.12</u>	<u>.35</u>	<u>.25</u>	1.00		
Pros K. Economy	<u>.21</u>	<u>-.02</u>	<u>.08</u>	<u>-.07</u>	<u>-.06</u>	<u>-.01</u>	<u>.21</u>	<u>.22</u>	<u>.18</u>	<u>.15</u>	<u>.22</u>	<u>.21</u>	1.00	
NPride-S Systems	<u>.48</u>	<u>.05</u>	<u>.29</u>	<u>-.34</u>	<u>-.20</u>	<u>-.07</u>	<u>.11</u>	<u>.26</u>	<u>.28</u>	<u>.25</u>	<u>.20</u>	<u>.21</u>	<u>.22</u>	1.00
NPride-Culture	<u>.33</u>	<u>.08</u>	<u>.04</u>	<u>-.13</u>	<u>-.05</u>	<u>-.02</u>	<u>.08</u>	<u>.20</u>	<u>.20</u>	<u>.14</u>	<u>.07</u>	<u>.12</u>	<u>.10</u>	<u>.46</u>

Note 1: Trust 1 = trust in society, Trust 2 = trust in political leaders, Trust 3 = trust in major social institution leaders.

Note 2: Correlation Coefficients underlined mean $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

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