*ASIAN PERSPECTIVE,* Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003, pp. 35-75.

# CHINA'S PATH TO GREAT POWER STATUS IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA

*Samuel S. Kim**

*Not since the debate in the mid-1960s over containment with or without isolation have the implications of rising Chinese power been so pervasive and controversial as in recent years. This article joins the debate by tracking and explaining China's path to great power status in the post-cold war era of globalization. Globalization has greatly influenced not only the dynamics of power on the world stage but also the very meaning of power. While external assessments of the significance of a rising China vary considerably depending on normative or theoretical perspective, China's own conceptualization and assessment have come to focus more on economic, scientific, and technological than military factors. As China is increasingly integrated into the world community, how it wields whatever power it holds determines in the end the character of its international influence.*

**Key words:** China, globalization, great-power status

* I would like to thank Emma Avery-Chanlett and Ji In Lee for their research assistance and the anonymous reviewers for Asian Perspective for their helpful comments and suggestions.

## Introduction

The question of China's status as a "great power" in world politics seems elementary enough, yet the answer is far from obvious. During the cold war, assessments of China's national power were legion, ranging from China as a "sleeping dragon" to an aspiring "superpower candidate" to an actual great power, the much-touted balancing third force in global triangular geopolitics. In the wake of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, many committed the fallacy of premature pessimism, portending a declining or collapsing China. And yet in the post-cold war and post-Tiananmen years, especially since the mid-1990s, the rise of China has suddenly become all things in the eyes of theorists and practitioners of international politics—a fait accompli, a myth, an unstoppable trend, and a theoretical puzzle.[1]

On the one hand, many argue that the reality of rising Chinese power is here and now, as certain as anything can be in the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world. Through the prism of "offensive realism," John Mearsheimer pessimistically predicts that China's emergence as a regional hegemon in Northeast Asia will be the most dangerous scenario the United States might face in the early twenty-first century, warning and prodding Washington to do what it can to reverse or slow the rise of China.[2] Writing in 1997, Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro predicted with confidence that "within a few years, China will be the largest economy in the world."[3] On the other hand, some still argue that Chinese power and influence are greatly overrated economically, politically, and ideationally. At best, China is no more than a "second-rank middle power," a "theatrical power" rather than a great power. China would then matter far less than most people inside and outside of China would have us believe.[4]

There is a double paradox at work in the heated rise-of-China debate. While China today is more integrated into the "global community" and exhibits greater levels of cooperative (status quo) behavior within it than ever before, the less than subtle premise of the contending approaches of containment, engagement, and constrainment (congagement) is that China as a dissatisfied revisionist (non-status quo) power is operating outside the global community on a range of international norms, thus posing the most crucial challenge for the future of regional and global orders.[5] Indeed, the rise-of-China thesis is often conflated with the "China threat theory" that pivots around the feasibility and desirability of various competing strategies to manage the rise of Chinese power through balancing, bandwagoning, capitulating, or ignoring.[6] At a time when the rise of China as a great power has become nearly conventional wisdom among most scholars, pundits, and policymakers in the West, China's own assessments of trends in power transition in comparative terms are increasingly pessimistic about its own capacity to catch up to the United States (see below).

1. See Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth, eds., *China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Samuel S. Kim, "China as a Great Power," *Current History*, vol. 96, No. 611 (September, 1997), pp. 246-51; Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," *International Security*, vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter, 1997-98), pp. 36-73; Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, No. 5 (September-October, 1999), pp. 24-36; Michael E. Brown et al., eds., *The Rise of China* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000); Avery Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," *China Quarterly*, No. 168 (September, 2001), pp. 835-64; Gordon G. Chang, *The Coming Collapse of China* (New York: Random House, 2001); and Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., *The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications* (Carlisle, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).
2. This is the conclusion of his latest book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton 2001), pp. 401-402.
3. Bernstein and Monro, *The Coming Conflict with China*, p. 4. See also William H. Overholt, *China: The Next Economic Superpower* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993).
4. Segal, "Does China Matter?" For a more dire collapse prediction, see Chang, *The Coming Collapse of China*.
5. For a trenchant empirical and theoretical analysis along this line, see Alastair Johnston, "China's International Relations: The Political and Security Dimensions," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *The International Relations of Northeast Asia* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, forthcoming).
6. For a wide ranging discussion on this question see Johnston and Ross, *Engaging China*.

Indeed, with the world's fastest economic growth in the post-cold war era, rising China has sired many debates in the West in general and in the United States in particular, more often than not with more heat than light. This article joins the debate by tracking and explaining China's path to great power status in the post-cold war era of globalization. The first of four main sections explores the impact of globalization, among other possible causes, on definition, measurement, and the pursuit of "power." The second section looks at the major indicators of China's estimated power in order to answer the question of how large are China's economic and military capabilities. The third section examines Beijing's great-power status drive in a larger context of grand strategic goals and actual ways and means of national power enhancement that Chinese leaders have adopted and pursued. The fourth section analyzes how and for what purposes a rising China has actually wielded its power or exerted its influence in post-cold war international relations. By way of conclusion the impacts and implications of rising China for East Asia and the global community are briefly sketched out so as to broaden the empirical referents and base of study in coming years.

## Defining and Measuring National Power

While most international relations theorists and practitioners would readily agree that "power" is at the heart of any inquiry of both theoretical and real-world significance, there seems to be agreement upon little else. "Power" is used to mean different things. Although structural realists explain international politics as a Hobbesian struggle for power and plenty in an anarchical international society, especially among major powers, there is no agreement on the defining and differentiating characteristics of a *great* power—what the great-power label denotes, where power lies, for what purpose it is wielded, how it can be measured, and what domestic and external forces are changing the sources of power and the international hierarchy.[7] This variance is not surprising, since power can be defined in so many ways: in terms of

7. For further discussion see Kim, "China as a Great Power."



hard versus soft power, baseline resources or control over preferred outcomes; malleable versus non-malleable attributes (e.g., territory, natural resources, and population); national diachronic comparative assessment versus international synchronic comparative assessment; estimated versus perceived power; and immediate versus potential power.[8]

While granting that there is no sure-fire "scientific" way to define and measure state power and influence in world politics, an assessment of Chinese power must be informed by several factors. First, virtually all states are subject today to the relentless twin pressures of globalization from above and without and sub-state localization and fragmentation from below and within. Assessing Chinese power in an era of globalization is all the more complicated by the profound domestic social, economic, and ecological transformation that China is experiencing even as the global system in which it is now embedded undergoes a structural transformation as well. The globalization-cum-transparency revolution has fundamentally changed the way we think about security in several mutually interactive ways: by blurring the domestic/international divide, thus posing an unprecedented "intermestic" challenge for national decision makers; by sharply increasing the costs of the use of force (materially and normatively); by shifting our attention from national security to human security; by creating multilateral pressures to cooperate with sub-state and transnational actors, including international organizations; and by generating relentless adaptive "survival of the fittest" pressures on states to establish a fruitful congruence between domestic and foreign policies amid the changing functional requirements of globalization.[9]

Second, in world politics the perception and credibility of national power matters as much as does the reality. The perception of what constitutes power has changed significantly in the

8. For a detailed analysis of China's estimated versus perceived power, see Goldstein, "Great Expectations," pp. 40-58.
9. For further analysis along this line, see Samuel S. Kim, "East Asia and Globalization: Challenges and Responses," in Samuel S. Kim, ed. *East Asia and Globalization* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 1-29; and Victor D. Cha, "Globalization and the Study of International Security," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 391-403.

wake of the demise of the socialist superpower. In a rapidly changing international environment the very notion of "great power" is subject to continuing redefinition and reassessment. The collapse of the Soviet Union without a fight shattered the cold-war illusion of a consensus on what constitutes a "superpower," as is made evident by the rise—and partial decline—of Japan as a global power of a different kind (a one-dimensional global economic power), by the sudden "third worldization" of the former Soviet Union (South Korea's GNP now surpasses that of Russia), and by America's heroic but increasingly ineffective claim of global leadership without bearing the costs and responsibilities.[10]

Third, in an era of globalization, "power" must be seen more than ever before in synthetic terms. What constitutes "great power" has changed significantly with the demise of the socialist superpower and the diffusion and multiplicity of power in all its varying forms, whether hard or soft, material or nonmaterial. The traditional military and strategic concept pays too much attention to a state's aggregate power (power potential as inferred from its yet unconverted resources and possessions) and too little to the more dynamic and interdependent notions of power in an issue-specific domain—that is, power defined in terms of control over outcomes. As David Baldwin argued more than two decades ago, "the notion of a single overall international power structure unrelated to any particular issue-area is based on a concept of power that is virtually meaningless."[11]

Embedded in an interactive and interdependent world, multiple games in multiple arenas (issue areas) require different kinds of power. China cannot be equally "powerful" in all issue areas ("structural power") and in all relationships ("relational power"). Thus, the dominant structural realist theory is having a hard time explaining why weaker states sometimes prevail over stronger states in asymmetrical negotiations and conflicts. The

10. As Avery Goldstein argues, four additional factors—historical context, the low starting point, the systems in which military modernization have been concentrated, and catalytic events—have given rise to the perception that China is in the process of a rapid rise to great power status. See Goldstein, "Great Expectations," p. 54.
11. David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics*, vol. 31, No. 2 (January, 1979), p. 193.



literature on asymmetric conflicts shows that weaker powers have engaged in wars against stronger adversaries more often than not, and big powers frequently lose wars in asymmetric conflicts (e.g., the Vietnam War).[12] According to a recent study, weak states were victorious in nearly 30 percent of all asymmetric wars in the approximately 200-year period covered in the *Correlates of War* data set. More tellingly, weak states have won with increasing frequency over time.[13]

The fourth and final factor in the assessment of Chinese power is the need to pay close attention to the Chinese way of defining and measuring national power. In the transition from the Maoist to the post-Mao era, the Chinese conception of "national power" shifted significantly away from a normative direction toward a more comprehensive and synthetic approach. How to make China rich and strong—how to make the outside world safe and congenial for China's born-again modernization drive—has become the single greatest challenge of post-Mao Chinese foreign policy. The idea of so-called "comprehensive national power" (*zonghe guoli*, or CNP) developed during the early 1980s is a multidimensional and multi-issue linkage concept by which Chinese strategic analysts and planners define, measure, evaluate, and predict China's own CNP in relation to other countries over the next ten to twenty years. The concept places a heavy emphasis on quantitative and qualitative calculations and estimates of relative power among major powers. The weighted coefficients for the eight "capabilities" that comprise the CNP (1.00) are: domestic economic activities (0.28), science and technology (0.15), foreign economic activities (0.13), social development (0.10), military (0.10), government regulation and control (0.08), foreign affairs (0.08), and natural resources (0.08).[14]

12. See Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics*, vol. 27, No. 2 (January, 1975), pp. 175-200; John Anquilla, *Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System* (Washington, D.C.: Crane and Russak, 1992); T. V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Thomas Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," *International Security*, vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring, 2001), pp. 5-40.
13. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*, vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer, 2001), p. 96.

## Measuring China's Estimated National Power

Let us then look at the major indicators of China's estimated power that constitute the foundation of its international influence, in order to answer the question of how large are China's economic and military capabilities. Some essential measurable economic data and figures suffice to show the extent of China's integration into the global economy as well as the extent of China's economic accomplishments in the post-Mao era of reform and opening up.

### *Economic and Industrial Power*

As *Table 1* shows, the rise of China in terms of its economic and industrial power in the last two decades of the twentieth century cannot be gainsaid. It is in Northeast Asia that a rising China, a declining post-Soviet Russia, a rising South Korea, and a declining North Korea have brought about the greatest swings in economic power in the last half-century. While the U.S. and Japanese shares of global GNP and industrial production from 1980 to 1997 have declined only slightly, the most dramatic changes are seen in the rapid rise and decline in shares of global GNP and industrial production for China and Russia, respectively. The concern for such major power transitions, especially a rapidly rising Chinese economic power, led many realists in the early 1990s to make dire "back to the future" predictions that East Asia was primed for the revival of a classical great-power rivalry. The end of the cold war was understood as a return to multipolar systems, or at least to the uneasy juxtaposition of global unipolarity and regional multipolarity that was said to be more prone to instability and conflict than were bipolar systems.[15]

14. Wang Songfen, ed., *Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu* (Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive National Power of the World's Major Nations) (Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), p. 169, as cited in Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future International Environment* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), p. 229.
15. For realist analyses along this line with some variations, see Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War," *International Security*, vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter, 1993-94), pp. 34-77; Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter, 1993-



*Table 1.* Changing Shares of Global GNP and Industrial Production Among the Major Powers, 1980-1997

| | 1980 | 1990 | 1995 | 1997 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shares of Global GNP (percent) | | | | |
| USSR/Russia | 7.0 | 5.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| USA | 22.3 | 22.5 | 20.8 | 20.6 |
| China | 3.3 | 6.6 | 10.7 | 10.7 |
| Japan | 8.1 | 9.0 | 7.7 | 7.7 |
| Shares of Global Industrial Production (percent) | | | | |
| USSR/Russia | 9.0 | 7.0 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
| USA | 18.7 | 17.4 | 16.9 | 16.6 |
| China | 3.0 | 8.0 | 14.1 | 15.3 |
| Japan | 7.3 | 8.7 | 7.1 | 6.9 |

Source: Adapted from Viktor N. Paviatenko, "Russian Security in the Pacific Asian Region: The Dangers of Isolation," in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe, eds., *Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 20-21.

As early as 1991, the World Bank had singled out post-Mao China as having garnered an all-time global record in doubling per capita output in the shortest period (1977-1987).[16] China's GDP growth rate in the period 1990 to 2001 is even more impressive—nearly four times the world average, as shown in *Table 2*. China easily won the global sweepstakes in economic growth rate and ranking, with the nearest peer competitor being the tiny city-state of Singapore—one of the fastest runners in the globalization race.

China's trade has exploded, from only several million dollars in the 1950s to $20 billion in the late 1970s and $510 billion in 2001. Trade as a percentage of GDP (a widely used measure

94), pp. 5-33; Friedberg, "Will Europe's Past Be Asia's Future?" *Survival*, vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 147-59; and Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," *Survival*, vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer, 1994), pp. 3-21.
16. World Bank, *World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 12.

*Table 2.* China's GDP Growth Rate in Comparative Perspective, 1990-2001

| Country | Average Annual Growth Percentage, 1990-2001 |
|---|---|
| China | 10.0 percent |
| Singapore | 7.8 percent |
| India | 5.9 percent |
| South Korea | 5.7 percent |
| Hong Kong | 3.9 percent |
| United States | 3.5 percent |
| France | 1.8 percent |
| Germany | 1.5 percent |
| Japan | 1.3 percent |
| North Korea | -2.0 percent |
| Russia | -3.7 percent |
| World Average | 2.7 percent |

Sources: Adapted from World Bank, *World Development Report 2003* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), Table 3, pp. 238-39; North Korea's GDP is based on the Bank of Korea (Seoul).

of a country's integration into the global economy) has more than doubled once every decade, from 5.2 percent in 1970 to 12.9 percent in 1980, 26.8 percent in 1990, and 44 percent in 2001, compared to 11 percent for North Korea, 18 percent for Japan, 19 percent for the United States, and 20 percent for India in 2001.[17] Contrary to popular misconceptions shared by proponents of both engagement and containment, China's economy is now almost two and half times more integrated into the global capitalist economy than that of Japan or the United States![18] By 2001, China with $510 billion in trade for the year had already emerged as the world's sixth-largest trading country, after the United States ($1,911 billion), Germany ($1,063 billion), Japan ($755 billion), France ($642 billion), and the United Kingdom ($606 billion), but ahead of Canada ($490 billion).[19] Nicholas

17. Calculated from World Bank, *World Development Report 2003* (New York: Oxford University Press 2003), pp. 234-41.
18. Iain Johnston is first to bring this much ignored fact to our attention. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Engaging Myths: Misconceptions about China and Its Global Role," *Harvard Asia Pacific Review* (Winter, 1997-98), pp. 9-12.



Lardy predicts that China is almost certain in the next few years to overtake Canada (as already happened in 2001), France, and the United Kingdom to become the fourth-largest trading country. Moreover, within a decade China is projected to surpass Japan and Germany to emerge as the world's second-largest trading country.[20]

As another sign of its growing importance to the world economy, China has attracted record foreign direct investment (FDI), especially in the 1990s, which has gone into bolstering China's position as the world assembly line. China now produces more steel than Japan and the United States combined, and is also a leader in almost every category of manufactured goods, from shoes to semiconductors.[21] While the accumulated total of utilized FDI for 1979 to 1989 was only $17.2 billion, China's FDI exploded in the wake of Deng's famous southern trip in early 1992. For most of the 1990s China was the world's second-largest recipient of FDI, behind only the United States. China's FDI leaped from $11 billion in 1992 to $27.5 billion in 1993 (thus exceeding the accumulated total of $17.2 billion for the decade of 1979-1989), to $37.5 billion in 1995, $41.7 billion in 1996, $45.3 billion 1997, $45.5 billion in 1998, $40.3 billion in 1999, and $40.7 billion—and its cumulative total of $348.3 billion—in 2000.[22] For 2002, China's FDI amounted to $52.7 billion, surpassing for the first time the United States as the world's largest recipient.[23] Furthermore, thanks to China's continuing trade surpluses over the years, its foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold) have increased more than seventeen times in a short span of a dozen years, from roughly $15 billion at the end of the 1980s to $259.43 billion by September 2002, becoming the world's second-largest holder of foreign exchange reserves (11.3 percent of the global total).[24]

19. *World Development Report 2003*, pp. 240-41.
20. Nicholas Lardy, *Integrating China into the Global Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. 176.
21. Joseph Kahn, "China's Hot, at Least for Now," *New York Times*, December 16, 2002.
22. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Country Profile 2001: China* (London: EIU, 2001), p. 57.
23. *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily, Beijing), January 15, 2003.
24. "A Survey of Asian Finance," *The Economist*, February 8, 2003, p. 15.

Without much fanfare China has gone a long way in just the past several years toward bridging the digital divide and becoming a significant player in the information-technology (IT) industry. In 2000, China surpassed Taiwan as the world's third-largest producer of computer hardware. In 2001, it surpassed the United States to become the world's largest mobile phone user and market, and also became the world's third-largest maker of IT products, after the United States and Japan. China is now projected to catch up with Japan by 2003 as having the largest number of Internet users in the Asia-Pacific region.[25]

The downside of China's political economy in the post-Mao era is a rapid growth in income inequality. Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, rose to 0.458 by 2000, up from 0.424 in 1996. China's ranking in the United Nations Development Programme's human development index dropped from 82nd place of a total sample of 160 countries in 1990 to 96th place among 173 countries in 2000, although the human development index itself registered an improvement of eighteen percentage points, from 0.614 to 0.726. Rapid growth helped lift some 200 million Chinese out of poverty between 1978 and 1995, but the poor (the World Bank's international poverty of $1 a day) still make up 18.8 percent of China's population (i.e., 239 million people) as of the end of 2001, down from 22 percent in 1995.[26] In per capita terms—China's per capita national income was only $890 for 2001[27]—the People's Republic of China remains a "poor global power."

### *Military Power*

Since 1989 the Chinese government has announced a succession of large peacetime increases in military spending. The rate

25. Peggy Pei-chen Chang and Tun-jen Cheng, "The Rise of the Information Technology in China: A Formidable Challenge to Taiwan's Economy," *The American Asian Review*, vol. 20, No. 3 (Fall, 2002), pp. 125-74.
26. World Bank, *China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1997), pp. 50-51; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 120; *Human Development Report 2002* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 150.
27. *World Development Report 2003*, p. 234.



of increase in Chinese military expenditures has grown substantially in recent years—by 19.4 percent in 2001 (144.2 billion yuan or $17.4 billion) and by 17.5 percent in 2002 (169.44 billion yuan or $20.47 billion).[28] Given the obsession of Chinese leaders with secrecy, however, estimating actual military expenditure is a daunting task. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London estimates China's actual military expenditure in 2001 at $46 billion, 2.6 times the official defense budget of $17.4 billion, while the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) estimate for the same year is $27 billion, 1.6 times the official figure.

The increased defense expenditure in recent years, according to *China's National Defense White Paper 2002*, has been incurred primarily for the following purposes: military personnel costs, gradual improvement of a social security system for servicemen, maintenance costs, cooperation with the international community in anti-terrorism activities, and improvement of military equipment to enhance defense capabilities under the conditions of modern technologies, particularly high technologies.[29]

An alarmist interpretation of China's increased military expenditures is not justified for several reasons. First, China's overall military power is still the weakest link of its CNP. Chinese leaders pursue military modernization as the fourth in priority order of the "Four Modernizations" and as a long-term goal rather than as an urgent requirement. Hence the double-digit increases in recent years are designed for "lifting the PLA [People's Liberation Army] from what has been a position of near impotence against all but the smallest of its regional adversaries."[30] As stated in *China's National Defense White Paper 2002*, increased military spending in recent years went mostly to fund military personnel expenses and maintenance and operations. Second, the Chinese defense burden remains relatively light by SIPRI's measure, and the military expenditure/GDP ratio is lower than that of all major powers and all of China's neighbor-

28. These official figures are cited in the latest *China's National Defense White Paper 2002*. For a full text in English, see PRC State Council's Information Office, "China's National Defense in 2002," in FBIS-CHI-2002-1209 (December 9, 2002), Internet version.
29. Ibid.
30. Goldstein, "Great Expectations," p. 51.

ing countries with the exception of Japan. This defense burden does not appear to have reached a level at which one could conclude that the Chinese economy is being militarized in order to balance against U.S. power. Third, military expenditures are not simply functions of external threats and opportunities, but are also determined by a host of other considerations such as technological innovation cycles, organizational interests, and bureaucratic rivalries.[31] Finally, there is every indication that Chinese leaders are determined not to repeat the Soviet strategic blunder of placing an unbearable defense burden on its economy by spending too much on its military forces.

In the late 1990s, China was faced with a rapid succession of seemingly threatening developments: the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the growing U.S.-Japan cooperation in the development of the theater missile defense (TMD) system, the U.S.-NATO air war against Yugoslavia, and the accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. These events triggered a strategic debate in China, with some strategic analysts arguing for seriously reordering the country's national priorities by upgrading the importance of defense development in China's national development strategy. Yet, top Chinese leaders rejected such domestic pressures because of concern that doing so would complicate or even derail efforts to ensure the growth and modernization of China's economy.[32]

Moreover, the Gulf War (1991) and the Kosovo War (1999) underscored with particular clarity that most of China's forces are not trained and equipped for modern, high-technology warfare. China has a long way to go to be able to close the widening gap with the United States in the "revolution in military affairs." Indeed, since 1996, especially after the successful projection of U.S. power in Kosovo and in the face of the growing military capability gap between the United States and any and all potential peer competitors, Chinese assessments of the future security

31. Johnston, "China's International Relations."
32. See Yong Deng, "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 116, No. 3 (Fall, 2001), pp. 343-65, and David M. Finkelstein, "Chinese Perceptions of the Costs of a Conflict," in Andrew Scobell, ed., *The Costs of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future War* (Carlisle, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), pp. 9-27.



environment have become increasingly pessimistic that multipolarization trends are not moving in the direction the Chinese leadership would prefer. While the assessments by Senior Colonel Huang Shoufeng of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) and a group of scholars at the civilian Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) agree that China will become one pole among five or more equals in spite of its much faster economic growth rate, they differ sharply in how to assess the rate of China's rise and America's decline. As shown in *Table 3*, the orthodox AMS study suggested that China might catch up to the United States by 2020 (97 percent of America's CNP), while the reformist CASS study sees China's CNP reaching only 61 percent of America's, ranking seventh in the world, even below that of South Korea at 65 percent of America's.[33] The most recent calculations, however, done by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), suggest that under the most optimistic growth scenarios China will only reach around 50 percent of America's CNP by 2020, and a more pessimistic growth scenario reduces this to 40 percent. Hence the struggle for a multipolar world order would now last far longer than previously estimated—some twenty to thirty years longer.[34]

That said, however, it is necessary to shy away from the polar extremes of the pessimistic or alarmist realists and the complacent or optimistic realists.[35] A combination of a substantial military force, the unique political geography of Sino-centric East Asia, and a highly charged nationalistic Chinese government in Beijing could still pose major challenges for American security interests in East Asia. China and the United States could

33. For a detailed analysis, see Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, ch. 5 (pp. 203-53).
34. CICIR, *Zonghe guojia liliang pinggu* (Estimations of Comprehensive National Power) (Beijing: CICIR, 2000); Finkelstein, "Chinese Perceptions of the Costs of a Conflict"; and Johnston, "China's International Relations."
35. For a most optimistic realist argument that the post-cold war international system is unprecedentedly and unambiguously unipolar, and that the current unipolarity is not only peaceful and stable but durable as well because it minimizes strategic peer competition among the other great powers, see William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer, 1999), pp. 5-41.

*Table 3.* A Comparison of the CNP Scores of CASS and Huang (as a Percent of U.S. CNP by Year)

| Country | 1989/1990 | | 2000 | | 2010 | | 2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Huang[a] | CASS[b] | Huang | CASS | Huang | CASS | Huang | CASS |
| United States | 100 percent | 100 percent | 100 percent | 100 percent | 100 percent | 100 percent | 100 percent | 100 percent |
| Japan | 62 | 58 | 66 | 76 | 69 | 97 | 73 | 119 |
| Germany | 64 | 58 | 68 | 67 | 72 | 77 | 77 | 85 |
| France | 47 | 46 | 47 | 59 | 48 | 70 | 48 | 82 |
| Italy | – | 41 | – | 52 | – | 64 | – | 79 |
| England | 36 | 42 | 34 | 48 | 33 | 54 | 32 | 60 |
| Canada | 23 | 36 | 22 | 38 | 21 | 40 | 20 | 42 |
| Australia | 19 | 28 | 18 | 29 | 17 | 31 | 17 | 32 |
| USSR | 65 | 66 | 79 | – | – | – | – | – |
| Russia | – | (50) | – | 54 | – | 57 | – | 56 |
| China | 37 | 34 | 53 | 42 | 72 | 52 | 97 | 61 |
| India | 24 | 18 | 34 | 22 | 44 | 26 | 57 | 30 |
| S. Korea | – | 25 | – | 36 | – | 49 | – | 65 |

[a] Huang Shoufeng, Zonghe guoli lun (On Comprehensive National Power) (Beijing: Zhongguo kexue chubanshe, 1992).
[b] CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Science)=Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive National Power of the World's Major Nations). (Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996).
Sources: Adapted from Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2000), p. 229.



*Table 4.* Amounts, Ranks, and Shares of Material Power Resources, 2001

| | China | Russia | Japan | U.S. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Basic Resources | | | | |
| Population | 1,271.9 (1st) | 144.8m (6th) | 127.1 (9th) | 284.0 (3rd) |
| percent of global total | 20.7 percent | 2.36 percent | 2.07 percent | 4.7 percent |
| Territory (1994) | 2nd | 1st | 59th | 4th |
| percent of global total | 7.3 percent | 13.2 percent | 0.3 percent | 7.1 percent |
| Economy | | | | |
| GDPin $bn (global rank) | 1,159 (6th) | 309.9 (18th) | 4,245 (2nd) | 10,171 (1st) |
| percent of global total | 3.7 percent | 1.0 percent | 13.6 percent | 32.5 percent |
| GDP at PPP in $bn | 5,415 (2nd) | 1,255 (10th) | 3,487 (3rd) | 9,902 (1st) |
| percent of global total | 11.7 percent | 2.7 percent | 7.5 percent | 21.3 percent |
| Trade as percent of GDP | 44 percent | 51 percent | 18 percent | 19 percent |
| Military | | | | |
| Nuclear Warheads | 3rd | 1st | – | 2nd |
| percent of global total | 2.1 percent | 48.1 percent | | 45.5 percent |
| Military Expenditure $bn (IISS) | 46.0 (3rd) | 63.7 (2nd) | 39.5 (4th ) | 322.4 (1st) |
| MilitaryExpenditure $bn (SIPRI) | 27.0 (7th) | 43.9 (2nd) | 38.5 (4th) | 281.4 (1st) |
| Military Expenditure as percent of GDP | 4.0 percent | 4.3 percent | 1.0 percent | 3.2 percent |
| (IISS) | 2.1 percent | 3.6 percent | 1.0 percent | 3.1 percent |
| Military Expenditure as percent of GDP (SIPRI) | 2,310,000 (1st) | 977,100 (5th) | 239,800 (21st) | 1,367,700 (2nd) |
| Military Personnel | | | | |

Sources: Adapted from Robert A. Pastor, "The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century: From Dawn to Dusk," in Pastor, ed., *A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 19; World Bank, *World Development Report 2003* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 234-42; IISS, *The Military Balance 2002-2003* (London: IISS, 2002), Table 26, pp. 332-337; *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 235, 284-87.

clash violently, especially over the issue of Taiwan, without the slightest pretense on Beijing's part of having caught up with the United States in overall national military power or technology.[36]

*Table 4* summarizes non-Chinese calculations of China's estimated material power in three key dimensions: basic resources, key economic indicators, and military indicators. As of the end of 2001, China had the world's largest population, second-largest territory, second-largest economy on a PPP (purchasing-power parity) basis or sixth-largest economy in conventional GDP terms, third-largest nuclear arsenal, the largest standing army, and the third-largest or seventh-largest military expenditure.

## The Ways, Means, and Ends of National Power Enhancement

Although the above-mentioned figures of estimated power are important, they convey little meaning unless they are evaluated in a larger context of grand strategic goals and actual ways and means of national power-enhancement that Chinese leaders have adopted and pursued. Post-Mao China's national development is closely hewed to and shaped by three overarching strategic goals: first and foremost, preservation of domestic stability and legitimacy; second, promotion of a peaceful and secure external environment free of threats to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity; and third, cultivation of its status and influence as a great power in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.[37] None of these strategic goals can be achieved without a solid economic power foundation.

### *The Impact of Reform and Globalization*

Deng's reform and opening in 1978 was a significant conceptual turning point in China's path to great-power status. There was a drastic reformulation (and re-legitimation) of China's future in terms of hitherto proscribed concepts such as the open door, international interdependence, division of labor,

36. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up."
37. See Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2000).



and specialization. China's backwardness and stunted modernization were attributed to its own isolationism going back to the Ming dynasty, not blamed on Western imperialism. For Deng, Chinese nationalism and globalization were defined in virtuous and mutually complementary terms.[38]

The heated and short-lived debate on "global citizenship" (*qiuji*) that the *World Economic Herald* (*Shanghai*) initiated in 1988 can be accepted as a preview on how to chart China's path to great powerdom via globalization. The meaning of global citizenship that came out of this debate seems clear enough. The new wave of the scientific and technological revolution, we were told, creates complex global networks of mutual influence and infiltration. In this new era, China could choose not to emancipate its political-economy thinking and fall behind in the technological race, forfeiting its global citizenship in the process, or it could more fully integrate itself into the world market and make more creative use of science and technology, whereby it would leap into the front ranks of world power.[39]

In the wake of the Tiananmen carnage, the concept of global citizenship has also come under attack, as springing from the same source as the thinking behind the bourgeois liberalization. Yet by the mid-1990s, globalization found its way clear into Chinese discourse. The mainstream scholarly discourse converged on the notion of globalization as a double-edged sword that is both empowering and constraining. What has changed, as reflected in Chinese discourse on and response to the forces of globalization, is that the underlying basis of national power has shifted significantly toward economic strength at the expense of the previous, narrower focus on military strength. Furthermore, the relevant instruments of state power are seen as being increasingly economic in nature (financial, technological, and industrial).[40] In

38. Christopher Hughes, "Globalisation and Nationalism: Squaring the Circle in Chinese International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 26, No. 1 (1997), pp. 103-24.
39. See Lu Yi et al., eds., *Qiuji: Yige shijiexing de xuanze* (Global Citizenship: A Worldwide Choice) (Shanghai: Baijia chubanshe, 1989) and Samuel S. Kim, *China In and Out of the Changing World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1991), pp. 48-49.
40. See Pang Zhongying, "China's International Status and Foreign Strategy After the Cold War," in FBIS-CHI-2002-0506 (May 5, 2002) (hereafter

short, economic factors enjoy a vastly higher profile in Chinese strategic thinking than at any other time since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949.

In the Chinese discourse on globalization, there has been a significant shift in mainstream thinking about world order as well. The notion that a strong China per se was an irreducible prerequisite to international order was central to Deng's reform and opening to the world. In contrast, the concept of the responsibility of great powers has in recent years suddenly come to the fore, against the backdrop of those warning of the rising "China threat." The rise of China as a responsible great nation in the international community is said to be one of the major changes in post-cold war Chinese foreign policy.[41]

This change is made manifest in the form of incremental and situation-specific multilateralism. Although China today belongs to the world, the world does not belong to China alone. "China cannot afford to pay the price that the destruction of the existing international system will entail. Nor can it afford the huge cost of setting up a separate system." China should shy away from an ultra-nationalist policy or the expansionist policy of hegemony. Should China pursue such a revisionist policy, three anti-China consequences will follow: China will face containment by the United States and the Western alliance, the security environment in the surrounding region and the world will be damaged, and China's neighbors may be pushed into

cited as Pang, "China's International Status."); Wang Yizhou, ed., *Quanqiuhua shidai de guoji anquan* (International Security in an Era of Globalization) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1998); Wang Yizhou, *Dangdai guoji zhengzhi xilun* (Analysis of Contemporary International Politics) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), especially pp. 19-46; Hu Angang, Yang Fan and Zhu Ning, *Daguo Zhanlue: Zhongguo de Liyi yu Shimin* (China's Grand Strategy: Missions and Interests) (Shengyang: Liaoning People's Press, 2000); and Pang Zhongying, ed., *Quanqiuhua, fanquanqiuhua yu Zhongguo: Lijie quanqiuhua de fuzaxing yu duoyangxing* (Globalization, Anti-Globalization and China: Understanding the Complexity and Diversity of Globalization) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2002).

41. For a wide ranging discussion involving Australian, British and Chinese scholars on the notion of China as a responsible great power, see Youngjin Zhang and Greg Austin, eds., *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001).



forming an alliance against China.[42]

Nation-states form alliances for two basic reasons: power enhancement and threat-reduction, that is, to aggregate their capabilities and to coordinate strategies to cope with common external threats. States enhance power in many ways, but the three most common power-accumulating strategies are arms building (internal balancing), alliances (external balancing), and territorial aggrandizement (which of course is becoming increasingly problematic in our times). In this connection, China has pursued since 1996 a "new security concept" that calls for basing international security on multilateral dialogue and on pledges by states to foreswear the use of military threats, coercion, and military intervention in the internal affairs of other states. In particular, this new security concept criticizes bilateral and multilateral military alliances as relics of the cold war that undermine rather than enhance international security. Over the last three years, in a thinly veiled effort to criticize U.S. security policies in Eurasia, China has juxtaposed this position on alliances with U.S. efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance and to encourage the enlargement of NATO in various diplomatic or public forums.

## *Globalizing Security*

The official conceptualization, as made evident in the annual "state of the world message" in the grand debate in the UN General Assembly, is an economic globalization that is largely state-centric. As *Table 5* shows, the first mention of "economic globalization" occurs in Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's state of the world message delivered in September 1996, a year earlier than Jiang Zemin's political report to the Fifteenth Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in September 1997, in which he mentioned "economic globalization" to the domestic audience for the first time with his imprimatur:

> Opening to the outside world is a long-term basic state policy. Confronted with the globalization trend in economic, scientific,

42. Chen Quansheng and Liu Jinghua, "China and the World amid Globalization," in *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), FBIS-CHI-1999-0306, March 3, 1999.

*Table 5.* Globalization in China's "State of the World Message" in the General Assembly's Grand Debate, 1994-2002

| Date<br>Doc Symbol<br>Speaker | Number of References | Key Remarks |
|---|---|---|
| 09/28/94<br>A/49/PV.8<br>Qian Qichen | Multipolarity=1<br>WTO=2 | "Globalization" is not mentioned, but the speech does say, in urging developed countries to take measures to share their wealth with other countries and to strengthen economic cooperation, that "the world economy is an interdependent whole." |
| 09/27/95<br>A/50/PV.8<br>Qian Qichen | N/A | The closest mention is the phrase "The worldwide tendency towards economic integration, regionalization and the formation of economic groupings has accelerated…" |
| 10/24/95<br>A/50/PV.39<br>Jiang Zemin | N/A | Jiang speaks of the "internationalization of economic life" and mentions the need for international cooperation on global issues like the environment and population control. |
| 09/25/96<br>A/51/PV.8<br>Qian Qichen | Multipolarity=3<br>Globalization=3 | The first mention of economic globalization occurs in this speech; it is cited as a "tide" and as a rare opportunity for all countries to enhance cooperation. China also speaks of the need to address non-economic global issues through international cooperation. |
| 09/24/97<br>A/52/PV.9<br>Qian Qichen | Multipolarity=1<br>Globalization=1 | Here China approves that the "economic links and mutual penetration among countries and regions are on the constant increase" but warns of the risks of the "highly globalized" international financial market. A paragraph is also devoted to "transboundary issues." |
| 09/23/98<br>A/53/PV.11<br>Tang Jiaxuan | Multipolarity=1<br>Globalization=3<br>WTO=2 | The trend of multipolarity and economic globalization are cited as indications of a readjustment of international relations. The 1997 crisis occurred "in the overall context of globalization," but China pledges to "keep abreast of the trend of globalization" and expresses its wish to join the WTO. The "accelerated democratization" of international relations (IR) is first mentioned in this speech. |
| 09/22/99<br>A/54/PV.8<br>Tang Jiaxuan | Multipolarity=1<br>Globalization=1<br>WTO=1 | Wealthy countries are asked to share in the responsibility of contributing to the growth of developing countries because "the world economy is an interrelated and indivisible whole." China requests that the UN hold a conference to discuss the globalization of the world economy and other global issues like poverty, the environment, population, etc. |
| 09/06/00<br>A/55/PV.3<br>Jiang Zemin | Multipolarity=2<br>Globalization=3 | "The trends towards multi-polarization and economic globalization are gaining momentum" opens this speech. China points out that the fruits of economic globalization and modern technology are not shared by all, as well as mentioning the need to address the environment, drugs, and refugees internationally. |
| 11/11/01<br>A/56/PV.46<br>Tang Jiaxuan | Globalization=5<br>WTO=2 | For the first time, China describes the question of security as becoming globalized and points to the positive and negative aspects of globalization; it is "neither a panacea for development nor a monster causing disaster," the speech reads. The need to "democratize" IR comes up again. |
| 09/13/02<br>A/57/PV.5<br>Tang Jiaxuan | Globalization=2 | China speaks of the need to "strengthen guidance and management of the globalization process." Following on the security issue, the speech reads, "countries have come to realize that they have common security interests and feel a greater sense of interdependence." |

and technological development, we should take an even more active stance in the world by improving the pattern of opening up in all directions, at all levels and in a wide range, developing an open economy, enhancing our international competitiveness, optimizing our economic structure and improving the quality of our national economy.[43]

43. Jiang Zemin's report delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on September 12, 1997, entitled, "Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics to the Twenty-first Century," *Xinhua*, September 21,

A content analysis of China's annual state of the world message in the General Assembly's grand debate in recent years (1994-2002) reveals several not-so-surprising points. First, "globalization" is often used in connection with "multipolarization" and is cited as a reason for the changing trend of international relations. Second, it is nearly always spoken of in economic terms, i.e., "economic globalization." Third, it is often mentioned as a double-edged sword to bring our attention to the positive and negative aspects of globalization—hence the need for the "standardization and management of globalization."

The real surprise in *Table 5* is that the 2001 "state of the world message" describes for the first time "security" as becoming increasingly globalized. Moreover, the concept of multipolarization that had remained as a recurring theme and claim in Chinese foreign-policy pronouncements since the early 1980s seems to have suffered its demise or disconnect from globalization. In a similar vein, the annual frequency of the term "multipolarization" (*duojihua*) in the *People's Daily* in 1990-2000 appears to be on a steady decline relative to the term "globalization" (*quanqiuhua*).[44] Globalization has entered Chinese strategic thinking as an "objective condition" or an "unstoppable trend" in the world economy rather than as a manifestation of U.S. hegemony, and as one of the most effective ways of enhancing China's CNP.[45] As noted earlier, the Kosovo War has triggered a significant shift in Chinese assessments of its own CNP, toward a more pessimistic conclusion.

## Expanding the Orbits of Influence

Ultimately, the critical issue in assessing China's international influence as a great power or as a rising power is behavior. What matters most is not the growth of Chinese power, but how and for what purposes a rising China will actually wield its power in the conduct of its international relations. Still, it is important to delineate at the outset the trump cards China holds in reserve: demographic weight as the world's most populous country, territorial size, modernizing military manpower with the world's largest armed forces (2.31 million troops in active service) and the world's third-largest nuclear weapons power, veto power in the United Nations Security Council, membership in virtually all the important global institutions, including most recently the World Trade Organization (WTO), new economic status as the world's second-largest economy (with its 2001 GDP at $5.4 trillion measured at PPP) or as the world's sixth-largest economy (with its 2001 GDP at $1.16 trillion), gigantic ecological impact as the world's second-largest generator of carbon dioxide emissions (after the United States), and traditional Confucian cultural influence with strong historical roots in East Asia. The combined weight of these malleable and non-malleable factors virtually guarantees that China will be acknowledged inescapably as part of both the problem and the solution, regionally and globally.

1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-266, September 23, 1997.

44. For a content analysis of the two competing terms—multipolarization (*duojihua*) and globalization (*quanqiuhua*)—that have appeared in Renmin ribao, see Johnston, "China's International Relations."

45. Pang, "China's International Status."



### *Mending Fences*

The challenge of post-Mao Chinese foreign policy has remained the same: how to make the outside world safe and congenial to China's born-again modernization-cum-status drive. In the post-Tiananmen and post-cold war era, however, there is an inordinate push in Chinese international relations for speeding up economic development and for restoring China's great-power status in the world to make up for domestic security and legitimation deficits. As a result of China's reformulation of its foreign-policy challenge and its growing global interdependence, economic security has come to enjoy a preferred position in Chinese security thinking. Military security is still important but is progressively downplayed in China's security considerations in favor of non-military power. Indeed, China is seeking to enhance its international influence by redefining its national identity as a responsible great power; by improving its foreign political, diplomatic, economic and military relationships; by settling border disputes with neighboring states; and by increasing its role in and contribution to regional and global multilateral institutions.

Viewed in this light, Beijing's decision in August 1992 to rec-

ognize and establish full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) underscores the extent to which post-cold war Chinese foreign policy has shifted from ideology to national interest. Moreover, the South Korean connection demonstrates the indispensability of the China factor in reshaping a regional order in Northeast Asia. During much of the cold war, China's regional policy remained a stepchild of its global superpower policy—a policy driven by China's centrality to the U.S.-China-Soviet geostrategic triangle. Chinese foreign policy in Asia and especially on the Korean peninsula was directed primarily toward the United States and/or the Soviet Union. China was a regional power without a regional policy or identity, as every regional question (including its invasion of Vietnam in 1979) was justified primarily in terms of global security imperatives, not as a matter of bilateral or even regional politics or economics. In the post-Tiananmen period, however, and especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chinese foreign policy has become more Asia-centric.[46]

Particularly notable has been the bi-multilateral processes leading to the resolution of disputes along China's borders of some 7,000 kilometers with Russia and the former Soviet republics, including several places where sharp border clashes erupted in the spring of 1969. These clashes resulted in heavy mutual fortifications, making this not only the longest land border in the world but also the most explosive one. The Sino-Russian post-cold war "partnership," as sealed in a new Friendship Treaty signed by Jiang Zemin and Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin on July 16, 2001, represents, to all appearances, the best relationship between these two territorially imposing neighbors in nearly fifty years.[47]

Although the People's Liberation Army has been involved in nine wars and armed conflicts—fought for ideological reasons and for the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity—most of these actions were taken in the 1950s and 1960s, and no war involving China took place in the 1990s, reflecting the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes with Russia, Mongolia, the Central Asian republics, Burma, Pakistan, and Vietnam, as well as the demise of the ideological basis for war.[48] To focus on "war" is perhaps to miss the larger picture of Chinese conflict behavior and crisis management. Yet Johnston's empirical analysis of China's militarized interstate dispute behavior from 1949 to 1992 concludes that "China will be more likely to resort to force—and relatively high levels of force—when disputes involve territory and occur in periods where the perceived gap between desired and ascribed status is growing or larger."[49] Therefore, the growth seen in Chinese power is not likely per se to translate into a more aggressive use of that power. In fact, China may be less involved in conflicts, as long as its territorial integrity and international status are afforded proper respect. The combined interactive effects of several factors in Chinese foreign relations augur well for the peace and stability of the East Asia region and beyond: the globalization pressures that sharply increase the costs of the use of force; China's successful settlement of territorial disputes with most of its neighbors, with the corresponding sense of enhanced state sovereignty; the demise of ideological conflict; and the substantial accomplishment of China's status drive to become a great power.

There is little evidence that China is seeking regional hegemony in East Asia; most Asian nations do not see China as dangerous or threatening. One indication of this lack of perception of China as militarily threatening is shown in a major multinational citizens' opinion survey, jointly sponsored by *Tong-a Ilbo* (Seoul) and *Asahi Shinbun* (Tokyo), conducted in October and November 2000 and involving national samples of 2,000 people in South Korea, 3,000 in Japan, 1,024 in the United States, and 1,000 in China. As *Table 6* shows, the China-threat theory is almost exclusively an American elite perception, especially strong among right-wing Republicans. The survey found that 38.1 percent of the American respondents in the survey singled out China as most militarily threatening, compared to only 7.7 percent of South

46. Samuel S. Kim, "China as a Regional Power," *Current History*, vol. 91, No. 566 (September, 1992), pp. 247-52.
47. See Lowell Dittmer, "The Emerging Northeast Asian Order," in Kim, *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*.
48. You Ji, "The PLA, the CCP and the Formulation of Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy," in Zhang and Austin, *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*, pp. 119-20.
49. Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data," *The China Quarterly*, No. 153 (March, 1998), pp. 1-30; quote at p. 29.

*Table 6.* Multi-national Citizens' Perceptions of Threat in Northeast Asia (late 2000)

| | | ROK | Japan | U.S. | China |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q-1: By which country do you feel most militarily threatened? Please select one country | 1. U.S. | 12.4 | 13.2 | — | 62.8 |
| | 2. Russia | 4.0 | 9.5 | 20.9 | 1.2 |
| | 3. **China** | **7.7** | **9.4** | **38.1** | — |
| | 4. Japan | 20.7 | — | 2.5 | 12.4 |
| | 5. ROK | — | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| | 6. North Korea | 53.7 | 44.2 | 6.0 | 0.2 |
| | 7. Do not know/ No response | 0.3 | 8.0 | 10.0 | 13.7 |

Source: "Multi-National Citizens' Poll on Current States Surrounding Korean Peninsula," *Tong-a Ilbo* (Seoul), December 4, 2000.
Note: South Korea: N=2000, survey conducted 10/25-11/18/2000. Japan: N=3000, 11/19-11/20/2000. U.S.: N=1024, 11/13-11/18/2000. China: N=1000, 11/1-11/10/2000.

*Table 7.* Multi-national Citizens' Perceptions of the Most Influential Power in Asia (late 2000)

| | | ROK | Japan | U.S. | China |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Question: Which country do you think will become the most influential in Asia in 10 years? Please select one country, whether it is an Asian country or not. | 1. U.S. | 8.1 | 13.7 | 54.9 | 9.6 |
| | 2. Russia | 2.1 | 1.1 | 4.7 | 1.4 |
| | 3. **China** | **52.6** | **47.2** | **18.9** | **73.2** |
| | 4. Japan | 23.3 | 8.4 | 3.8 | 7.7 |
| | 5. ROK | 10.7 | 4.3 | 0.9 | 1.1 |
| | 6. North Korea | 1.0 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 0.1 |
| | 7. India | 0.1 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 0.4 |
| | 8. Vietnam | — | 0.3 | 1.3 | — |
| | 9. Others | 1.2 | 0.6 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| | 10. None | 0.1 | 7.3 | — | — |
| | 11. Do not know/ No response | 0.8 | 13.9 | 9.6 | 4.6 |

Source: "Multi-National Citizens' Poll on Current States Surrounding Korean Peninsula," *Tong-a Ilbo* (Seoul), December 4, 2000.
Note: South Korea: N=2000, survey conducted 10/25-11/18/2000. Japan: N=3000, 11/19-11/20/2000. U.S.: N=1024, 11/13-11/18/2000. China: N=1000, 11/1-11/10/2000.



Koreans. What is most surprising is that only 9.4 percent of Japanese singled out China as most militarily threatening. Equally revealing are the responses of South Korean, Japanese, and American citizens-respondents to the question, "Which country do you think will become the most influential in Asia in ten years [by 2010]? Please select one country, whether it is an Asian country or not." The fact that 52.6 percent of South Korean citizens-respondents singled out China as the most influential Asian power in ten years, as against only 23.3 percent for Japan, was to be expected. What is particularly surprising and revealing, however, is that 47.2 percent of Japanese citizens-respondents selected China, as against only 8.4 for their own country, Japan, as the most influential Asian power in ten years. Almost five times as many Americans (18.9 percent) selected China as selected Japan (3.8 percent) as the most influential Asian power in ten years, showing the extent to which the familiar "Japan As Number One" chorus of the 1980s has completely vanished from American collective memory (see *Table 7*).

### *Playing the Part of a Responsible Great Power*

Beijing's response to the Asian financial crisis (AFC) of 1997-1998 shows how a variety of considerations are at work in the shaping of China's policy and behavior. Of the many factors, however, China's integration into the global community as a responsible great power seems primary. China's policy elites seldom fail to cite Beijing's refusal to devaluate the *renminbi*, along with the fact that China provided $1 billion each to Thailand and Indonesia and pledged $4 billion overall, as a proof positive of its status as a responsible great power. Beijing's decision not to devalue the *renminbi* is explained in "grabbing with two hands" terms. On the one hand, the non-devaluation of the *renminbi* is said to have demonstrated to the world community China's formidable economic muscle. On the other hand, China has also impressed its neighbors as a country that does not take advantage of others' misfortune, showing its sense of responsibility for the stability of the world economic system.[50]

Responsible great powerdom aside, it was not in China's

50. Chen and Liu, "China and the World amid Globalization."

own interest to devalue the *renminbi.* Although devaluation would make finished Chinese goods cheaper on the world market, it would also raise the price of imports. According to most estimates, about 50 percent of China's total exports depend on the processing of imported raw materials. This also shows that China's integration into the world economy (China's economic globalization as it were) has made the calculation of relative and absolute gains more complex and non-zero-sum. As Moore and Yang put it, "even the fact that China acted with restraint to preserve its own interests during the AFC showed how much has changed, inasmuch as Chinese interests are now significantly intertwined with those of its neighbors, at least compared to the past."[51] Increasingly, Beijing must define its interests in the context of its position as a responsible economic power and of how its behavior could sire instability contrary to its own national interests.

China's international influence is Asia-centric to be sure, but the 1990s witnessed China's growing integration into the global community and greater levels of cooperative behavior within it than ever before, even as Beijing gradually removed two of the major causes of war in the past—ideological conflict and territorial disputes. The post-Mao era, especially in the 1990s, has witnessed the acceleration and intensification of Sino-UN linkages and interactions as China's membership and participation in UN-related regimes and Chinese accession to UN-sponsored multilateral treaties has increased steadily. This growing and widening engagement with the UN-centered global community has been touted as both a source and a mark of China's expanding influence.[52] All the same, it has produced the feedback and spillover effects of facilitating certain adjustments and shifts in Chinese multilateral diplomacy, as well as in the policy-making and policy-reviewing processes and institutions within China.[53]

51. Thomas C. Moore and Dixia Yang, "Empowered and Restrained: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Economic Interdependence," in David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese and Security Policy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 224.
52. Ann Kent, "China's Participation in International Organizations," in Zhang and Austin, *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 132.
53. See Samuel S. Kim, "China and the United Nations," in Elizabeth Economy



By any reckoning, the WTO has become a lightning rod for anti-globalization protests. Thus, nothing better illustrates China's stand on globalization than its protracted struggle to gain WTO entry. After fourteen years of protracted and often difficult negotiations, in late 2001 China finally became a member of the WTO under terms that hewed to the longstanding Western demands for not only reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers but also opening up long-closed sectors such as telecommunications, banking, and insurance. In a few important areas, China assumed obligations that exceed normal WTO standards—the so-called WTO-plus commitments.[54] There is no denying that Beijing's determination to gain WTO entry at almost any price represents a big gamble in the checkered history of China's engagement with the global community. Why then has Beijing taken some unprecedented sovereignty-diluting steps to get in?

While there is no simple answer to this, China's WTO entry nonetheless underscores the extent to which the forces of globalization have blurred the traditional divide between the international and the domestic, confronting China's leadership with the "intermestic" challenge. As Joseph Fewsmith argues, what really convinced the Chinese leadership to proceed with the deal, despite or perhaps even because of the mounting domestic opposition, was the commitment of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji to globalization and a fundamental restructuring of Chinese industry. Politically, failure to reach an agreement would have left Jiang in a passive position with his domestic adversaries, including Li Peng. Jiang would have had a large and inefficient government-owned enterprise sector with no way to address its problems.[55]

Indeed, Jiang and Zhu seem to have assigned to foreign trade, especially exports, an almost impossible multi-tasking social and economic mission: of alleviating the growing unemployment problem, increasing tax revenues and the state's foreign exchange reserves, fueling a steady economic growth, accelerating technology transfer, and above all enhancing the competitive-

and Michel Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp. 42-89, and Kent, "China's Participation in International Organizations."
54. Lardy, *Integrating China into the Global Economy*, p. 2.
55. Joseph Fewsmith, "The Politics of China's Accession to the WTO," *Current History*, vol. 99, No. 638 (September 2000), p. 273.

ness and productivity of domestic enterprises. China's participation in the WTO is also seen not only as providing one of the most important channels to participation in economic globalization but also as allowing Beijing more space to exert its influence on the management of economic globalization. The drive for status, not as a hegemonic or revisionist power but as a responsible great power, seems made to order for mutual legitimation: The WTO needs China, China needs the WTO. The not-so-subtle subtext of China's status drive is clear enough: "The rise in a country's economic status will bring about a corresponding rise in its political status."[56] As revealed in Jiang Zemin's major speeches since 1997, the forces that most define China's national identity at the turn of the millennium are those associated with globalization.[57] This shows the extent to which China has shifted from ideological or nationalistic legitimation to performance-based legitimation. Such performance-based legitimation can be generated over the long term only through increased trade, foreign investment, and the more disciplined and rule-bound domestic economy that WTO membership is expected to bring about.

China's growing but still conditional multilateralism is made evident in the sensitive domain of arms control and disarmament. As Swaine and Johnston sharply argue, the Chinese perspective has shifted significantly over the years, especially in the 1990s, from a view of arms control as largely irrelevant to its concerns to a broader conception of security that recognizes that there are benefits to be derived from more active cooperative participation. Whereas Beijing had signed about 10 to 20 percent of all arms control agreements it was eligible to sign in 1970, by 1996 this figure had jumped to 85-90 percent. Much of this cooperative behavior had to do with China's determined status drive to be seen as a responsible great power.[58]

56. *Jingji ribao* (Economic Daily, Beijing), "The World Trade Organization Needs China, China Needs the World Trade Organization," in FBIS-CHI-2000-0121 (internet version via WNC).
57. For this line of reasoning, see Thomas Moore, "China's International Relations in Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension," in Kim, *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*, and George T. Crane, "Imagining the Economic Nation: Globalisation in China," *New Political Economy*, vol. 4, No. 2 (July, 1999), pp. 215-32.
58. Michael D. Swaine and Alastair Iain Johnston, "China and Arms Control



China is also rapidly becoming one of the most important if not yet completely unproblematic players in global environmental politics. Beijing plays an active role as a concerned but responsible environmental giant in the preparation and implementation of international environmental conventions. China has already ratified all relevant environmental conventions, including the Montreal Protocol, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. The ratification and implementation process itself seems to have worked its way clear to placing environmental issues on the national agenda.[59] Beijing often cites these facts to show that China is "a responsible big country" and acts as such in every issue area of global politics. China's incremental multilateralism is all the more remarkable when viewed against the backdrop of America's creeping unilateralism during the Clinton administration, turning into runaway unilateralism in the Bush administration.

China's human-rights diplomacy in the post-cold war and post-Tiananmen era has proved to be most confusing, turbulent, and significant, marked by a series of unprecedented events. Although the human-rights clock was set back after the Beijing massacre, China returned to global human-rights politics with a divide-and-conquer strategy, combining sovereignty-bound defense and resistance with selective but progressively expansive concessions. Conceptually and normatively, the year 1998, as the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, marked the most significant turning point in Beijing's acceptance of the universality of human rights with all of its accompanying legal accountability and obligations. This occurred despite the crackdown in December of that year to nip in the bud the emergence of an opposition party, the China Democratic Party.

The International Bill of Rights and the international human-rights regime have engendered various "second-image reversed" consequences that are already evident in the emergence of a

Institutions," in Economy and Oksenberg, *China Joins the World*, p. 101.
59. See *China Human Development Report 2002: Making Green Development a Choice*, produced by Stockholm Environment Institute in collaboration with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

human rights epistemic community, the publication of a flurry of white papers, the enactment of a series of criminal justice laws, and the incremental lessening of the scope of political repression. Participation in the human-rights regime linked China's international legal behavior and its legislative politics at home. The two keystone human rights covenants that Beijing signed in 1997 and 1998 would surely provide a legitimating platform from which China's emerging labor union and democratic movements may prod their government to carry out its new legal obligations. China's willingness to sign such covenants rather than walk away from the human-rights regime is an acknowledgment that human rights are a valid subject of international dialogue, as well as a sign of Beijing's willingness to respond to international concerns. In the Chinese case, there is further the normative-behavioral requirement of great power status: A great power abroad is and becomes what a great power does at home and abroad.[60]

Despite its "principled opposition" to a wide range of issues in the Security Council, China generally expressed its opposition in the form of "nonparticipation in the vote" in the early post-entry years and abstention in the 1990s. In thirty-one years of participation, from late 1971 to the end of 2001, China cast only 4 vetoes—or 23 vetoes if we include 19 vetoes on recommendations regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General (December 1971, December 1976, and October 1981)—compared to 12 by the Soviet Union/Russia, 14 by France, 25 by United Kingdom, and 73 by the United States. What is even more notable is that except on the Taiwan-related issues, Beijing would rather abstain than veto on problematic draft resolutions.

Given its long-standing assault on the veto as an expression of hegemonic behavior, China has tried hard, and successfully,

60. For detailed analyses, see Ann Kent, *China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Rosemary Foot, *Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Ming Wan, *Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); and Samuel S. Kim, "Human Rights in China's International Relations," in Barrett McCormack and Edward Friedman, eds., *What If China Does Not Democratize?* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 129-62.



not to allow itself to be cornered into having no choice but to cast its solo veto. Instead, abstention has become a kind of normative veto, an expression of "principled opposition" without standing in the way of the majority will. Thus, China is sometimes forced to affirm a resolution (as in the case of resolution 827 on the international war crimes tribunal in Bosnia) that violates its most cherished principle of the inviolability of state sovereignty with nothing more than the habit-driven ritualistic pronouncement of a "principled position."[61] The most obvious explanation for such behavior is the desire to retain maximum leverage as part of its indeterminate strategy of becoming all things to all nations on the many issues intruding upon the Security Council agenda. To abstain is to apply the Chinese code of conduct of being firm in principle but flexible in application, or to find a face-saving exit with a voice in those cases that pit China's conflicting realpolitik interests against idealpolitik normative concerns for China's international reputation. In short, the pattern that emerges with respect to China's voting behavior in the Council, particularly regarding abstentions on Chapter VII enforcement resolutions, is neither positive engagement nor destructive obstruction but one of pursuing the maxi-mini strategy in a situation-specific and self-serving way.

That said, however, the pattern of conditional multilateralism is mirrored by Beijing's rising involvement in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs), particularly since the end of the cold war.[62] Recent Chinese writings and Chinese multilateral diplomacy show a greater willingness to evaluate UNPKOs according to their contributions to the "conditions of peace and stability." With a lesson from Kosovo (where China got badly burned) fresh in Chinese minds, Beijing opted for a more flexible conflict management approach in East Timor, where China for the first time contributed its civilian police in a UN peacekeeping and peacemaking role. One indicator of Beijing's incremental and conditional multilateralism with respect to UNPKOs has been

61. Nigel Thalakada, "China's Voting Pattern in the Security Council, 1990-1995," in Bruce Russett, ed., *The Once and Future Security Council* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 94-95.

62. See Kim, "China and the United Nations," and Bates Gill and James Reilly, "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing," *Survival*, vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 41-59.

the establishment and expansion in China of training programs for peacekeepers—the Office of Peacekeeping in China, located under the PLA's General Staff Headquarters. Another indicator of Beijing's greater commitment to UNPKOs is that in May 1997 China decided in principle to take part in the UN's standby arrangements for UNPKOs. In January 2002 China actually joined the Class-A standby arrangements system.

China's active participation in two of the major UNPKOs—Cambodia and East Timor—suggests a range of situation-specific factors at work: geographical proximity, initial involvement with the authorization process in the Security Council, and host-nation consent (one of the two conditions for the first generation of UNPKOs). As long as these conditions are present, along with the absence of the Taiwan-related factor, Beijing's slow yet steady support for UNPKOs is likely to continue unabated in coming years.[63]

As if to showcase Beijing's growing interest and willingness in expanding its influence globally, China announced on February 10, 2003 that it will send 218 "peacekeepers"—175 engineers and forty-three medical personnel—from the PLA to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in support of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (MONUC), thus more than doubling the number of its peacekeepers from its previous total of 137 to 355.[64] Apparently a victory of sorts for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and more progressive elements in the PLA, Beijing is demonstrating its desire and willingness to boost its international role and reputation as a responsible great power at a time when the United States is challenging the world organization to demonstrate its "relevance" by legitimizing America's preemptive war against Iraq.

## Future Prospects

One lesson of the sudden demise of the cold war is, as Robert Jervis and others have observed, that if past generalizations are no longer valid, they cannot provide a sure guide for

63. Ibid.
64. *Renmin ribao,* February 11, 2003.



the future. To a significant degree, the flow of world politics has become contingent or path-dependent, since unexpected events can easily force world politics along quite unexpected trajectories.[65] The historically derived correlation between a global system transition and hegemonic war—that accommodating a rising power into the established international order has proved disruptive and war-prone—may not apply in the Chinese case, not only because of the many differences between a rising China and a rising Bismarck Germany or imperial Japan, but also because world history may well be path-dependent, moving in a different normative product cycle in the post-cold war era.

If anything, the past quarter-century has seen a double failure in prediction. While no pundit or international relations theorist predicted such momentous events as the end of the cold war, German reunification, or the collapse of the Soviet Union, many predictions on the rise of Soviet primacy in strategic rivalry, the rise of Japan as a superpower, and the hegemonic decline of America have fallen by the wayside. The lesson of all of this is that we should shy away from committing the fallacy of premature extrapolation, conflating China's actual power with its potential power and overestimating China's national power. Doing so may well create a self-fulfilling prophecy of costly and unnecessarily intense rivalry.[66]

China's growing integration into the global community, coupled with the globalization-cum-transparency revolution of our times, is having paradoxical effects of at once confirming and constraining Chinese sovereignty. There is no denying that the confluence of domestic and external forces has made it necessary for China's post-Mao leadership to accelerate its reform and opening to the outside world in order better to protect its state sovereignty, modernize its economy, enhance its international reputation, and increase its comprehensive national strength. As a result, Chinese sovereignty and power are more secure and more confirmed in the global community today than ever before. All the same, post-Mao opening has allowed the forces of globalization to enter and perforate the once formidable castle of Chi-

65. Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" *International Security*, vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter, 1991-92), pp. 42-45.
66. Goldstein, "Great Expectations," p. 73.

nese state sovereignty to such an extent as to shackle and constrain it with all kinds of sovereignty-diluting global norms and rules. Thanks in part to globalization, the Chinese "totalitarian" party-state is no longer the almighty Leviathan of yore.

China's emerging role in world affairs-its future capabilities, intentions, and foreign-policy behavior-remains the major source of uncertainty in a turbulent post-cold war world that is becoming increasingly integrated and fragmented. China is a major regional power-an incomplete great global power-with myriad world-class domestic problems. In the coming years, the way Beijing manages its economic reforms, especially the state-owned enterprises, rising unemployment and social unrest, rampant corruption, widening inequality, and ethnonational pressures from below and within may be decisive factors that will shape China's future as a complete great power. A weak and fragmenting China would be the worst of all possible scenarios, a disaster not only for China but also for peace and stability in the region and beyond.

## References

Baldwin, David. "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics*, vol. 31, No. 2 (January, 1979), pp. 161-94.

Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Monro. *The Coming Conflict with China*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997.

Brown, Michael E. et al., eds. *The Rise of China*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000.

Chang, Gordon G. *The Coming Collapse of China*. New York: Random House, 2001.

*China Human Development Report 2002: Making Green Development a Choice*. New York: Stockholm Environment Institute in collaboration with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) China, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Christensen, Thomas. "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," *International Security*, vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring, 2001), pp. 5-40.

China Institute for Contemporary International Relations. *Zonghe guojia liliang pinggu* (Estimation of Comprehensive National Strength). Beijing: CICIR, 2000.

Deng, Yong. "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 116, No. 3 (Fall, 2001), pp. 343-65.

Economy, Elizabeth and Michel Oksenberg, eds. *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.

Finkelstein, David. "Chinese Perceptions of the Costs of a Conflict," in Andrew Scobell ed., *The Costs of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future War*. Carlisle, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 9-27.

Foot, Rosemary. *Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Gill, Bates and James Reilly. "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing," *Survival*, vol. 42, No. 2 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 41-59.

Goldstein, Avery. "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," *International Security*, vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter, 1997/98), pp. 36-73.

________. "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," *The China Quarterly*, No. 168 (September 2001), pp. 835-64.

Harris, Stuart and Gary Klintworth, eds. *China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Huang, Shuofeng, *Guojia shengshuai lun* (On the Rise and Fall of Nations). Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996.

Hughes, Christopher. "Globalisation and Nationalism: Squaring the Circle in Chinese International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 26, No. 1 (1997), pp. 103-24.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 2002-2003*. London: IISS, 2002.

Jervis, Robert. "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" *International Security*, vol. 16, No. 3 (1991-92), pp. 39-73.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Engaging Myths: Misconceptions about China and Its Global Role," *Harvard Asia Pacific Review* (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 9-12.

_______. "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data," *The China Quarterly*, No. 153 (March 1998), pp. 1-30.

Johnston, Alastair Iain and Robert S. Ross, eds. *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*. London and New York: Routledge, 1999.

Kim, Samuel S. *China In and Out of the Changing World Order*. Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1991.

_______. "China as a Great Power," *Current History*, vol. 96, No. 611 (September, 1997), pp. 246-51.

_______, ed. *East Asia and Globalization*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

_______, ed. *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003 (forthcoming).

Lardy, Nicholas R. *Integrating China into the Global Economy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.

Lu Yi et al., eds. *Qiuji: Yige shijiexing de xuangze* (Global Citizenship: A Worldwide Choice). Shanghai: Baijia chubanshe, 1989.

Pang Zhongying, ed. *Quanqiuhua, fanquanqiuhua yu Zhongguo: Lijie quanqiuhua de fuzaxing yu duoyangxing* (Globalization, Anti-Globalization and China: Understanding the Complexity and Diversity of Globalization). Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2002.

Pillsbury, Michael. *China Debates the Future International Environment*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000.

Pumphrey, Carolyn W., ed. *The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications*. Carlisle, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

Segal, Gerald. "Does China Matter?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, No. 5 (September-October, 1999), pp. 24-36.

Swaine, Michael D. and Alastair Iain Johnston. "China and Arms Control Institutions," in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999, pp. 90-135.

Swaine, Michael D. and Ashley J. Tellis. *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2000.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Stockholm: SIPRI, 2002.

United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report 2002*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Wang, Songfen, ed. *Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu* (Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive National Power of the World's Major Nations). Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996.

Wang, Yizhou. *Dangdai guoji zhengzhi xilun* (Analysis of Contemporary International Politics). Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1995.

_______. ed. *Quanqiuhua shidai de guoji anquan* (International Security in an Era of Globalization). Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1998.

World Bank. *World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development*. New York: Oxford University Press.

_______. *China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1997.

_______. *World Development Report 2003*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Zhang, Youngjin and Greg Austin, eds. *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001.