

THE PEACE SYSTEM IN CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN POST-WAR AND CURRENT JAPAN: CONFLICT, REPARATIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION

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Peace treaties and agreements are neither the end of conflict nor the beginning of confidence because they do not always by themselves provide a guarantee for efficient, successful implementation. They also mark the beginning of opening the way to the reconstruction of societies and value systems crippled by serious conflicts. Rebuilding of the peace system is the key to preventing hostilities and developing the systems for building mutual confidence among former adversaries. The Japanese constitution, as the institutionalized or built-in peace system, is the essential technical factor for the East Asian peace system.

Key words: peace, Japanese Constitution, reparation, memories of conflicts, reconstruction

Introduction

Stability and instability were the concepts that most heavily influenced geopolitical strategy during and after World War II. In the process, communism and the forces of communism

became major focal points of concern. Instability was identified with the threat of nuclear war, the U.S.-Soviet standoff, and military intrusions upon other countries. The threat of spreading communism and the struggle to contain it together provided the adversarial atmosphere with a sense of legitimacy. The notion of protecting one's own country or other countries from the threat of communism, from within and without, was accepted as a justifiable basis for going to war.

That war is something to be won or lost is a proposition that even today overshadows the notion that war will always come to an end. Now instability is identified with spreading terrorism. The threat of terrorism is perceived as a basis for going to war.

The long-partitioned Korean peninsula faces some extremely serious problems now, and China is burdened by various problems as well. However, the United States and Japan also have plenty of problems of their own with respect to peace building. Although the culture and history of East Asia is diverse, not much importance is attached to systematically analyzing the relationship between society and people in this region. As such, when some conflict occurs, there is a tendency to explain this situation by means of some conventional concept-nationalism, power politics, or imitation of methods adopted by advanced countries in dealing with crises. But if the Asian system is one memory of conflicts, it is impossible to understand and realize systemic changes and reforms unless they are viewed from a historic standpoint. Just as nationalism differs from sincerity, memory in the form of a system determines what is right and what to place at the center of politics. In this sense, it is crucial to understand the Japanese constitution in a new light, as an essential peace system. Northeast Asia has the potential to become the first place where the relationships between each country and the "stability" of the entire region are created by memories of the war and by a value system based on such memories, without relying on latent force, threat, and win-or-lose dualism.

The essential question, however, is what can generations do to solve security problems through history and regain identity lost by economic turmoil.

Memories of Conflicts and Identities

Identities

In relation to the causes and outcomes of World War II, Japan's acknowledgment of its war crimes and atrocities would signify the culmination of its atonement and represent a new beginning for the countries and individuals that were victimized. This is perhaps the root difference separating the parties. State memories constitute a reconstruction of a state's relationship with the past. As international bonds strengthen, that process will continually take into account the views of other individuals and countries and face certain challenges. Those challenges may involve questions about reparations, territory, and other complicated issues that could take time to solve. At the same time, though, as questions of law, justice, and value with a direct bearing on public well-being or contentment come to light, some issues demand that the state be involved. In such cases, accordingly, it is essential that the state assume a leadership role.

East Asian countries are characterized by several key factors. First, economic power is the main factor for East-West, or East-East relationships, followed by military force. Second, a variety of characteristics and mixed identities exist, depending on each nation and region. Third, in the global system after World War II and during the cold war, the Asian region played a balancing and/or cooperative role in the East-West and South-North confrontations. Fourth, countries in the region have experienced more or less a historic, political turnabout after World War II. Fifth, modernization amid competition among nations have improved national strength in East Asia, as well as in other countries in Asia in the 20th century. Strengthened national power was an urgent task motivating the introduction of Western technology and values.

It is typical in Japan that a large number of standards were strongly influenced mainly by economic values. The postwar framework in Japan shows a conflict between people who regard past mistakes as a source of problems for postwar society and spare no efforts to turn negative inheritances into enriched soil for the future, and people who want to separate the past

mistakes from the present and future after 1945. The two parties have been in conflict with each other both openly and secretly and have insisted on their memories, identities, and values. We can see the conflict at every turn in political, judicial, and economic circles or events.¹

In a sense, economic turmoil is also a kind of conflict based on the win-or-lose dualism that may affect the identities of Japanese people. The sense of growing crisis and direct damages has stirred up public discussion about reform. In Japan, today as in the past the reform movement began only when unavoidable economic turmoil, extreme poverty, or terrible corruption came to light. On this point, economic turmoil provided an opportunity to review current policies, systems, and security problems.

Nowadays East Asian countries do not have to deal with Western colonial occupation or any other form of outside control as they did in former decades. Nevertheless, past memories are still alive, and those memories of conflict and constraint still affect current defense systems and strategic relations. Therefore, the change in generations is an essential element in the solution of conflicts that are influenced by the memories of the past.

There are still questions. Have we proven successful in properly raising the next generation with an eye to future solutions? Don't we still see opponents only from the perspective of the former strategic framework of the cold war? It can be questioned whether or not our generation has improved the system of peace. As generations with past memories are fading out, the systems formed by those declining generations (or systems never formed) have not always been effective. It is necessary to create identities supported by values other than just economic values.

*From Identity As Victor To Identity As Vanquished:
Unchanged Values*

After the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, there was clear evidence that Japanese industrial and military modernization had been accomplished over a short half century of time. Despite the many successful industrial acquisitions, however, many studies pay too little attention to factors that had the potential to worsen the situation. Although Japan's modernization was accomplished and sustained by wars and by using cheap labor, Japan lacked both resources and a democratic system.² To be sure, Japan was a developed country compared with the other countries in Asia. At the same time, however, whenever Japan compared itself to Western countries, latent confrontations surfaced. This is exemplified by developments in Japan in recent years. Furthermore, in the process of modernization, large enterprises or political factions survived because of the sacrifices of the rural labor units. Increasing military public debts squeezed rural property.³ The shadowy, negative factors of the Meiji Era as well as the Taisho Era contributed to an accumulation of bellicosity and aspirations to become a colonial power in Asia. Although the Meiji Restoration and modernization encouraged the colonized and/or half-colonized Asian countries to seek independence, and thus side with the winner, Japan's lack of democracy did not allow public opinion to check the government's inclination toward war.

Freedom from oppression was conceivably one of the deep-rooted factors underlying Japan's profit motive. In Japan, this "freedom" was directly tied to the notion of "power." As one of the "have-nots" (i.e., in possession of only a few colonies) within the community of nations prior to World War II, Japan had felt

1. Kikui Reiji, *International Society and Japan's Role* (Kyoto, Japan: Minervashobo, 2002), p. 121; Onoda Setsuko, "Arts in Policies, Nation in Arts: National Consciousness in its Relationship with Chinese Woodprints," *Shimane Journal of North East Asian Research*, vol. 3 (March, 2002), pp. 205-6.

2. About the problems of the Meiji Era, see: Earl H. Kinmonth, *The Self-Made Man in Meiji Japanese Thought: From Samurai to Salary Man* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 207-13; Ohama Tetsuya, *The Grave of Meiji-era* (Tokyo: Kawade-shobo-shinsha/Kawade, 1990), p. 90; Yoshino Sakuzo, "The Beginning of Political Consciousness in Japanese Modern History," in *The Collection of Treatises by Yoshino Sakuzo* (Tokyo: Chuo-kouron, 1976), pp. 212-14, 257.

3. Tetsuya, *The Grave of Meiji-era*, p. 65.

oppressed by the Western powers. As such, it sought to solve conditions of economic depression and poverty at home by subjecting the rest of Asia to colonial rule. At the time, rural life in Japan was characterized by extreme poverty, and life was not that much better for workers in urban areas either. A strict hierarchy of privilege was enforced on the basis of age, gender, and genealogical descent. Traditional restrictions and family-based rules controlled literally every facet of life for the average individual. Under the militaristic policies that reigned during the war years, everyone (whether by choice or not) was forced to endure a life of privation, and freedom of speech was completely suppressed. Only one set of values was accepted as good, and everything else was either banned outright or subject to stiff suppression.

Despite the superficial “overnight” transformation of its social structure, Japan continued to face a contradiction in value systems that would continue to brood into the postwar years. In effect, during its rapid-growth era, Japan sought to achieve its goals as an aspiring world power through economic ascension in addition to drawing on its still-intact arsenal of technological prowess. (Japan’s foreign exchange during the Korean War had increased from \$590 million to \$800 million dollars).⁴ Coupled as it was to an ever-growing appetite for mass consumption, within the social system this ambition gave the notion of money-as-power a solid reputation as a means of achieving freedom from the forces of suppression. Hence, for now, the goal would be to quickly—indeed, in blitzkrieg fashion—shake off the humiliation of defeat by putting the economy back together.⁵ This would be Japan’s primary goal in the postwar years.

As the rapid-growth era drew to a close, rural Japan faced a shortage of job opportunities, and urban Japan faced a shortage of labor.⁶ These forces, together with changes in economic structures at the rural level, had the effect of fueling a population influx into the Tokyo area. The economic disparities between

population centers and the rest of the nation continued to widen in practically every dimension. As one of the solutions, projects were implemented to build roads, bridges, and other infrastructure (such as dams and nuclear power plants) that the smaller communities had long yearned for. However, instead of nurturing a reciprocally balanced set of relations that would allow rural districts to establish their own economic independence, many of these projects were designed to provide rural districts with new access to financial resources merely by placing them under the central government’s control through the provision of subsidies.⁷

However, the value system embraced by most people at that time had been increasingly influenced by realistic arguments favoring steps to revitalize those rural districts plagued by progressive depopulation, as well as by the widespread conviction that politics was a vehicle for the realization of one’s own selfish interests. Together with powerful politicians in the national government, there were also citizens who wanted to see their districts’ interests served through the implementation of large public works projects.

On top of this, there were the local chambers of commerce, industrial associations, community councils, and farm cooperatives, all of which were capable of strongly influencing voter turnout in local elections.⁸ In terms of national policy, these groups demonstrated a tendency to opt for methods aimed at direct self-interest rather than the interest of the national social system at large. That by and large is the criterion by which “politics” is measured even to this day. In effect, Japanese politics ended up being ruled by nepotism on a massive scale.

4. The Bank of Japan (Nippon Ginko), revenue and expenditure report, 1954.

5. Takeuchi Hiroshi, *History of Japanese Economic Development* (Chikumashobo Tokyo: Chikuma Pub., 1988), pp. 138, 165-166.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

7. One of the critical matters in the Japanese administrative reform plan is the transfer competence of local government, including financial affairs, grant from the national government to the local governments. The Japanese government has struggled over this plan for over fifteen years. To understand the history and problems, see: “Finance Society of Japan,” *Administrative Reform and the Law of Finance* (Tokyo: Ryusei, 2003); Masujima Toshiyuki, *The Viewpoint and Development of Administrative Reform* (Tokyo: Gyousei, 2003).

8. Hiroshi, *History of Japanese Economic Development*, pp. 229, 264; “The Absence of Autonomy Consciousness,” *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), April 19, 1955; “The Reality of Rural Elections,” *Asahi Shimbun*, April 21, 1955.

These realities effectively demonstrate how power—so dependent on monetary value during the postwar economic reconstruction of Japanese society—was eventually consolidated into a set of shared values during the crisis atmosphere of the cold war. This was a period during which many people had the mistaken assumption that politics meant pursuing development or construction projects or otherwise exercising unbridled authority in accordance with arbitrarily set goals. Such people at the time were behind policies that sought only short-term gain, speed, or efficiency rather than the erection of the kinds of systems society should have been pursuing over the longer term. The ongoing diversification of values was thus cut short. The history of procedure and values ultimately could not be passed on, and the shared memory or state memory was in turn unable to crystallize into a new value system. Any time an economic crisis or turmoil appeared, the nation risked losing its identity.

Turning Point of the Memory of Conflict: 1990

Japan's responses to the first war in the Persian Gulf, to civil war in the states of the former Yugoslavia, and to recent acts of terrorism have been shaped and influenced by a complex mixture of perceptions toward "conquering nations" that can be traced back to the days following its defeat in 1945. We need only recall that the "Pacific War" has often been explained as a war of liberation in which Japan fought as the "white knight" against the Asian colonization policies of the Western Alliance.⁹

On this point, and in light of the fact that Japan's political system at that time led to atrocities committed in the name of the state, we need to consider several realities that have become entangled with fatal identity flaws: namely, that Japan has no awareness of its crimes, or does not know the policy measures that should be implemented to deal with that fact, or willfully

9. *The World*, No. 548 (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten/Iwanami Pub., December 1990), pp. 27-29, 50-51; Takashi Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama, "Introduction" and Arif Dirlik, "'Trapped in History' on the Way to Utopia: East Asia's 'Great War' Fifty Years Later," in Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama, eds., *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 15, 303; *The World*, No. 549 (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten/Iwanami, January 1991), p. 88.

obfuscates such measures. It is important to note that Japan has tied its freedom from subjugation to the United States to such notions as increased military power, independent security frameworks, and international contributions to the fight against "common threats." Given recent military affairs (including efforts against "terrorism") and slumping economic trends, little attention has been devoted to the "forward-looking" relationship Japan has sought with neighboring countries it invaded in the past. Instead, Japan is constantly reflecting on an identity that glorifies its former military might and places more power in the national flag and anthem—notions Japan was supposed to have abandoned along the path to resuming its position as a responsible member of the international community of nations.¹⁰

This trend has been amplified through the synchronized actions of the mass media and certain political factions within the current administration. Over the past decade, and the past three years in particular, newspapers, TV programs, and magazine media have sent a consistent message that demonstrates how readily people can be moved by the hype of such past values, although it should be noted that the publication of many of these stories merely reflects media's concern with audience ratings, circulation, or ordinary profits. The "threat" posed by North Korea has been harnessed as nothing other than a tool to that end.

Six laws relevant to national security have been passed since 1990 in Japan: the International Peace Cooperation Law, the Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, three emergency laws, and the Law on Special Measures for Assisting the Rehabilitation of Iraq. Except for the first of these, all the laws made it possible for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to assist U.S. military actions. Moreover, a revision of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) allows Japan to provide ammunition at the stage when Japan is in a "state of expecting an attack," that is, even when

10. The Law of the National Flag and Anthem, August 8, 1999 (August 13, 1999, enforced). Although the law does not directly restrain freedom, accompanying orders and guidelines are restraints upon individual freedom and human rights, especially those of teachers.

Japan is not directly attacked. This is a clearly contrived way of supporting U.S. use of force.¹¹ The real goal here is to revise Article 9 of the constitution, the article that renounces war as a state policy.

Japan's economic reconstruction and development from the ashes of war was achieved precisely because Japan no longer had the ability to actively wage war itself. Budget resources that until that point had been earmarked for military ends were instead re-funneled into the advancement of the private-sector economy. However, today, many people under the burden of economic hardship, without the benefits formerly afforded by the cold war, and facing the impoverishment of their existing political value system, are striving once again to recover their national pride. A sense of national rebirth always pushes people to seek a way out from defeat or misfortune.

The real question is, however, not whether Japan suffered a defeat in war or in some other enterprise. Rather, a key problem seems to be that an already-defeated Japanese society and its state apparatus placed so much value in win-or-lose dualism: i.e., what had to be done to win, what would have been assured through victory, and what was learned through defeat. Added to this dualism is the important problem that victors and vanquished had failed, in the course of reconstruction, to respect the will of a populace that had gained its independence, and had failed to establish a political system, either domestically or internationally, that assimilated the lessons of defeat.

For people living today, that chronicle serves as nothing more than an excuse, trimmed to shape as necessary, to evade domestic and international issues with links to the past. This convenient revisionism in turn permits the assertion that all problems including economic turmoil and security will be solved by abandoning the constitution "imposed" on Japan by the Allies.

Under this revisionism, on July 26, 2003, the Diet enacted controversial legislation to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq.¹² Under the legislation, the SDF will provide logistical sup-

11. Revision of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, government draft, *Asahi Shimbun*, February 20, 2004 and March 1, 2004.

12. *Asahi Shimbun*, July 27, 2003.

port for U.S.-led forces. Despite approval of the bill, the Japanese government struggled with exactly where and when the SDF should be sent to maintain security, provide humanitarian assistance, and rebuild the infrastructure in Iraq. However, rebuilding a country's social system is not the job of the military; that job belongs to the civilian government or nongovernmental organizations. The emergency defense legislation approved on June 6 is also controversial because it may limit human rights and rural autonomy, and commit Japan to collective defense under U.S. leadership.¹³ While only four countries dispatched forces to maintain public peace and order in Iraq (sixteen countries dispatched combat forces), the Japanese government wrestled with ways to get legislative backing for its use of military force.¹⁴ Clearly, the government's aim is not building peace but gaining status in international affairs by being able to use force.

We must ask whether, in the course of striving to bring newly acquired democratic values closer to their pragmatic peace ideals, the mass media, parliament, and government administration, supported by the voting public, have been making efforts to deal with Japan's "rebirth of identity," as was the case with reconstruction and the creation of new social systems in the postwar era.

Systemized/Institutionalized Memories and Peace

Reparations

Japan's new relationships with Asian countries after World War II started from peace treaties and reparations. These relationships opened the way to today's various economic aid projects. Even if understood as a natural extension of policies aimed at disarming Japan in the same way that its former Axis allies in Europe were disarmed, eliminating the values that supported militarism and fostering democratic principles within the geopolitical climate that took shape in the immediate "postwar" years,

13. *Asahi Shimbun*, June 7, 2003.

14. The data as of July 17, 2003, from the Foreign Policy and Defense Commission.

the generous overtures of peace made at the initiative of the United States seemed hasty and coercive in the eyes of many nations victimized by Japan. At the San Francisco peace conference, they collectively denounced this generosity. In particular, Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which became the legal cornerstone for reparations, went no further than to establish that war reparations would be paid by the Japanese, in principle, and contained no provisions detailing specific sums or the countries that would receive those reparations. Thus, it was necessary that separate negotiations and agreements addressed these issues. What is more, with the Korean War fully under way and Japan preoccupied with reconstruction and the fulfillment of special procurement contracts, the peace treaty was signed without further, separate deliberation on a range of crucial issues, including liability for the war in Asia and Japan's role.

Effectively bundled with the Japan-U.S. security pact, the peace treaty created a situation that demanded that these issues for Asian countries be redefined and restructured within a separate context. For example, Nationalist China and India entered into separate peace treaties with Japan and forfeited their claims to reparations. (The People's Republic of China also abandoned its claim to reparations later on.) Cambodia and Laos also eventually forfeited their reparation claims. In the end, Japan entered reparations-related negotiations only with Vietnam and the Philippines, both of which demanded reparations under the peace treaty; with Indonesia, which did not ratify the peace treaty; and with Burma (now Myanmar), which did not participate in the peace treaty negotiations.

Payment Situation

The charts that follow list reparations paid and outstanding at the beginning of the reparation processes.¹⁵ Japan began full-scale reparation negotiations after the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia from April 18-24, 1955. According to the general account budget of the finance ministry, the special account for settlement of special debt of reparation, which

15. Finance Ministry, "Trial Balance," *Asahi Shimbun*, July 17, 1955.

Table 1. Paid and Outstanding Reparations as of 1955

Paid reparations (as of 1955)	1. Burma: \$200 million in total, 10-year period. \$20 million (¥7.2 billion) redemption by yearly installment, and annual credit of \$5 million. 2. Prisoners of Allied Powers: £4.5 million, 1 year. 3. The special yen account for Thailand: ¥5.4 billion paid in pounds, 5-year period. 4. The pounds bond and dollars bond of \$9.3 billion (balance on 1955); the payment of principal and interest was \$23 million per year.		
Outstanding reparations (as of 1955)	1. Philippines: \$550 million in total, 18-year period; \$30 million (¥10 billion) annual redemption. 2. Indonesia: \$20-\$30 million (balance). 3. Vietnam: on negotiation, the South Vietnamese government claims \$2,250,000 for saving sunken vessels. Reparation of \$55,600,000 was also claimed. 4. Debts with America: \$600 million in total, 30-year period, annual interest at 2.5 percent (pre-war debts, Government and Relief in Occupied Areas, etc.) 5. Reparations to neutral powers and certain Allied powers: \$200-\$300 million (estimate) except Switzerland: 12,250,000 Swiss francs (¥1,080,000,000) 1 year. Released commodities by British Forces: ¥8 billion in total (¥4 billion paid), \$50 million annual redemption.		
Annual Foreign Payment (51 billion in total)	For Neutral Powers		
Ireland (2), Sweden (45), Denmark (627), Spain (911) ^a , Portugal (7), Stateless-person (3)	Claims to Japan for war damages during Japanese occupation in Asian countries (1955):	Pre-war debts kept in force or revived by Art.18, San Francisco Peace Treaty. (Art. 8 of Peace Treaty, in respect of India) (1955):	Foreign assets in Japan reclaimed by Allied Powers under Art.15 (Art.5 for India), San Francisco Peace Treaty:
	USA (1), U.K. (352), Australia (1), Canada (3), Pakistan (18), Argentina (1), Iraq (109), Iran (4), India (27)	USA (595), U.K. (341), France (35) ^b , Australia (35), Canada (27), Turkey (5), New Zealand (9), Greece (4), Pakistan (7), Union of South Africa (3), Norway (1), Syria (1), Mexico (1), Argentina (1), Netherlands (3) ^c , India (1)	

Note: ^aThe Japanese government paid reparations of \$5,500,000 to Spain for damages, including 300 Spanish people slaughtered and the consulate and churches burned by Japanese forces when they withdrew.
^bExcept for Special Yen problems.
^cIncludes claims for mistreated war-prisoners.

should be carried over to the next year's budget, was ¥10 billion. Hence, the finance ministry was opposed to the claims of Asian countries. On the other hand, Japanese defense spending reached ¥45.9 billion the same year.¹⁶

Japanese indemnity services and product exports were arranged for each of the countries with which reparation negotiations had been held. According to a reparations status report released in 1961, agreements on reparations, economic aid, and technical assistance were concluded, ratified, and implemented from the mid-1950s to the 1960s.¹⁷ However, during government-level negotiations held in 1955 and thereafter, the Japanese side was conspicuous in its insistence on reduced reparations.

Agreements

With Burma, Japan signed a peace treaty in Rangoon on November 5, 1954.¹⁸ The treaty entered into force on April 16, 1955. Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo and Burmese Foreign Minister Kyaw Nyein also signed the Agreement for Reparations and Economic Co-operation.¹⁹ On March 20, 1955, revisions were made to the government decree ordering the return of assets to Burma. Prior to this, a review clause had been added to Article 5 of the Peace Treaty in 1954, which brought about a number of changes. This was because balancing the interests of other countries that were demanding reparations began to emerge as a problem. For example, as of January 16, 1961, the end of the sixth year of reparations to Burma, Japan had provided over ¥15 billion to the country, mostly in the form of capital investments, including ¥2.2 billion in development funding and ¥6.9 billion in capital goods (according to figures

16. Finance Ministry, Reference Materials for the Annual Expenditure Budget of Special Account (1955), p. 261.

17. The Society for the Research of Reparation, *The Present Reparation Status Report* (Tokyo: Gaiko-jihō-sha/Foreign Affairs Report Pub., 1961), pp. 200-3.

18. Collection des Traites, 1955-XXXIII, Nos. 26 and 1221. Hereafter, Treaties.

19. Ibid., Nos. 27 and 1222. In relation to the Japanese government's economic interests, see "Ministers' Conference," *Asahi Shimbun*, March 10, 1955 and March 11, 1955.

released January 17, 1961). At Japan's request, initial plans worked out in 1955 to pay an average \$20 million annually in reparations, for a total of around \$200 million (¥7.2 billion) over a ten-year span, were postponed.²⁰

In the case of *the Philippines*, although difficulties had been experienced in the Japan-Philippines reparation negotiations, the Reparations Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines (including exchanged notes and agreed minutes) was signed in Manila on May 9, 1956. It entered into force on July 23, 1956. The agreement provided for reparations in the form of capital goods, the total value of which would be so much in yen as should be equivalent to \$550 million computed at ¥198 billion within a ten-year period. For the succeeding ten-year period, the annual average payment was determined to be equivalent to \$30 million, computed at ¥10.8 billion.²¹

The Plenipotentiary Takasaki Tatsunosuke and the Plenipotentiary Felino Neri also signed an Exchange of Notes between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Economic Development Loans. The loans or similar credit arrangements (\$250 million, or ¥90 billion at that time) were to be extended by private firms or nationals of Japan to private firms or nationals of the Philippines.²²

Japan sealed reparation agreements and exchanged letters of understanding with the Philippines on development assistance, allowing for reparations weighted significantly more toward manufactured goods than toward service indemnities. However, with respect to reparation negotiations concerning private loans on the order of \$250 million, the Philippines declared that loan terms in exchange for ¥7.2 billion in the second year were too stringent. The Philippines cited problems with the schedule for deferred payments, and accordingly demanded relaxed loan terms. However, the Japanese side proved unyielding.²³ Throughout the negotiations, Japan insisted

20. Peace Treaty, Art. 5 (1-3) in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaties Bureau, *Current Treaties and Agreements, "Burma"* (Tokyo, 1963). And see *Asahi Shimbun*, March 22, 1955. The Agreement on Economic Co-operation was signed on March 29, 1963.

21. *Treaties*, 1956-XXXIV, Nos. 33 and 1290.

22. Ibid., Nos. 34 and 1291.

23. Society for the Research of Reparation, *The Present Reparation Status*

on tighter terms or reduced amounts for loans to counterpart nations. Japan also generally demonstrated a less-than-objective or sincere posture with respect to victimized countries or with respect to its own acts of aggression in Asia and the role it was expected to fulfill in return as a driving force for Asian reconstruction and development.

At that time, an overwhelming majority of public opinion polls and industry trade papers in Japan highlighted intense demand for ever greater economic benefits despite impressive figures for GDP growth.²⁴

With respect to *Indonesia*, Japan on January 20, 1958 concluded two agreements: the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of Indonesia²⁵ and the Reparations Agreement.²⁶ Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro and Indonesian Foreign Minister Soebandrio also signed a Protocol between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Relating to Settlement of the Claims with Respect to Balances in the Former Clearing Accounts and Other Accounts,²⁷ and the Exchange of Notes concerning commercial loans and investments.²⁸ During the negotiations, the Japanese government regarded the reparation payment as an economic opportunity, enabling it to take part in Southeast Asian development. On the other hand, the Indonesian government insisted that the reparation should not be treated as an economic aid program.²⁹ Because of these differences, it took over three years to conclude the agreements.

According to the agreements, the supply of products and services constituting reparations was to be made at an annual

Report, pp. 200-1; *Asahi Shimbun*, April 17, 1955, May 31, 1955, and June 15, 1955.
 24. *Asahi Shimbun*, January 13, 1955, February 28, 1955, and March 15, 1955; "National Opinion Research," *Asahi Shimbun*, May 10, 1961 and March 25, 1965; report on "Japan, 20 Years After the War," *Asahi Shimbun*, May 10, 1965.
 25. *Treaties*, 1958-XXXVI, Nos. 7 and 1362.
 26. *Ibid.*, Nos. 8 and 1363.
 27. *Ibid.*, 1958-XXXVI, Nos. 9 and 1364.
 28. *Ibid.*, Nos. 10 and 1365.
 29. "Foreign Ministers Conference," *Asahi Shimbun*, March 28, 1955 and April 25, 1955.

average of the yen equivalent of \$20 million, which was computed at ¥7.2 billion, during the first eleven years. The outstanding balance was to be settled in the twelfth year. Since Japan had renounced a previous credit of \$176 million, a twenty-year loan of \$400 million was extended to Indonesia.

Concerning *South Vietnam*, when the Vietnamese government refused to give Japan most-favored-nation status, negotiations reached a deadlock. The Vietnamese case required careful handling since it was unclear which government (North or South) should be regarded as the legitimate one. After a long hiatus, the two countries came to an agreement. On May 13, 1959, the Reparation Agreement was signed; it entered into force on January 12, 1960.³⁰ Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau also signed an Agreement of the Loan³¹ and an Exchange of Notes Relating to Commercial Loans and Investments³² the same day. During a five-year period Japan was to supply capital goods at \$39 million (approximately ¥14 billion), and during a three-year period a loan of \$7.5 million was to be granted. The agreements were important in the context of international relationships and politics, since Japan's decision making was strongly influenced by the U.S.-led South Vietnamese government's anticommunist policies. Fifteen major economic organizations, such as the Japanese-Vietnamese Trade Organization and the Japanese International Trade Organization, issued an official statement against the government's decision.³³ At the same time, the North Vietnamese government officially declared against the reparation agreements and announced that North Vietnam reserved the right to claim war damages.³⁴ The Japanese government insisted that since Japan had entered into diplomatic relations with South Vietnam by way of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the legitimate government of Vietnam was South Vietnam.³⁵

30. *Treaties*, 1960-XXXVIII, Nos. 1 and 1407.
 31. *Ibid.*, Nos. 2 and 1408.
 32. *Ibid.*, Nos. 3 and 1409.
 33. *Asahi Shimbun*, May 8, 1959.
 34. *Ibid.*, May 11, 1959.
 35. *Ibid.*

Special Yen

In talks held on March 28, 1955, by Thailand's Foreign Minister Prince Wan Waithayakorn and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, Thailand proposed a reparations sum of ¥50 billion.³⁶ Earlier, Japan had purchased ¥130 billion in supplies for its military forces in Thailand with ¥1.5 billion in special yen loans. Japan accomplished this by having the Thai government lend it funds in baht and then having the Bank of Japan deposit converted yen amounts into Thailand's Tokyo account.

The reparations sum proposed by Thailand was calculated on the special yen loans basis. Although this occurred after comments made the same month by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the effect that more Japanese goods must be exported to Southeast Asian markets, the sum corresponded with Japan's request for reduced reparations.³⁷ After the negotiations, it was agreed that Japan would provide Thailand a sum of ¥5.4 billion over a five-year period, in addition to another ¥9.6 billion in loans and investment funding.³⁸

The Directory of Southeast Asian Industry and Technology is a compendium of data on Southeast Asian resources, imports, and exports collected through prewar surveys of the countries with which Japan held individual negotiations following conclu-

sion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The information is extensive, ranging from data on mining, electric power, chemicals, machinery, and textiles to transportation, port and harbor operations, and the scale of investments by colonial powers.³⁹ If one were to calculate the losses suffered by the countries of South Asia based on these data for the period prior to the occupation by Japanese military forces, one would face the task of first estimating how much the figures changed after the Japanese military occupation, and second, determining the form of reparation for damages. However, as it turned out, reparations by Japan to these countries were later transformed into loans and economic aid.

In their coverage of the negotiations and circumstances described above, the Japanese media proved extremely passive. The leading national dailies in Japan—the *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, and *Daily Yomiuri*—most often limited their articles on these matters to a few lines or a single paragraph buried in the government affairs sections on the second or third page of their papers. By contrast, it can be argued that they put substantially more energy into establishing a public record of how Japan's defeat would be remembered, and in particular, made a conscious effort to shift the perspectives and debate from defeat to the termination of the war, and from that closure to a new beginning for Japan as a "peaceful" nation. As an extension of this shift, Japan pursued its de facto rearmament within the frameworks of "peace" and "prosperity."⁴⁰

Table 2. Reparation Payment Plan (February 28, 1961)

	Total reparation (¥)	Paid (¥)	(percent)
Burma	72,000,000,000	40,961,973,173	56.89
Philippines	198,000,000,000	41,349,318,203	20.88
Indonesia	80,308,800,000	15,051,507,375	18.74
Vietnam	14,040,000,000	1,714,913,400	12.22
Total	364,348,800,000	99,077,712,151	27.19

Source: Society for the Research of Reparation, *The Present Reparation Status Report*, p. 58.

36. *Ibid.*, March 30, 1955.

37. *Ibid.*, March 10, 1955; *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), March 10, 1955; "Asian Economic Aid," *Asahi Shimbun*, March 8, 1955; "Firmer U.S. Stand in Asia Indicated in New Appraisal," *New York Times*, March 7, 1955; *The World*, No. 548 (December, 1990), p. 347.

38. *Asahi Shimbun*, April 10, 1955.

39. Editorial Office, *The Directory of Southeast Asian Industry and Technology* (Tokyo: Sankaido, 1944).

40. Economic Planning Agency, *National Economic Calculation Yearbook* (1991). The GDP growth rate reached 10-12 percent. On the other hand, in Japan throughout the two wars in Korea and Vietnam, 134 U.S. military bases were provided for the U.S. forces (two bases were provided in 1985). See Maeda Tetsuo, *The Balance of U.S. Forces in Japan* (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo/Chikuma, 2000), pp.16-17.

The Establishment of the Constitution

Ongoing Tug-Of-War Over Its Value

Many countries became democracies after World War II. Democracy is of course a social system as well as a set of values. As such, it incorporates rules that prevent the subjugation or domination of one group by another, either through the use of force or authority. Further, it guarantees that all individuals shall be able to live in freedom without discrimination or oppression based on nationality, gender, race, origin, or creed. At the same time, it demands that these same rights be observed by and for all others. Assigning importance to these values equips one with a model or set of criteria for judging the task of nation building. These measures in turn eventually grow into full-fledged legal systems or administrative structures, and on a broader scale, into customs and cultures.

After the war, as a covenant with its people, Japan in the interim prepared to lay the groundwork for a new social structure through the promulgation of its constitution. The Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and put into force on May 3, 1947. Events leading up to this point included the following:

- the Four Point Principles drafted by State Minister Joji Matsumoto for tentative constitutional amendments (December 8, 1945);
- the Outline of Constitutional Amendments (drafted by the Japanese side and submitted to the U.S. General Headquarters on February 8, 1946);
- the Outline of Constitutional Amendments by the Japan Liberal Party (January 21, 1946);
- Constitutional Amendment Issues by the Japan Progressive Party (February 14, 1946).

All these placed sovereign authority in the hands of the emperor. The Socialist Party of Japan submitted an Outline of the New Constitution (February 24, 1946) that drastically curtailed the powers of the emperor and placed sovereign authority in the state (the national community, including the emperor).⁴¹

41. Nagai Kenichi and Toshitani Nobuyoshi, *The Japanese Constitution I*

The draft constitution (March 5, 1946) proposed by the Constitutional Commission declared that sovereign authority rested with the general public, including the emperor. The Outline of the New Constitution issued on November 11, 1945 by the Japanese Communist Party, the outline of the draft constitution proposed (on December 27, 1945) by the Research Commission on the Constitution, and the outline of the revised constitution proposed by Iwasaburo Takano (December 28, 1945) all placed sovereign authority in the Japanese people. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Japan, as drafted by the Japanese Communist Party (June 29, 1946), would have abolished the imperial system, dismantled the corporate zaibatsu, and renounced Japanese involvement in or support for wars of aggression.⁴²

As against these proposals from the Japanese side, the constitution drafted by General Headquarters under General Douglas MacArthur underwent several revisions following issuance of the MacArthur notes (Draft Submitted to the Japanese Government by the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), on February 13, 1946), and then faced a lengthy revision process in the Imperial Diet at the hands of the Lower House and House of Lords.

After the defeat, for the first time Japan had a constitution that called for democratic values and systems as well as disarmament. In particular, as would also be declared at the signing of the peace treaty, the constitution in its preamble explicitly states and pledges that Japan will assume a new stance in its future relations with the other countries of Asia. Japan was allowed to resume its position as a member of the international community of nations after resolving never again to use force in settlement of international disputes. The constitution clearly articulated the objectives of joint cooperation by Japan and the United States, and achieved status as a foundation for expected future undertakings in bilateral cooperation by Japan and its Asian neighbors.

1945-1949 (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1986); Sawano Giichi, *Permanent Neutrality and Unarmed Peace Constitution* (Osaka Economic University Pub., 2002), pp.152-53.

42. See Documents of Contemporary Constitution Research Institution, *The Japanese Constitution* (Tokyo: Horitsu-Bunka-sha, 2001).

However, after the turning point to the cold war in the 1950s, the United States itself, as well as certain groups within Japan that rejected the values espoused by the constitution and considered it to have been imposed on their country, began to see the constitution as a long-term impediment to the functions of the state and to Japan's actions in the realm of Asian geopolitics.⁴³ A rift had developed between those who, on the one hand, realized that the values of the constitution had been obtained through Japan's wartime defeat and provided clear benefits, and those who, on the other hand, denounced these values as unjust and an obstacle to the independence and decision-making powers of the state. This antagonistic rift would surface over and over again within the chambers of the Diet, on the pages of the mass media, and in the undercurrent of public opinion.⁴⁴

The forces that occupied Japan after its wartime defeat, however, unseated everyone who had held the reins of government power to that point, and a new set of systems and values was allowed to take root under occupation force supervision. This was one of the expected political outcomes of Japan's defeat. Nevertheless, the old morals and "autonomy" that Japan's conservatives asserted had been lost under the new system imposed from the outside could be reinstated; what had been done after the war could be undone.

Wartime defeat effectively brought liberation and democratic values for the first time to a Japanese population whose country had been unable to bring about any changes on its own. However,

43. See the remarkable analysis by Hirata Tetsuo, *Historical Study on the Red Purge* (Tokyo: Shin-Nippon, 2002), pp.184-85, 199-203; Reiji, *International Society and Japan's Role*, p. 97; Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals—Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 21-25, 64-66; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), chapters 13, 16; "Japan's Pendulum (course) Turns to the Right Again," *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 10, 1955. For comparison, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1951*, vols. 1-30, especially vol. 2: Administration of the Occupation; vol. 25, Reparations; and vol. 28, Elimination of Zaibatsu Control.

44. Onoda Setsuko, "Agreements: Post-war Cooperation, Reparations and the Muster," *Shimane Journal of North East Asian Research*, vol. 5 (March, 2003).

several problems remained. First, Japan was inexperienced in upholding these values. Second, its people were not familiar with political systems. And third, it had in fact spontaneously abandoned its own traditional morals and autonomy in the process of reaping unprecedented growth and prosperity through industrial production aimed at meeting the military procurement demand that arose with the Korean and Vietnam wars. The fundamental values, moral systems, and autonomy of a country cannot be readily altered through the imposition of something else from the outside. Such change comes about through popular acceptance and the exercise of affirmative choice. And indeed, it was the old, pre-war value system—dormant on the fringes of public awareness—that could not be readily changed. That system was characterized by the stigma and constraints of a vast societal hierarchy, belligerence, discrimination against the weak and underprivileged, a poor spirit of cooperation and tolerance, contempt for diversity, and an indifference to the past. All of these characteristics were rejected by the new constitution, and were rooted in the dualities of victory versus defeat, strong versus the weak.

An important point is that this value system was a covenant with the past and interstate agreements, gained in exchange not only for the stark fact that Japan had lost the war, but also the fact that it had committed atrocities. After it had been placed into force, the constitution was utilized to demonstrate, both domestically and internationally, the values that would form the foundation for Japan's future as a nation-state. However, many have neglected to consider that actively applying the values of the constitution in a more universal manner can be a fundamentally effective way of stemming modern conflict.

The promulgation of the Japanese constitution in 1946 was significant in two ways. First, inasmuch as it was promulgated the year after World War II, its provisions were not seriously influenced by the cold war that intensified some years later. As a result, it was drafted for improving Japan's stature within the international community, based on atoning for past crimes and supporting the well-being of the Japanese people. The other implication had to do with the essential role that this constitution—established as it was prior to the peace treaty, the treaties with individual countries, and the agreements concerning repa-

rations—would serve in reestablishing ties with the countries victimized by the war.

In essence, the constitution signified a pledge to renounce war, uphold the rights of the people, and, by extension, meet related ideals. It was a pledge not only to the Japanese public, but also to the countries that Japan victimized, yet it predated other bilateral and international treaties. In light of the intrinsic qualities of this pledge, the stance Japan adopted toward the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, as well as the political posture it displayed thereafter, cannot be described as having been based on keen political judgment or objectivity. By contrast, at that time, the United States and its allies clearly shared the ideals on which this constitution had been founded. However, having since established its own history of interference and aggression in Asia, the United States still does not appear to comprehend its problems in that region of the world.

For a long time, in reality, Japan's security problems were strongly influenced by U.S. policy in Asia at large even if one discounts the fact that Japan developed into a bastion of anti-communism as the cold war intensified. Understanding the international policies of the United States automatically meant understanding Japan's policies and attitudes. Or perhaps Japan's problems were problems with market impact, as is the case for today's financial markets. Hence, in terms of the obligation to uphold postwar international stability and order, the security problem for Japan was precisely whether it could meet its obligations to other countries, including the protection of its own autonomy, within the framework of its constitution as an institutionalized, built-in peace system.

For Political Steps Beyond Dualism

In terms of relations with its Asian neighbors, Japan had several choices for the future. They included the possibility—outside the peace-treaty framework—of pursuing diplomacy aimed at establishing long-term ties with nations other than treaty signatories; declarations—as a former war-waging state—aimed at fostering better ties with other nations; and the building of ties with Asian nations that were treated poorly by Japan in the course of pursuing its politically immature and hasty

wartime expansionist policies. The textbook issue in Japan—smoldering as it has like a glowing cinder ready to burst into flames with the slightest breeze—the Yasukuni Shrine visits by the prime minister and other cabinet members, the endless stream of foot-in-mouth gaffes by leading government officials, reductions in Official Development Assistance funding, and the movement to revise the constitution are all problems that stem from the immaturity of Japanese relations with Asian nations.⁴⁵

Whenever the textbooks issue arises (an issue that symbolizes Japan's problem in Asia), reaction in Japan typically includes assertions to the following effect: acts of war by Japan were provoked by other countries, certain surprise attacks by the Japanese in the course of the war were caused by conspiracies, or the orientation of the Japanese educational system has been skewed by having to teach each country's own perspective on history. Then again, Japanese tend to become impatient with any perceived lack of forgiveness from other countries in response to a formal apology, and rush to the conclusion that Japan should put its "autonomy" into shape in the name of stronger, easier-to-comprehend terms.

However, this attitude is not a reaction to a perceived lack of forgiveness. Rather, it can be seen as another Japanese reaction to international society based on the insistence on articulating the autonomy and superiority of their own country. And that insistence seems to come from a dualistic perception of bilateral relations: friend or foe, dominance or subordination.

Accordingly, the question in this case is whether, on the condition of peace, a nation that has been forgiven in some way for aggressions against another nation will live up to the obligations it accepted in return for that forgiveness. What is unforgivable is the untiring effort to overturn those obligations and attempt to restore the value system of a state that collapsed because it committed past crimes. Pledges articulated in the interest of moving relations forward must be fulfilled in principle whether they contain shortcomings or not. Consequently, the pressing challenge for Japan is how it will live up to its own obligations. It was the lack of shared values that allowed this problem to escape discussion even at a fundamental level inside

45. Reiji, *International Society and Japan's Role*, pp. 41-46.

Japan. The internal contradiction is reflected in the relationships with Asian countries.

This absence of fundamental discussion allows the problem to deteriorate into a question of, for example, whether Japan's relations with Asian countries would have improved had reparations been paid at a given point in time. To be sure, the situation conceivably would have been different had Japan's own economic reconstruction been hampered by the payment of reparations, or had the Japanese government and mass media made an effort to explain the significance of Japan's obligation to pay those reparations in terms of their grounds, causes, and results. Besides, states victimized by Japanese aggression had the justifiable right to seek reparations. However, as a realistic issue, it is essentially impossible to offset human losses and the memory of conflicts and atrocities committed against survivors with monetary compensation alone. One must also address the legal issues and take the political step of offering explicit apologies for acts committed in the name of the state. This is because these are the steps that have the power to link together memories and protocols, thereby facilitating change by both parties concerned (i.e., by the nation offering apologies and the nation(s) being given such apologies).

Conclusion

Asia has reached the threshold of yet another new phase with China's acceptance into the World Trade Organization. Developments of this kind tend to rekindle the almost-sarcastic debate over whether Asia should pursue economic or political unions comparable to the European Union. Additionally, there is a constant tendency to unfairly subject Asian stability to the same kinds of comparisons. However, aside from the issue of whether these comparisons of European and Asian unification are appropriate or not, it would appear that debate within individual countries has focused solely on dimensions of stability and individual competitive advantage within their respective communities. Things of substance eventually perish. Stability and order, however, are built upon successive promises, and nations sustain their ties with one another by meeting their obligations under those promises. It is the people of a nation who ensure that it

lives up to its promises and who infuse human sincerity into their nation's words. It is the reciprocal fulfillment of promises in principle—be they with the citizens of countries outside one's borders or with citizens within—that will define the future of regional communities.

For some years now, tensions on the Korean peninsula, questions about Taiwan, pressures to relocate U.S. bases in Japan, and other issues have spawned a variety of scenarios for future relations between Japan, China, and the United States.⁴⁶ Examples include a new adversarial relationship prompted by a switch in partnerships; relationships with improved transparency; and trilateral frameworks with more elasticity or freedom. Some scenarios also add Russia or the Korean peninsula to the equation.

Needless to say, most of the frameworks for security in Northeast Asia have been conditioned on Northeast Asian contingencies. However, it should be emphasized that domestic developments in an influential country like the United States could have a destabilizing effect on the region. Also, domestic developments inside the noncommunist countries—Korea, Russia, and particularly Japan—could have an impact as well. They all have the potential to function as destabilizing forces in Northeast Asia. Thus, the fundamental peace system in Japan should be confirmed. Stability works more effectively when it operates in tandem with peace systems.

In the event another blatantly anticommunist Republican administration assumes power in the United States, it stands to reason that U.S. policy toward the "communist" or "terrorist" countries of East Asia will also change on various fronts, including trade and foreign relations. That development in turn could spark a new conflict that is in no one's interest. In the United

46. Alan Bird, "Threats to Peace, Challenges to Prosperity: Themes from the 4th Shibusawa Seminar," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 27, No. 3 (2003), pp. 7-19. On trilateral frameworks, for example, see Yoshihide Soeya, Jianwei Wang, and David A. Welch, "A New Look at the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle: Toward Building a Stable Framework," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 27, No. 3 (2003), pp. 209-11; Gaye Christoffersen, "The Role of East Asia in Sino-American Relations," *Asian Survey*, vol. 42, No. 3 (May-June, 2002), pp. 376-77; Ming Zhang and Ronald N. Montaperto, *A Triad of Another Kind: The United States, China, and Japan* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp.119-21.

States and Japan, commentators frequently assert in often-critical terms that China, North Korea, or Russia has been trying to influence the policies of the United States, especially those of the two main parties. Whether those assertions are true or not, it is worth noting that many in Japan and the United States seem unable to squarely examine their own political character. In itself, the tendency to demand that “communist” or “terrorist” countries adopt new policies or value systems seems utterly inconsistent with a more realistic stance—namely, a preparedness to explore matters from a variety of angles, put oneself in the other country’s shoes, and try to form a better understanding of the historical basis for the value systems that a country has nurtured and embraced.

The wars waged in Asia would seem to demand that certain European countries, the United States, and Japan all reexamine the value systems that presumably provided the justification for those wars. Many situations of “instability” in this century were actually based on the preconceptions and deeds of the nations that applied that label. For the same reason, decisions to place “Northeast Asia” within the scope of new security pacts seem fundamentally no different from the structural frameworks applied in decades past.

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