

ASSESSING THE MILITARY BALANCE IN KOREA

Jae-Jung Suh

Conventional wisdom has it that North Korea, despite a bankrupt economy and a starving population, maintains one of the largest militaries in the world because its primary goal is "reunification by force." North Korea's military is big by many conventional measures. If the quality of fighting power is taken into consideration, however, this military does not look so menacing. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the North is trailing behind the South in terms of military might, even without factoring in U.S. forces in South Korea and the vicinity. Pyongyang seems to have turned to missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a last resort to provide for its survival under increasingly unfavorable international conditions. The current military balance on the peninsula can be described as a "balance of terror" in which each side maintains an asymmetric advantage over the other, resulting in a fragile condition of mutual deterrence. Such a balance is inherently unstable and dangerous, and can be resolved only when the legitimate security concerns of both sides are addressed in a simultaneous, comprehensive, and binding manner.

Key words: U.S.-North Korea relations, asymmetrical power, balance of terror, security dilemma

Unstable and Dangerous

North Korea remains one of the most militarized countries in the world today, with over a million military personnel—at least 12 percent of the male population. Its military is commonly estimated to consume as much as 25 percent of the national budget. Recently Kim Jong Il, who runs the country as chairman of the all powerful National Defense Council, made the “military-first policy” the supreme guiding principle for his rule. Not only is North Korea highly militarized; it also maintains a threatening posture with two-thirds of its ground forces and a significant amount of logistical support concentrated in the forward area between Pyongyang and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), ready to strike with little warning.

It is therefore hardly surprising that South Korea is vigilant about the possibility of a surprise attack from the North. Such an attack could turn Seoul, South Korea’s capital with over ten million residents, almost instantaneously into “a sea of fire.” Nor is it surprising that Washington and Tokyo also suspect an increasing threat from Pyongyang’s continuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. A little disheartening, and even counterproductive, however, is the thoroughness with which policymakers in Seoul and Washington ignore or dismiss Pyongyang’s legitimate security concerns, as if North Korea were not threatened by outside military forces.

Not only does the South have sufficient military capability, without U.S. military support, to stop and defeat a North Korean blitzkrieg attempt, but it also leads the North in important categories of military power. Faced with this increasingly unfavorable balance of power, Pyongyang seems to have turned to asymmetrical power advantages that would give it the ability to deter an attack. On balance, the military situation on the Korean peninsula may be characterized as an asymmetric balance between the South’s conventional power superiority and the North’s asymmetric power advantage (derived largely from its long-range artilleries and WMDs), leading to a “balance of terror” that sustains the current armistice. Such a state is inherently unstable. A small incident, accidental or not, could trigger a chain of events that would unleash the destructive power each holds over the other, resulting in mutual assured destruction.

Imbalance of Power, Asymmetric Balance of Terror

The Weapons Imbalance

Despite the official position of the South Korean and U.S. governments that the South is inferior to the North in terms of aggregate military power, the South can in fact stop a North Korean blitzkrieg attempt to seize Seoul—even by itself with its allegedly inferior military capabilities.¹ While the North enjoys a numerical advantage in every category of weapons, its military is essentially of 1950s vintage. The South, on the other hand, has a smaller, albeit still sizable, military equipped with the latest weapons systems. Many analysts therefore conclude that if both quantity and quality are taken into consideration, the South wields more military power than its adversary to the North.² The South’s military also maintains a high force-to-space ratio, more than twice the level many analysts consider necessary for defense, effectively leaving few sectors that can be breached by the North.³ Even if the North should succeed in punching a hole

1. For the official position, see for example Ministry of National Defense, *Ch’amyôjôngbuûi kukpangjôngch’aek* (Participatory Administration’s National Defense Policy), July 11, 2003, online at www.mnd.go.kr/jungchaek/baekseo/2003/2003main.htm.
2. Taik-young Hamm, *Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power* (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 115; Les Aspin, “An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options” (Washington, D.C.: House Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1992); I Yong-Hui, “Nambukhan chonjaengnûngnyôk pigy-yôn’gu: hanbando p’yônghwa t’odaëûi kuch’ugul uihan mosaek” (Comparative Study of South and North Korea’s War Capability: An Exploration to Establish a Foundation for Korean Peninsula’s Peace), in Kyôngnam University, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, ed., *Nambukhan Kunbigyôngjaengkwa Kunch’uk* (South-North Korea’s Arms Race and Disarmament) (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1992), pp. 117-44.
3. Barry Posen and John Mearsheimer argue, for example, that 0.5 to 1 armored division equivalent (ADE), occupying 15 to 25 kilometers in depth, can guard 25 kilometers of front. Their argument suggests that the South needs at most 10 ADEs to defend the 250 kilometers-long front, and the South’s military is estimated at over 20 ADEs. Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 110-15; Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 181-82.

in the first line of defense, it would face at least two additional lines of defense before it could reach Seoul, a certainty that challenges the North's break-through units with the likelihood of being surrounded and attacked from all sides.

Such an optimistic assessment is reinforced by the results of simulations showing that the South's qualitatively superior tanks, fighting in a defensive position, can all but decimate the North's numerically superior but qualitatively inferior tank forces.⁴ Other simulations also show that the North's infantry soldiers would find it practically impossible to cross the DMZ where the South's artilleries would create a "killing zone."⁵

Given that Pyongyang's blitzkrieg attempt runs little chance of success, South Korea's capability alone should prevent Pyongyang from launching an all-out attack. If we add the military capability that the United States can bring to bear upon the North in the event of an invasion, the South wields enough power to deter a second Korean War. No wonder, as one author notes in a recent article, there has been no war since 1953: "deterrence has been clear and unambiguous."⁶

Things may look quite different from a North Korean perspective, however, for the simple reason that what one side considers a defensive or deterrent capability may be perceived as threatening by the other side. While it is unproblematically accepted by most in the South and the United States that their combined military forces are purely defensive and thus pose no threat, the North has to be concerned about the capabilities as well as the intentions of the countries that surround it. For intentions may change and today's tool of defense can be used for tomorrow's aggression. Scholars of international relations have long noted the inherent difficulties of distinguishing offensive from defensive capability, which lie at the core of what they call

the "security dilemma." As such, North Korea, no more or less immune from these problems, views the South's defensive capability as a potential offensive capability.

The North is also concerned by indications that its military capability actually lags behind the South's, undermining its security and even threatening its survival (just as there are indications of the South's inferiority in certain sectors that make Seoul worried about its security). Many standard measures of power reveal the North's inferiority. It has half the population of the South. Its gross domestic product (GDP) stands at 3-5 percent of the South Korean GDP.⁷ Because of an economic crisis, North Korea's import of weapons systems all but ceased by 1993, while Seoul routinely ranks among the world's largest weapons importers.

The disparity in economies is reflected in military spending as well. The South's military spending began to surpass the North's in 1972, and the gap has widened ever since, resulting in a cumulative difference of \$38.7 billion by 1990.⁸ In 1991 Seoul spent \$7.8 billion on its military, more than three times Pyongyang's \$2 billion. Ten years later, Seoul's defense budget had grown to \$10 billion, almost eight times as much as Pyongyang's, which shrank to \$1.3 billion.⁹ While Pyongyang is allocating a higher ratio of its national budget to the military, it would not be unreasonable to interpret the North's higher military spending ratio as a desperate effort to match its adversary's spending level, obviously without success.

4. Jae-Jung Suh, "Blitzkrieg or Sitzkrieg? Assessing a Second Korean War," *Pacifica Review*, vol. 11, No. 2 (1999).

5. Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier Than the Pentagon Thinks," *International Security*, vol. 22, No. 4 (1998); Michael E. O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), Appendix 1.

6. David C. Kang, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 47, No. 3 (2003), p. 304.

7. Chang-Ho Yoon and Lawrence J. Lau, eds., *North Korea in Transition: Prospects for Economic and Social Reform* (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2001).

8. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, various years). Estimates of defense spending vary because of the difficulties in obtaining accurate data on the spending itself and also in estimating the exchange rates. SIPRI's estimates are largely corroborated by the annual surveys of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, but show a wide difference from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's appraisal. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, various years); and ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, various years.

9. *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 280.

If only one-fourth of military expenditures are spent to improve the quality of the military's fighting capability, with the rest spent for maintenance and operation, the South has cumulatively invested about \$10 billion more than the North on new weapons and upgrades over the past twenty years.¹⁰ Since the South's manpower in uniform is about 40 percent smaller than the North's, the amount that Seoul has invested to improve each soldier's combat power is disproportionately larger. In addition, South Korea's far heavier investment in support systems should increase its effective combat power beyond what is represented in simple comparisons of firepower.¹¹

If one includes U.S. military expenditures on its troops stationed in and around Korea, the combined military spending far exceeds what Pyongyang spends on its military. According to one estimate, the combined U.S.-South Korea expenditures totaled about \$12 billion in 1986, four times the North's military spending.¹² The best study on the military spending by the two Koreas, carried out by Hamm, concludes after a careful examination of various data that the North's military capabilities stood at 32-56 percent of the South's in 1995, a ratio that fell even further for the rest of the decade.¹³ James Dunnigan estimates that in 1995 the North had about a third of the South's "combat power."¹⁴

10. South Korea spent as much as 39 percent of its defense budget on force improvement in 1988, and between 30 percent and 40 percent per year in recent years. Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper, 1997-1998* (Seoul, 1998), Appendix 10.

11. Posen makes this observation in the context of Central Europe. See Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the Central European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," *International Security*, vol. 9, No. 3 (1984/85), pp. 67-70; also Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation*, pp. 70-76.

12. Ravenal estimates one third of U.S. defense budget is spent on its forces in the Asia-Pacific, and it is precisely these forces that will be mobilized against the North in case of a contingency. Earl E. Ravenal, "The Defense Planning Process as a Pivotal Determinant of a Nation's Foreign Policy: The U.S. FY 1998 Defense Budget and Its Critics," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 29, 1997.

13. Hamm, *Arming the Two Koreas*, p.115.

14. James F. Dunnigan, *How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare for the Post-Cold War Era*, 3rd ed. (New York: William Morrow

and Company, Inc., 1993), p. 591.

15. See Aspin, "An Approach", p. 24.

16. Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, eds., *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 284. See also John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, "The Koreans Build Their Own Armor Force While the U.S. Army Fights Pentagon Bureaucrats," in *U.S.-Korean Security Relations: New Challenges and Opportunities* (Seoul: Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies, 1987), pp. 213-22.

17. The K-1 A-1, an upgraded version, is equipped with a CO₂ laser-range finder and a thermal viewer together with composite armor, an integrated fire control and an adjustable suspension, making the K-1 A-1 comparable to America's most advanced tank, the M-1 A-1. If the M-1 A-1's qualitative advantage over Iraq's T-72 tanks in Desert Storm is any indication, the South's K-1 A-1s would enjoy a similar, if not greater, edge over the North's T-62s, which are Soviet-designed tanks one generation older than the T-72s. David Miller, *Modern Tanks and*

According to Les Aspin, then chairman of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, "South Korea alone can bring to bear about six-tenths Desert Storm Equivalents of total ground combat force to deal with North Korea's about six-tenths Iraq of total ground offensive power." Given that Desert Storm overwhelmingly defeated Iraq, Aspin's measure indicates that the South's army as early as 1992 had the ground capability to achieve a similar victory over the North's army and that its relative strength has continued to increase thereafter. Although Aspin's indices cannot be independently verified, they do add some credence to the results derived by Hamm and Dunnigan.¹⁵

That the North is trailing the South in the arms race on the peninsula is vividly illustrated by a comparison of the quality of their weapons systems. Most of the North's fighter aircraft, for example, were introduced before 1960, with the notable exception of about thirty MiG-29s, the only modern jet fighters; the South's air force has its own share of aged aircraft but also maintains sixty F-16s, considered far superior to MiG-29s. The contrast is more pronounced in the category of main battle tanks. While the North's main battle tanks, the T-54/55 and T-62, were introduced in 1949 and 1961, the South upgraded most of its 1950s vintage M-48s to M-48A3s or M-48A5s between 1980 and 1990.¹⁶ During the same period, moreover, the South began producing a new-generation tank, the K-1, that carries several state-of-the-art features found in the M1 Abrams.¹⁷ It is indicative of

and Company, Inc., 1993), p. 591.

15. See Aspin, "An Approach", p. 24.

16. Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, eds., *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 284. See also John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, "The Koreans Build Their Own Armor Force While the U.S. Army Fights Pentagon Bureaucrats," in *U.S.-Korean Security Relations: New Challenges and Opportunities* (Seoul: Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies, 1987), pp. 213-22.

17. The K-1 A-1, an upgraded version, is equipped with a CO₂ laser-range finder and a thermal viewer together with composite armor, an integrated fire control and an adjustable suspension, making the K-1 A-1 comparable to America's most advanced tank, the M-1 A-1. If the M-1 A-1's qualitative advantage over Iraq's T-72 tanks in Desert Storm is any indication, the South's K-1 A-1s would enjoy a similar, if not greater, edge over the North's T-62s, which are Soviet-designed tanks one generation older than the T-72s. David Miller, *Modern Tanks and*

the arms race trend that Seoul proceeded in the 1990s to manufacture the K-1 A-1, an upgraded version of the K-1, while Pyongyang failed to acquire the T-72 that had initially caused Seoul to launch the K-1 project. Furthermore, it was the South, not the North, that imported the latest Russian tank, the T-80U, in the late 1980s. Not only does the South Korean army operate as its mainstay the K1 A1s that are comparable to the most advanced U.S. tank, it also maintains eighty T-80Us.

The Political Side of the Competition

As the North fell behind, it might have perceived behind certain aspects of the South's political institutions an "ulterior motive" to invade, in the same way that the South has pointed to evidence of the aggressive nature of the North's system. For example, the original 1948 constitution of the Republic of Korea (ROK) declared that the Republic was the sole legitimate state on the Korean peninsula whose "territory shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands," while the constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) designated Seoul as the country's capital. According to these constitutions, the other side was an illegitimate group that unconstitutionally occupied a part of Korea. As Wada Haruki rightly points out, the ROK and the DPRK, if seen from a constitutional perspective, were entities that could not coexist or reconcile with each other without undermining their own *raison d'être*: "Because one's mere existence negates the other, their relationship can be compared to the state of war without the declaration of war."¹⁸

Despite several constitutional revisions in subsequent decades, the South's current constitution still claims jurisdiction over the entire Korean peninsula, with the implicit but unmistakable implication that what governs the North is an illegitimate regime that should be overthrown. The North in contrast has no such clause in its current constitution. Article 9 of the North's constitution, amended in 1998, states that "in the *northern half*,

the DPRK strengthens the people's administration and strenuously executes the three revolutions of ideology, technology and culture to accomplish the complete victory of socialism" [emphasis added]. This subtle but critical difference is also repeated in the clauses about unification policy. The North confirms as the basis of its unification policy the three principles of unification on which Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee agreed in 1972: "It strives to realize the unification of the fatherland on the basis of the principles of independence, peaceful unification and grand national solidarity." In contrast, the South, while adopting the policy of peaceful unification, asserts "liberal democracy" as the principle of unification, a formulation to which the North has never agreed nor is likely to find agreeable.

The South, furthermore, continues to rely on several UN resolutions as the legal justification not only for claiming to be the sole legitimate government over all of Korea but also for the use, under the UN Command, of military force to occupy the North and to unseat a regime that it deems an illegal anti-state entity.¹⁹ It also has laws, such as the National Security Law, that define the North as an illegal anti-state organization that must be eradicated. The North has no comparable law.²⁰ Although the North's ruling party commits itself to the superiority of its *Juche* ideology—just as the Grand National Party adopts liberal democracy and market economy as its guiding ideology—a political party by definition valorizes political programs and the philosophy behind them.²¹ The above comparison is no proof that the South

19. Li, Sang-Chôl, "Hanbando Chongjônch'ejewa UNC wising" (Korean Peninsula Armistice System and UNC's Status), *Hanbando kunbit'ongje* (Korean Peninsula Arms Control), vol. 34 (2003), p. 309.

20. In the 1998 constitution revision, the North also removed a clause that prescribed "a grave punishment" for people who committed "the gravest crime" of betraying the country and people. The North has no law comparable to the South's National Security Law, and its criminal law has been revised a number of times to remove such references as *wônsu* (enemy) or *chôk* (adversary), phrases that apparently referred to South Korea. "Hyongpop, namhanamsi 'chok' kyujông sarajyô" (Criminal Law Purged of "Enemy" Definitions Implying South Korea), *Han'gyôre sinmun*, September 23, 2004, online at www.hani.co.kr/section-00300000/2004/09/p003000000200409231853534.html.

21. It is also without significance that the Korean Workers Party, when it

Fighting Vehicles (New York: Smithmark, 1992), pp. 66-69.

18. Wada Haruki, *Pukchosôn: yugyôktaikukkaesô chônggyugun'gukkarô* (North Korea: From a Guerilla State to a Regular Army State), trans. by Ki-Jung Nam and Dong-Man Suh (Seoul: Tolbegai, 2002), p. 90.

harbors an “ulterior” motive to invade the North or that the North has no aggressive intentions. Nevertheless, it suggests that Pyongyang’s concerns about its security are not unwarranted.

Since the commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) maintains operational command over the South’s military, Pyongyang is concerned not only about the South but also about the United States. The USFK maintains operational plans that include strikes deep into North Korea in the initial phase of a war and maneuverings designed to sap the North’s military readiness, some of which border on preemptive strikes.²² The possibility of preemptive strikes came dangerously close to becoming a reality in 1994 when President Bill Clinton almost chose a military strike option to destroy Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities, only to turn away at the last minute.²³ The 1994 episode was not unique. Even before President George W. Bush included the North in the “axis of evil” and in the Nuclear Posture Review, and before preemptive strikes became part of the official policy of the administration, the United States had contemplated, threatened, prepared for, and came close to preemptive nuclear attacks against North Korea several times since the Korean War.²⁴ For example, in 1998, the U.S. Air Force practiced a preemptive nuclear strike against the North;²⁵ in 1976, in reaction to the killing of two American soldiers, B-52 bombers simulated bombing runs, flying from Guam toward the DMZ before

revised its bylaws in 1980, dropped such aggressive purposes as the “completion of revolution in the South” and replaced them with benign objectives like “to achieve reunification on the basis of the principle of grand national unity.”

22. Bruce B. Auster, Kevin Whitelaw, and Thomas Omestad, “Upping the Ante for Kim Jong Il: Pentagon Plan 5030, a New Blueprint for Facing Down North Korea,” *U.S. News and World Report*, July 21 2003. See also OPLAN 5030 at www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5030.htm.
23. Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001) and Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
24. “Nuclear Posture Review” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2002) and “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2002).
25. Hans M. Kristensen, “Preemptive Posturing,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 58, No. 5 (2002).

veering off at the last moment;²⁶ and in 1968 when the North Koreans seized the American spy ship *Pueblo*, “the initial reaction of American decision-makers was to drop a nuclear weapon on Pyongyang,” an idea helped by the fact that “all the U.S. F-4 fighter planes held on constant alert on Korean airfields were loaded only with nuclear weapons.”²⁷

North Korea’s Efforts to Level the Playing Field

The foregoing is not an argument that Seoul and Washington are bent on launching an attack to destroy the North. While the Bush administration after September 11, 2001 included North Korea in a number of nuclear or preemptive strike scenarios, it has sought a multilateral solution and continued humanitarian assistance. Seoul under the Roh Moo Hyun administration seems to have as its top priority the prevention of an open military conflict.²⁸ From Pyongyang’s perspective, however, the strategic situation cannot but appear dangerous. North Korea, therefore, seems to be attempting to level the playing field by building up asymmetric capabilities.

Faced with a perceived threat to its existence, a state can adopt two kinds of defensive policies to protect itself: It can try to increase its own capability or seek an alliance with other states. The latter became an impractical, if not unrealistic, option for Pyongyang in the 1990s when its traditional allies, China and Russia, raced to embrace South Korea as their new friend. Moscow went to the extreme of letting its mutual defense treaty with the North expire and taking more than ten years to replace it with a toothless friendship treaty. While Beijing did not follow Moscow’s example by spurning the North, it seems engaged in a

26. Peter Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 60-62.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

28. The previous administrations of Clinton and Kim Young Sam flipped on whether to exercise a military option to take out the North’s nuclear program. See Samsung Lee, *Hanbando Haekmunjewa Migukwoegyoo* (The Nuclear Question and U.S. Policy on the Korean Peninsula) (Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1994).

policy of maintaining equidistance. Given its dilapidated economy and deteriorating technological base, Pyongyang found it difficult, if not impossible, to match the South's power by building up its internal strength. Its decision to enhance its missile program seems to have grown out of a perceived necessity to counterbalance the South's growing power superiority.

An analysis of the physical characteristics of North Korean missiles corroborates such a hypothesis. South Korea has a qualitative advantage in air power, but if North Korea succeeds in catching planes on the ground with a surprise attack, its quantitative advantage might be a serious factor. With even fewer aircraft available after the initial blow, the South's air force would be hard-pressed to execute both an air-to-air campaign and close air support. Although it is very unlikely that the North's aged aircraft could penetrate the South's sophisticated air defense system and catch its combat planes on the ground, Pyongyang might nevertheless launch a surprise missile attack on the South's air assets.²⁹

Still, the results are hardly alarming for the South. Even if the North achieves a high degree of accuracy—50 meters of Circular Error Probability (CEP), a ridiculously high number in light of the well-established inaccuracy of North Korean missiles—it needs to expend ten Scud-B missiles to inflict 25-percent damage on a command center and eighty-six missiles to render one air base runway useless for operations. Given that Scud-B CEPs are estimated at 0.15 percent to 3.3 percent of the range—which means that they can strike within 100 meters at least half the time—the North would need forty-one missiles to destroy an air base command center and 101 missiles to take out a runway. In other words, the North has to fire forty to 100 missiles to disable *one* air facility while the South maintains more than 100 airfields, not to mention the extensive network of highways it can use to fly aircraft in an emergency. Moreover, in a war situation, the North would not be able to take all the preparatory steps, such as flying a balloon to measure high-altitude winds, and as a result its missiles' accuracy would be compromised even further. Even if North Korea currently possesses more than 200 Scud-B mis-

siles, they pose little threat to the South's air capability.

The obvious question then is: Why does Pyongyang seem obsessed with missiles that have little offensive military value? The question becomes all the more perplexing given the North's persistent efforts in its development programs to increase missile range but not missile accuracy.

While Pyongyang began missile production in the 1960s with the short-range missiles FROG-5 and FROG-7, its missile development programs really advanced in the early 1980s when it reverse-engineered a Scud on the basis of a Soviet missile purchased from Egypt. After test-firing a modified-A in 1984, it reduced the missile weight to extend its range to 320-340 km. The modified-B, test fired in 1985, is probably as inaccurate as the Soviet Scud on which it is based. After successfully marketing the modified-B in the Middle East, Pyongyang further extended the Scud missile range by lengthening the body so that it could carry more fuel. The outcome, the modified-C, probably represents the maximum range for a missile based on Scud technology because even heavy investments in increased fuel capacity will only marginally extend the range.

Since the modified-Bs can reach anywhere within the South, it would have made more sense for Pyongyang to direct its attention and resources to improving the missile's accuracy rather than developing a yet longer range missile on the basis of the Scud technology. It "bundled up" four Scud engines to produce a *Nodong* with a range of 1,000 km. Succeeding in this task, Pyongyang increased the range yet again, this time by multi-staging: using a *Nodong* in the first stage and a modified-C in the second. The result, known in the United States as "*Taepodong-1*" and called "*Kwangmyōngsōng*" by the North, flew over Japan in a 1998 test fire and is estimated to have a range of 2,000 kilometers.

In the end, Pyongyang has consistently and exclusively focused on maximizing its missile range, and it has relied entirely on Scud technology to do so. Both of these decisions have larger political implications. To reach the continental United States with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Pyongyang would need to develop something completely different from the Scud engine, the only technology it has worked with for the past twenty years. There is little evidence that the North has the technological wherewithal to develop an ICBM-capable engine. With-

29. This of course assumes that the South's aircraft remain concentrated and on the ground despite an impending strike, a highly unlikely scenario.

out outside help, which is not likely to come, it would be extremely difficult, although certainly not entirely impossible, for Pyongyang to develop a new class of missile engine powerful enough to propel an ICBM. Meanwhile, Pyongyang's exclusive focus on increasing missile range at the expense of accuracy—coupled with its sense of insecurity and its inability to match the South's more sophisticated, more powerful weapons systems—suggests that North Korea's leaders have sought some kind of capability to deter a war. Such missiles can be used as a weapon of terror with which to convince political leaders in the South and in the United States that their preemptive strikes would be punished with a massive destruction of civilian assets. Despite its incredibly inaccurate missiles, the North possesses the capacity to wreak havoc on Seoul and Tokyo even with conventional warheads, a prospect that Pyongyang hopes will dissuade South Korean and American political leaders from launching preemptive strikes.

The United States and South Korea jointly have more than enough military capacity to turn all of North Korea into ruins. Lacking the ability to match them in kind, the North seems to have turned to a method that will give it the power to inflict pain and damage that can outweigh any potential benefits of a first strike. It is the logic of Mutual Assured Destruction applied to the Korean peninsula, North Korean style. While the South has the power to assuredly destroy the North, a balance of asymmetric terror endows the North with the capacity to terrorize the other side into foregoing an attack. It is not just deterrence that has sustained the armistice without war in Korea; it is mutual deterrence.

From the Security Dilemma to a Virtuous Cycle

Dealing with Mutual Assured Destruction

Such a condition of mutual deterrence based on power imbalance and asymmetric terror balance is inherently volatile. Not only is one side unable to counter, much less eliminate, the other's advantage in another category, but the very effort to nullify the other's advantage is likely to trigger an asymmetric

response that results in an even greater gap. Their overall military advantage notwithstanding, Seoul and Washington would probably not act on their advantage by eliminating Pyongyang's ability to retaliate; their attempt to do so would only lead Pyongyang to increase its asymmetric advantage. On the other side of the border, Pyongyang faces the same dilemma. This asymmetry complicates military plans as well as arms control measures. It is liable to produce misunderstandings about the situation and misperceptions about the other's intentions, with the potential to turn a mistake into a larger-scale tragedy.

To move out of this volatile mix requires, first of all, that both parties recognize that they are in a situation of mutual assured destruction as a result of the asymmetric terror balance, which itself is an outcome of a larger power imbalance. Beneath the asymmetry and imbalance lies the security dilemma that traps both sides. As they continually seek security in measures that would neutralize the other's capability, both sides are in fact prisoners of their own failure, or refusal, to recognize the reality of the security dilemma. To stop this self-defeating vicious cycle requires a move beyond narrow self-centered perceptions. Once both sides adopt a perceptual framework that takes into consideration the other side's security concerns—and understands that the threat is not unilaterally posed but mutually produced—they can begin to free themselves from the self-perpetuating security dilemma.

The security dilemma can be currently seen in its most acute form in the dispute over North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles that has become more contentious after President Bush took office. The fundamental difference between Clinton's near-success in resolving the issues and Bush's stalemate lies not in Bush's unwillingness to talk or in his proposal to expand the agenda for talks but in his refusal to end the enmity between the two nations. The U.S.-North Korea joint statement of October 2000 shows that it was precisely because the two governments made a commitment to end hostile policies toward each other that the North was ready to scrap its missile program:

Recognizing that improving ties is a natural goal in relations among states and that better relations would benefit both nations in the 21st century while helping ensure peace and security on the

Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. sides stated that they are prepared to undertake a new direction in their relations. As a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.³⁰

It is precisely this commitment “to build a new relationship free from past enmity” that is required to defuse the nuclear and missile issues peacefully. Pyongyang is not likely to give up its nuclear or missile programs unless Washington shows a willingness to address its security concerns. Hence a possible solution seems to lie in a set of reciprocal concessions whereby the United States provides a security guarantee in exchange for Pyongyang’s termination of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Only when the United States comes to the realization that its nonproliferation policy is riddled with contradictions and that the U.S.-North Korea relationship is entrenched in a security dilemma will such a solution become possible.

Given the logic of the security dilemma, it would be not only a fundamental misunderstanding but also a tragic miscalculation to suggest that the North is engaged in extortionist behavior by wielding its weapons for profit. Although the North is currently experiencing deep economic problems, it will not likely embrace with enthusiasm such economic incentives as the removal of sanctions in the absence of measures that allay its security concerns. Pyongyang views its military capabilities and missiles as the only guarantor of its survival. To treat what it considers to be a “life-or-death” issue exclusively as an economic bargaining chip is to put the cart before the horse. Such an approach ignores

the stubborn reality that North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are a byproduct of the enmity between the two nations and that steps toward a solution can only be taken with a reciprocal recognition that both sides of the DMZ share a legitimate security concern as well as a common responsibility for the persistent military tension. Without such recognition, hawks in the United States and South Korea, as well as in North Korea, will take every opportunity to halt and reverse any peace process and maintain the military *status quo*.

In addition to its growing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, forward deployment of North Korea’s infantry units and artillery forces near the DMZ represents a major source of concern for the United States and South Korea. Here again the logic of the security dilemma is easy to see. Just as the United States and South Korea are concerned about North Korea’s force deployment near the DMZ, so the North is equally concerned that 90 percent of ROK and USFK personnel are positioned within 50 kilometers of the DMZ.³¹ Each side claims that its own forces are defensive and that the other’s are offensive, and each justifies its own force posture on the basis of a perceived threat from the other’s force posture. If either Pyongyang or Washington argues that its forces are purely defensive, then it should also be prepared to accept the other side’s claim that its forces are also defensive. Given Seoul’s growing military superiority over Pyongyang, by the same token, the South should be prepared to scrap its plans for weapons purchases and force modernization in exchange for Pyongyang’s halting of its missile programs and limiting its arms purchases. Washington, the major weapons supplier to the South, should also be prepared to support Seoul’s decision to stop arms imports and to stop reinforcement of the USFK in exchange for Pyongyang’s pledge not to export or import weapons. Once such an arms limitation is agreed upon and implemented, the two Koreas can start the process of building down their arms stockpiles.

Some of these steps were in the works during the Clinton administration. The Agreed Framework of 1994 laid the political framework that would allay in a step-by-step, reciprocal manner

30. The document further states, “Building on the principles laid out in the June 11, 1993 U.S.-DPRK. Joint Statement and reaffirmed in the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework, the two sides agreed to work to remove mistrust, build mutual confidence, and maintain an atmosphere in which they can deal constructively with issues of central concern. In this regard, the two sides reaffirmed that their relations should be based on the principles of respect for each other’s sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.” U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique, Department of State, October 12, 2000.

31. Bruce Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 469.

U.S. concerns about the North's nuclear program and the North's concerns about the U.S. military posture. The Clinton administration was apparently on the verge of negotiating away the missile problem in its final days precisely because it acknowledged the dynamic of the security dilemma on the Korean peninsula. This was clearly reflected in William Perry's admission that the "primary reason [for North Korea's missiles] . . . is deterrence. . . . They would be deterring the United States."³² On the basis of this acknowledgement, the Clinton administration moved to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea and guarantee that it would not be attacked with nuclear weapons; the Kim Jong Il administration reciprocated by freezing its nuclear and missile programs.

The Bush administration halted these processes, allegedly for a policy review, and has thus far stubbornly refused to acknowledge that the United States and North Korea are trapped in a vicious security dilemma cycle. The Bush administration's insistence on taking unilateral steps—rather than adopting reciprocal measures—goes directly against the premises underlying the Agreed Framework and other joint statements, and could well undo the achievements made through negotiations.

Current U.S. force restructuring in the South will probably further complicate the strategic balance. While these reforms are ostensibly driven by an effort to better confront terrorism and regional conflicts by taking advantage of technological advances to develop a high-tech twenty-first-century military, their application to Korea is likely to exacerbate Pyongyang's security concerns. Given that the U.S. plan involves reducing the number of American soldiers stationed in the South and relocating the remaining troops to a rear area, why such a paradoxical outcome? Such a restructuring, if carried out under the condition of symmetrical power balance, would seem to help mitigate the security dilemma. But in Korea it effectively removes the U.S. military from harm's way, out of the North's artillery range, weakening—if not removing—the asymmetric advantage that the North relies on as a deterrent. From the perspective of an insecure Pyongyang, it would seem that Washington's move is meant to gain a first-

strike capability in order to implement the officially declared pre-emptive strike doctrine in Korea.³³ The North might respond by building more and longer-range missiles and putting them on a launch-on-warning footing. And the tension over the Korean peninsula will rise another notch. The South may find it logical to increase, as it plans to, its military power in response to Washington's reduction of troops, but that too will end up contributing to heightened tensions, not enhanced security.

Solving the Security Dilemma

A way out of such an escalating cycle of security dilemma, therefore, is not likely to be found in military responses. A solution lies in crafting a framework within which both sides recognize the other's legitimate security concerns and take measures that simultaneously address both sides' concerns. A good starting point would be for the two to reconfirm the political commitment that they made in the 2000 joint communiqué to the termination of past enmity and the start of an effort to build amity. While their reconfirmation can be expressed in many different forms, such as an exchange of unilateral statements, a joint communiqué, or a multilateral statement, a clear, public expression of political will is most critical.

North Korea has long demanded the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty with the United States and the normalization of diplomatic relations, but has in recent years shown interest in what it calls "a nonaggression pact" in lieu of a peace treaty. It has even indicated its willingness to consider dropping a long-standing demand that the U.S. military withdraw from South Korea. After the historic summit in 2000, Kim Dae Jung revealed that Kim Jong Il expressed his "understanding" that the U.S. military might remain on the Korean peninsula even after reunification. Washington, however, regards the Korean armistice as the cornerstone of the U.S. alliance system in Northeast Asia and therefore untouchable. It is "virtually

32. Selig S. Harrison, "Time to Leave Korea?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, No. 2 (2001), p. 64.

33. In other words, the reduction and relocation has the same effect on the strategic balance on the Korean peninsula as a successful "Star Wars" program would have had on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance during the cold war.

heresy even to raise the issue, let alone discuss a detailed road plan toward ending the armistice," as two insightful observers have noted.³⁴

The potential for a mutual acknowledgement of security concerns or the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty has decreased with the election of Bush to a second term and the further consolidation of the Republican Party's control over Congress. Should the Bush administration maintain its inflexible approach, Pyongyang is likely to reciprocate with a redoubled unwillingness and even an increased hostility, which would only lay an additional justification for maintaining a hostile posture, exacerbating the security dilemma. This leaves Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Moscow as critical actors who can play a constructive role in facilitating a political rapprochement between Washington and Pyongyang.

One possible way to resolve the differences seems to lie in a set of simultaneous nonaggression pacts between the parties to the Korean War that would establish a new, truly peacekeeping function for UN forces. The challenge, however, is determining who is party to the war.³⁵ Washington and Pyongyang are certainly parties, but there is little agreement on the status of Seoul and Beijing. Although China as one of the three signatories is still a *de jure* party to the armistice, it is not a *de facto* party because the *de facto* state of war that had existed between China and the United States and South Korea ended when Beijing opened diplomatic relations with both. Also, despite Pyongyang's insistence that Seoul is not a party, Seoul's *de facto*, if not *de jure*, status has to be reckoned with.

A peace regime on the Korean peninsula cannot be built if the South is not involved as a full party. One logical solution, therefore, would be the creation of a peace regime where Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang adopt a set of documents that lay

out a comprehensive set of measures. Perhaps in a form similar to the Agreed Framework, such a document would commit the parties to certain steps in order to end the state of war among the three. Seoul and Pyongyang already made progress on this front when they signed a nonaggression pact in 1991 and held a summit in 2000. To officially end the *de facto* state of war, they need to take the additional step of adopting a peace declaration. At the same time Pyongyang and Washington must take meaningful measures to end their *de facto* and *de jure* state of war. If the two adopt a peace treaty, complemented by a peace declaration between Seoul and Pyongyang, it will not only increase the likelihood that the three will honor the peace regime but will also help allay the concerns of Seoul and Washington that Pyongyang is trying to split the allies with a peace treaty only with Washington.

The peace regime among the three parties should be bolstered by a regional regime because arms control and disarmament requires the wider participation of regional states such as China, Russia, and Japan. The involvement of all three is essential for a Northeast Asia-wide regime of restraints in arms transfers to the Korean peninsula and for a regional agreement to make the peninsula a nuclear-weapons-free zone. On a regional level, Washington needs to recognize that Beijing and Moscow would find intolerable the idea of a reunified Korea in which the United States remains the sole foreign military presence, just as it would be unfathomable for Washington or Tokyo to accept a reunified Korea under Chinese or Russian influence. All four powers have a vital stake in peace on the peninsula, but they all prefer a divided Korea that no single power controls to a unified Korea under the lopsided influence of one of them. The international system in Northeast Asia, in other words, has an interest in maintaining the status quo even at the price of continued instability and the risk of mutual assured destruction. Furthermore, the United States, Russia, China, and, to a lesser degree, Japan, have a further incentive to perpetuate the fragile division that gives them political and economic leverage over the two Koreas.

If the peace process is intensified through the successful implementation of these mechanisms, the two Koreas may be able to enter a qualitatively higher level of inter-Korean dia-

34. Peter Hayes and Stephen Noerper, "The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance," in Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, eds., *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 266.

35. See for example, Pat Norton, "Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues," The Nautilus Institute, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, Policy Forum Online, March 1997, online at www.nautilus.org/napsnet/fora/2a_armisticelegal_norton.html.

logue. That, in turn, may eventually pave the way toward a confederal or federal form of political integration. At this juncture, the multilateral peace talks, which began as a specific forum for peace on the Korean peninsula, can develop into a region-wide security forum for Northeast Asia. The focus of the multilateral forum can then shift to a more encompassing peace mission for East Asia. For example, the non-nuclear declaration signed by the two Koreas in 1991 and endorsed by the four surrounding powers can serve as a basis for building a regional nuclear-weapons-free zone that includes not only the Korean peninsula but also Japan. The multilateral regional forum can perhaps start addressing regional security issues such as the arms race in Northeast Asia. As it expands its scope, such a dialogue may develop into a multilateral common security organization similar to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Realism and Idealism in Search of a New Formula

E. H. Carr illuminates in his seminal work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, a dialectical way in which realism and idealism interact.³⁶ Realism, Carr explains, emphasizes facts and their analysis, and tends to downplay the role of purpose. Realism tends to “emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, these forces and tendencies.” Carr warns that this type of realism, though at times needed as a corrective to the excesses of utopianism, might result in “the sterilization of thought and the negation of action.” He admits that there is also a period when “utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism.” Thought without analysis is utopian, but thought without purpose is barren. In a final dialectical synthesis, therefore, Carr proposes that mature thought combines purpose with observation and analysis: “Utopia and reality are thus

the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place.”³⁷

How do we find a place for reality and utopia in designing a path toward a peace regime on the Korean peninsula? A beginning lies in envisioning a creative synthesis of brute power politics and liberal institution-building, a step that is critically contingent on transcending the antagonistic self-other divide to imagine the other in a non-antagonistic way. In Northeast Asia, a simple acceptance of power politics provides no guarantee of peace. Tripartite militarization by the United States, South Korea, and Japan will only precipitate negative reactions from North Korea, China, and Russia, aggravating an already tense environment of the region and possibly triggering a more intense arms race and even a war. As long as the United States, South Korea, and Japan pursue the realist power strategy of strengthening and integrating their military alliances, the international system in the region will continue to be tense. At the same time, South Korea and Japan may become prisoners of their complacency, unable to develop their own vision of a new regional order—one that would slow the arms race and promote a peaceful interaction among the nations of Northeast Asia.

This vicious cycle was first broken by the Agreed Framework in which each side to the confrontation not only recognized its adversary's security concerns but also took measures to allay them. Further progress was made when Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il held a summit in 2000, moving the two Koreas closer to amity. The final step in this first round of the peace process was to be Clinton's own summit meeting with the North Korean leader. Clinton's contradiction-ridden “conengagement” policy was taking a decisive turn toward engagement, only to be stopped and reversed by Bush. The 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* stifled debate within the Bush administration by reasserting the two-wars strategy. Thus, proponents of containment have gained an almost irreversible momentum and mortally crippled those who favor engagement, which will only exacerbate the tension

36. Vendulka Kubalkova, “The Twenty Years' Catharsis: E. H. Carr and IR,” in Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert, eds., *International Relations in a Constructed World* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).

37. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 10.

that Clinton's "old" two-war strategy had created.³⁸

To resolve the missile issue and to build peace in the region, a new security framework is needed, one that deemphasizes the centrality of power politics and stresses the importance of multilateral interactions among countries in Northeast Asia. A balance must be struck between alliance politics and multilateral peace endeavors. Continued arms transfers from the United States to South Korea, the accelerating arms build-up by South Korea, and joint efforts in arms production—particularly of ballistic missile defense systems—by Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo make any peace proposal a barren gesture. An initiative for peace talks must be coupled with a blueprint for reducing the centrality of military transactions within the military alliances. To acknowledge the reality of the security dilemma and the necessity of reciprocity is the first step toward a regional peace initiative.

Principal References

- Aspin, Les. "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options." Washington, D.C.: House Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1992.
- Auster, Bruce B., Kevin Whitelaw, and Thomas Omestad. "Upping the Ante for Kim Jong Il: Pentagon Plan 5030, a New Blueprint for Facing Down North Korea," *U.S. News and World Report*, July 21, 2003, p. 21.
- Cha, Victor D., and David C. Kang. *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
- Cummings, Bruce. *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*. New York: Norton, 1997.
- _____. *North Korea: Another Country*. New York: New Press, 2004.
- Dunnigan, James F. *How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare for the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Mor-

38. Jae-Jung Suh, "The Two-Wars Doctrine and the Regional Arms Race: Contradictions in U.S. Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia," *Critical Asian Studies*, vol. 35, No. 1 (2003), pp. 3-32.

- row, 3rd ed., 1993.
- Hamm, Taik-Young. *Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital, and Military Power*. New York: Routledge, 1999.
- Harrison, Selig S. "Time to Leave Korea?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, No. 2 (2001), pp. 62-78.
- Hayes, Peter. *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991.
- Kang, David C. "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 47 (2003), pp. 301-24.
- Kristensen, Hans M. "Preemptive Posturing," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 58, No. 5 (2002), pp. 54-59.
- Lee, Samsōng. *Hanbando Haekmunjewa Migukwoegyo* (The Nuclear Question and U.S. Policy on the Korean Peninsula). Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1994.
- Mearsheimer, John J. *Conventional Deterrence, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Norton, Pat. "Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues," Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, Policy Forum Online, Nautilus Institute, 1997.
- O'Hanlon, Michael. "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier Than the Pentagon Thinks," *International Security*, vol. 22 (1998), pp. 135-70.
- O'Hanlon, Michael E. and Mike Mochizuki. *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003.
- Oberdorfer, Don. *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*. New York: Basic Books, rev. ed., 2001.
- Posen, Barry R. *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Ravenal, Earl E. "The Defense Planning Process as a Pivotal Determinant of a Nation's Foreign Policy: The U.S. FY 1998 Defense Budget and Its Critics," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 29, 1997.
- Sigal, Leon V. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Suh, Jae-Jung. "Blitzkrieg or Sitzkrieg? Assessing a Second Korean War," *Pacifica Review*, vol. 11, No. 2 (1999), pp. 151-76.

- _____. "The Two-Wars Doctrine and the Regional Arms Race: Contradictions in U.S. Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia," *Critical Asian Studies*, vol. 35, No. 1 (2003), pp. 3-32.
- Wada, Haruki. *Pukchosôn: yugyôktaikukkaesô chônggyugun'gukkaro* (North Korea: From a Guerilla State to a Regular Army State), trans. by Ki-Jung Nam and Dong-Man Suh. Seoul: Tolbegai, 2002.
- U.S. Department of Defense. "Nuclear Posture Review," Washington, D.C., 2002.